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UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX  
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY IN MARITIME LEGAL STUDIES 
THE PROBLEMS OF CONTAINERISATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 
SUMMARY 
This thesis questions how the recent development of containerisation has affected 
the liability of the carriers involved and whether we need new law to solve relevant 
problems that have occurred as a consequence. In my research, I will address questions 
such as whether law should be proactive towards technological advances and how 
commercial practice influences the current legal regimes dealing with this undertaking. 
Moreover, the problems of containerisation are analysed in practice and in law, the latter, 
which is often too slow for the developments in modern shipping. I will question the 
relationship of custom and law in relation to containerisation which both have an impact on 
maritime practice.  
 The work sets out to analyse some of the main practical and legal problems in 
relation to the transit of the cargo by containers and the different dimensions this 
undertaking can take. Many different ways have been used to improve international trade 
meanwhile new shipbuilding is thriving nowadays. The new era of containerisation has 
begun and many issues have been raised about the way shipping agreements are concluded 
and how consignors and consignees are to fulfil shipping contracts.  
Exploring further this undertaking, the author would like to demonstrate the 
differences, both legislative and practical, in the procedures used by various states. 
Attention is drawn to the industry practices, such as sealing containers and deck cargo, 
which would be of particular use to those who are interested in the “what happens next” 
stage in the revolution of maritime trade and in particular, multimodal transport. 
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A.) INTRODUCTION 
The recent development of containerisation has affected the liability of the carriers 
and the most important issue arising on this undertaking is whether we need new law. 
Moreover, specific matters in practice and law are demonstrated within the context of the 
thesis below which are various and of major significance in modern shipping trade. 
Initially, the new era of containerisation has begun and important issues have been 
raised about the way shipping agreements are concluded and how consignors and 
consignees are to fulfil shipping contracts. Containerisation brought a revolution in trade 
and therefore, it is widely implemented by the shipping industry, as shown further below 
(Chapter I). This revolution affected society and economy, bringing serious changes in 
maritime trade. Also, issues, such as the legal and practical terms, which conquer container 
transport and container law, are analysed, since we need a stable legal term for this 
undertaking. These are important to be solved, in order to avoid confusion and further 
debate upon the major problems. Certain organisations are working upon the specific 
relevant problems and influence the undertaking of containerisation in maritime trade. 
In Chapter I, the author felt right to act circumspection upon certain matters of 
technology, which are related to containerisation. This is important, in order for the reader 
to understand specific terms that may be encountered within the context of each chapter and 
in particular maritime legal cases. The evolution of technology in containerisation will 
bring advances in a global level in the future and this will be for the benefit of maritime 
trade. 
Moreover, the significant matter of package limitation is analysed within the present 
thesis (Chapter II) and in particular as to who is liable for the loss of or damage to the cargo 
and how the liability of the carriers will be calculated within containerisation. 
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The technology and shipping today have been evolved via containerisation but 
unfortunately legislation is still inadequate to govern this undertaking. Here, certain legal 
regimes play their role, such as the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Therefore, the Hague 
and the Hague-Visby Rules are analysed in Chapter II in relation to the package limitation. 
A very important matter that arises at this point, while calculating the liability according to 
the package limitation that our current legislation of COGSA is enacting, is whether the 
container is a package or not. This is certainly serious to be defined in the legal maritime 
world which unfortunately, still till today has not taken place.  
However, as demonstrated further (Chapter II), according to COGSA 1971, a new 
paragraph is coming forth to define what constitutes package. The author found appropriate 
at this chapter that certain approaches and case-studies are analysed to show the muddle 
upon the issue whether the container is a package or not, leading to the “metal package” 
approach, a term which might solve the relevant issue of what constitutes package in the 
future. Finally, in Chapter II, it is demonstrated why Containerisation and the evolution of 
the new technology in container-ships have affected the regimes governing maritime 
transport directly or indirectly for the limitation of the liability of the carriers. This is of 
major importance, since we might achieve to draft the new uniform container law 
especially for containerisation. 
Furthermore, it is significant to discuss the matter upon containerisation in law and 
practice of liability and undeclared deck cargo or undeclared dangerous deck cargo, as 
demonstrated below (Chapter III).  It is debated whether the courts should be strict towards 
undeclared deck cargo, when containers are carried on the deck of container-ships. This is 
an issue of major importance to be settled under a future legal regime, because it affects the 
liability or non-liability of the carrier for any loss or damage.  
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For the key issue of the undeclared dangerous deck cargo, a significant maritime 
legal case is discussed in chapter III. This is significant, because carrying dangerous goods 
and explosive substances on board without proper care can end up in severe health injuries 
of the crew and loss or damage of the cargo. Therefore, it is of major gravity that new 
container law is implemented to avoid accidents as such, shown in this Chapter.  
Also, attention is drawn to the industry practices, and particularly, the relationship 
of custom and law in containerisation is discussed, both which have a high impact on 
maritime practice. Obviously, at this chapter (III), the major research question takes place 
whether we need new law to govern container issues, since custom may act by itself in 
certain circumstances. Furthermore, the shipping industry has their own methods of 
packing and unpacking goods within the containers, and on sealing the latter. Still, several 
issues, such as unsuitable containers, temperature within the containers, defective and 
sensitive goods within the containers and delay in delivery, remain the most casual 
problems within the undertaking of containerisation. These issues are analysed in Chapter 
III and they are important in the calculation of liability of the consignor and the consignee, 
because simply “if you acquire special treatment, you need to say so early in advance”. The 
point is not only to have a suitable container but to know how to use it and to know the 
requirements of your cargo. 
Additionally, the implication of containerisation on INCOTERMS is important to 
be explored, since problems have been encountered, because the traditional FOB point has 
become totally inappropriate for the procedure of containerisation. The issue of bailment in 
container carriage is also demonstrated, since the notion of bailment is relevant to container 
carriage, as analysed below (Chapter III) followed by examples.  
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At this point, it is significant to comment on the “Himalaya” clause, which rules 
containerisation and especially, the relevant “multimodal transport,” as shown below 
(Chapter IV). This issue is important, because it regulates the limits of liability of the 
carrier for the conduct of the servant or agent and third parties as discussed in Chapter III. 
The main purpose to the undertaking of containerisation, which leads to multimodal 
transport, as shown later (Chapter IV) is to achieve legal uniformity and have uniform laws 
throughout the world so that no matter where a suit is brought, the outcome will be the 
same. Therefore, we need new law, since the international convention framework in 
maritime law is not as uniform as it may seem to be. The creation of such a multimodal 
legal regime is debated in Chapter IV. Lack of uniformity may occur when a convention 
contains optional provisions, which allow the contracting States to provide otherwise in 
their respective national laws governing certain areas.  
In this chapter (IV), the relevant multimodal liability systems in practice and law are 
discussed and an analysis is made of the kinds of transport arose with the advent of 
containerisation. The era of containerisation brought the era of multimodalism, a term 
which may govern in the future. Finally, the variety of terms and conditions of carriage are 
demonstrated (Chapter IV) on the way of creating the multimodal liability system and what 
we need is to be decided further ahead. 
In conclusion, there are developments in container transport and there are two 
revolutions in the modern maritime trade; containerisation and computerisation. The issue 
of computerisation, which involves electronic commerce is interesting, but has been 
excluded from the current thesis, since it is adequate enough to create another thesis. After 
a thorough analysis within the current thesis, one can see that specific areas in law cannot 
be symbiotic with containerisation and that the latter has limits.  
 17 
No international multimodal convention is in force for Containerisation and 
certainly we should be specific on what we actually need. It should be taken into account 
what the parties agreed to and as evidenced in the bill of lading.  
On creating the future multimodal legal regime, the “pyramid method” might be a 
way to success, as further demonstrated in Conclusion. Consequently, amending the 
regimes that presently govern the carriage of goods is worthwhile, if international 
uniformity is achieved, with a benefit to all involved in the carriage of goods by sea and 
land. An appropriate legal instrument would be the one that embraces multimodal transport 
through all and any combined modes. Such scope is suitable to a project of uniformity in 
the international legislation on multimodal transportation. 
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B.) THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS    
This project should be useful to people in the marine industry. To provide clarity, 
the author has adopted a helpful, practical method of analysis, using relevant academic 
material and results of in depth interviews. Meanwhile examples and case-law are 
implemented where necessary. 
The facts of case law are used in explaining the practical investigations, which are 
significant to establish liability under the different rules. Furthermore, this thesis has 
concentrated on the problems of containerisation in law and practice, and specifically on 
the definition of what is a “package,” thereby launching the “metal package” approach, and 
also terminology problems, which are encountered in practice throughout the spread of the 
documents. 
It also refers to complex legal problems, such as identifying the set of rules 
applicable to the claim in concealed damage, stowage matters and creation of the ideal 
liability system in multimodalism. This reflected a perception, supported by others, that the 
growth in container traffic and the availability of capacity to deal with the ships employed 
on deep-sea trades are important catalysts for decisions by port operators about 
developments at UK container ports. 
The question of cargo liability regimes for maritime transport is by its very nature 
an international issue, which is why any new standard in the area should entail substantive 
consultations with all industry representatives, as also the ICC suggests
3
. 
This thesis makes use of figures and photos, wherever applicable in order to show 
the revolution of technology in containerisation and compares the relevant legal regimes 
                                                 
3
 “Synopsis of the Responses of National Associations, Consultative Members and 
Observers to the Consultation Paper and Other Comments on the Draft Outline 
Instrument”, part II - the work of the CMI, CMI Yearbook 2001, pp. 384-530, at p. 386. 
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that apply in each mode. Furthermore the labour implications in this evolution, though, are 
covered very briefly. 
The author also takes into account academic material and law reports to support her 
argument. Sometimes, cases are analysed where appropriate and if needed case study is 
invented. This method is appropriate for this subject because it both expands legal 
knowledge and enables the practical application of this newfound knowledge. 
 The journals that specialise in the kind of research in which the author has 
researched are mainly maritime ones, like the “Containerisation International,” the “Lloyd’s 
Shipping Economist,” the “Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly” and 
periodicals such as “Ships.” The bodies of research to which she wishes to add are IMO, 
IMCO, UNCITRAL and UNCTAD. 
The experts in the field of research are maritime lawyers, ship-owners, shipbrokers, 
shipping agencies, freight forwarders, transportation companies and shipping lines. The 
Harvard System is used to cite authors of textbooks, journals and periodicals, although 
sometimes footnoting system is implemented for opinions and/or additional information. 
Case-law is cited in full each time in the same text, but only once for the same case.  
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Chapter I 
DEFINING CONTAINERISATION… 
 21 
A.) INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of containerisation, important issues have been raised about the 
way shipping agreements are concluded. Containerisation brought a revolution in shipping. 
This revolution affected society and economy. Therefore, it is essential to define it and 
analyse further why it has conquered maritime trade. There are specific institutions that 
influence the performance of maritime trade globally and it is worth mentioning a couple of 
them within the current chapter. 
Furthermore, certain matters of technology are to be discussed, related to 
containerisation. The evolution of technology in containerisation will bring advances at a 
global level in the future and this will be for the benefit of maritime trade. Containerisation 
has expanded so widely and universally that it is worth examining why it has been adopted 
so widely. For several reasons, I believe it is necessary to analyse the benefits trade gains 
from this undertaking.  
Additionally, the amount of money involved in containerisation is huge. The fully 
cellular vessels and the containers as well as the handling equipment acquired are 
expensive. The cellular containership is a ship which is dedicated to the carriage of 
shipping containers: it is fitted with cell guides, uprights which provide a framework 
designed to accommodate standard size containers in such a way that the containers do not 
move in any direction (Brodie 1996, pp. 26-27). Moreover, it is important to demonstrate 
(sub-chapter C) the interaction among containerisation, economy and society, since the 
process of containerisation and its effect on the economy is closely linked.  
Finally, a journey in time is also essential to show how containerisation has evolved 
in global shipping and what is bound to take place in the future. 
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B.) WHY CONTAINERISATION? 
 The undertaking of containerisation saves time loading commodities on to the 
vessel (Herman 1983, p. 132) and it minimises the stevedoring costs, since one single crane 
loads and discharges the large ‘container’ units. The containers themselves can be filled to 
capacity and with items of various types, shapes and sizes (Herman 1983, p. 133). 
Moreover, a significant amount of time is gained for the transit of this cargo, since fewer 
voyages are made and less labour is needed, because of the evolution of RO-ROs (Roll 
on/Roll off vehicles) while the turnaround times in ports are measured in minutes not in 
days (French S. /Rabey T. 2003, p. 1)
4
.  
 When containerisation takes place, the goods are put into the containers by the 
shippers and instead of manually stowing hundreds of different parcels; the carriers 
mechanically place the containers on specially designed ships. With containerisation, 
numerous items are consolidated into one standard size unit which can be handled faster, 
stowed better, and moved more efficiently with the proper utilisation of container vessels, 
while risks of pilferage and damage are minimised, as Armstrong
5
 also adds.    
Moreover, by containerisation the container vessels save expensive time in ports 
waiting for all the different commodities to be placed in order on the vessel (Herman 1983, 
p. 135). According to Herman (1983, p. 135), actually, ship time in ports with 
containerships is reduced to twenty-five per cent a year compared to sixty per cent a year 
spent in ports by break-bulk, conventional ships.  
                                                 
4
 See FRENCH S. /RABEY T. (2003) 
“Containerships for the 21st Century”;  
http://members.ozemail.com.au/~trabey/cship.html, (27 July 2004, at 19:00). 
5
 See ARMSTRONG T (July 1981) “Packaging Trends and Implications in the Container 
Revolution” 12(4), Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce, pp. 427-465, at p. 427. 
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Break-bulk relates to dry cargo lifted on and off ships one piece or bundle at a time 
by means of cranes and derricks but not shipped on trailers or in shipping containers. Such 
goods may be described as break-bulk cargo; the ships which carry them are sometimes 
referred to as break-bulk ships (Brodie 1996, p. 13). The term “break-bulk” is often used to 
denote the opposite of containerised. 
It has been suggested that, because the procedure is so quick, the captain of the ship 
does not have the time needed to check the containers that are loaded aboard. This is a 
suggestion that the author of this investigation does not agree with, because if something 
goes wrong within this procedure, then it is very likely that the captain is to blame. 
Therefore, time should be provided for the appropriate checking and the captain should be 
entitled to the necessary time to check the containers. Although combined container-
breakbulk carriers, which can carry up to four hundred to five hundred (400-500) containers 
are in existence, they are not very common.  
Moreover, the construction of special container terminals and assembly depots are 
needed for the procedure of containerisation
6
. The latter is one of the most important kinds 
of trade nowadays, but often its launch can create many problems in practice
7
. 
Containerisation came, technological advances took place, and certain states, including the 
USA, have made efforts for global unification, in contrast with other states, such as Japan. 
And, this is one more issue that must be discussed; the fact that some states resist 
unification efforts at a global level. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 See photo 4 in chapter 1; the port of Miami. 
7
 See chapter 2. 
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C.) THE EFFECT OF THE REVOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
 Containerisation has started a revolution in international trade. Issues raised by this 
revolution will be developed. How does this revolution manifest itself? Initially, in the 
manufacture of new types of ships; a single container-ship is faster than liners; the first sails 
at a speed over twenty five knots while liners at a speed of fifteen knots and containers can 
carry up to five times the amount of cargo that a conventional break bulk ship does 
(Herman 1983, p. 132). Refrigerated containers permit the carriage of perishable goods on 
the same vessel as non-perishable goods. This reduces the need for specialised non-bulk 
carriers, such as refrigerated vessels. 
 The modern faster ships are keeping pace with the current demands of international 
commerce and they are more efficient since they can deliver essential cargo within hours of 
when they are needed; rather than days or weeks. According to Giles’ term, “like a moving 
warehouse” (Giles 1997), these new ships will possibly change society and life in the 
future. If, for example, a metal box of medicines has to be delivered by sea to a state in one 
of the Less Developed Countries (LDCs), this box should definitely be shipped in one of 
the modern, fast ships
8
.  
  
 
 
                                                 
8
 See GILES (October 1997) “Faster Ships for the Future”, Scientific American,  
http://www.sciamdigital.com/browse.cfm?sequencenameCHAR=item2&methodnameCHAR
=resource_getitembrowse&interfacenameCHAR=browse.cfm&ISSUEID_CHAR=55FFD5
23-BFC2-4006-87AB-B49A4B9B4A1&ARTICLEID_CHAR=521885C7-E82A-4885-B899-
09929B75E5B&sc=I100322 (06/12/2004, at 11:30); KOEHLE H. (1985) All About a 
Container-Ship, West Germany, Hamburg, Schiffahrts -Druckerei Schroedter & Tauer 
Gmbh, Co. Kg, 1.  
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Moreover, if we are to speak in terms of the revolution, Institutional advances can 
be recognised in the evolution of transhipment arrangements and rules of payment. This 
revolution has affected both economics and society, since the process of modernisation 
demands various schemes, which have serious financial implications. Extending this 
thought, it is worth analysing the link between container transport and the economy, 
initially, and then containerisation and society.  
This multiple interaction is demonstrated in the following diagram (1): 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
(Diagram 1) 
- Containerisation affects the economy and the economy affects Containerisation. 
- Containerisation affects society and society affects Containerisation. 
- The economy affects society and society affects the economy. 
- The economy affected by Containerisation affects society and  
society affected by Containerisation affects the economy. 
The economic revolution can be seen both in the way goods are handled and 
generally in the whole transportation of the cargo.  
Containerisation 
Economy Society 
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Further effects/influences on the economy can also be seen in the implementation of 
new projects in transportation management. People in the shipping industry are looking for 
ways of transporting the containers to ports, and then onboard that would not demand 
enormous sums of money. 
Society is getting involved in the financial expenditure of this undertaking and any 
failure can harm an economy. A vivid example is the economy of Nigeria. Under certain 
recent guidelines, in order for a company to be eligible for status as a ‘national’ carrier and 
thereby, benefit from the cargo reservation provisions of shipping policy law, Nigerians are 
only required to own a minimum of sixty per cent equity interest in that company. 
This makes joint venture arrangements between Nigerians and foreign investors 
possible, and this is actively encouraged by the National Maritime Authority (NMA), 
which was established by the National Shipping Policy Decree No. 10 of 1987 as the 
regulatory and implementing agency of the government’s policy on shipping (Agbor 2000, 
p. 1)
9
.  
Moreover, the Ministry of Transport of Nigeria has also recently let it be known that 
one of its major shipping lines, the National Unity Line is looking to interest foreign 
investors in the company. The NMA runs the Ship Acquisition and Ship Building Fund, 
which has so far disbursed a total of $87.9m to a few Nigerian shipping companies. 
However, the latter was suspended in 1996 when beneficiaries were unable to repay the 
loans on schedule.  
                                                 
9
 AGBOR F. (February 2000) “Wearing Shades in Nigeria, Nigeria”, 10, Maritime 
Advocate, as in  
http://www.maritimeadvocate.com/maritim1/maritim1/maritim1/i10_nige.htm (21/10/2004, 
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The consensus has been that the fund may not have been properly managed and 
should be revived with the appropriate professional expertise obtained to manage the fund 
efficiently. Accordingly, containerisation cannot be properly operated without an adequate, 
financial system launched by the competent authority. 
In conclusion, the process of containerisation and its effect on the economy is 
closely linked with the way each political nexus of the state manipulates the economy. 
Political institutions play a major role in this undertaking and an adequate economy or a 
damaged one are the result of their efficient or inefficient strategies, as Notteboom (June 
2004, p. 1) also notes
10
. 
Furthermore, the effect of world containerisation in global economy can also be 
distinguished by the constant elimination of trade barriers and the liberalisation of markets. 
The financial sector has been affected since pressure on cost control may be created by the 
intensified competition at the supply side. The revolution in the supply chains and the new 
logistic models urge the container ports to revise their function in the logistic process and 
consequently this affects the finances of such ports.  
 Moreover, shipping itself is a capital-intensive industry where some material goods 
are owned and others are leased, which results in a variety of cost bases (Notteboom 2004, 
p. 3). The economy can be affected by this revolution in a positive way when, for instance, 
freight rates are pulled down with existing slot overcapacity, or in a negative way when 
there is instability in the shipping industry.  
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Additionally, one of the most significant factors of this revolution that signals a new 
era in economy is the large containership. Huge, more fuel-economic vessels result in the 
reduction of the costs by having a lower cost per TEU-mile than smaller units with the 
same load factor.  
 On the other hand, in order to build these ships, capital investment is necessary and 
this will be most crucial when a post-Panamax ship will need to be constructed. A post-
Panamax ship cannot pass through the current Panama Canal since the critical maximum 
dimensions, based on the capacity of existing lock systems on the Canal are 32.31 m wide, 
294.13 m length overall (LOA) and a draft of 12.04 m. Consequently, this will seriously 
affect its financial life since its current dimensions will not accommodate the new, larger 
ships. Therefore, the Canal must be rebuilt or otherwise upgraded, in order to maintain its 
economic importance and to serve the needs of containerisation -not just in the future, but 
now. Post-Panamax vessels have been developed and constructed, and are already in 
operation
11
. In order to emphasise this aspect, it should be mentioned that expansion 
programmes are on the drawing boards on the Baja Peninsula and at the Panama Canal. 
Such changes should be implemented with great care, however, and must take into 
consideration every social and financial aspect of the Canal
12
.  
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Similar construction projects are also taking place in Alaska, Canada and along the 
West Coast. In particular, the seaport of Anchorage, Alaska, is spending US$350 million to 
more than double its berthing spaces, and it plans to boost its cargo business from five 
hundred thousands containers in 2004 to one million within two or three years; hence the 
use of ice-strengthened container vessels
13
. Even though the revolution is only just getting 
under way with these giant ships and the international logistics revolution, a change has 
already occurred in Europe. The financial status of Rotterdam has altered since the latter 
decided to clear the deck to berth these mega-vessels in the Maasvlakte II. Meanwhile, the 
port of Algeciras can already receive mega-vessels
14
. 
In addition, land bridges have been used since the advent of containerisation. 
According to a successful definition by Herman (1983, p. 150) “a land bridge is an 
overland portion of a voyage which connects two sea legs”. Although land bridges have 
been used since 1975, they are a revolutionary method for containerisation itself and an 
advantage, since they shorten sea voyages. Utilising land bridges means higher speed, 
saving of time and cost, since the containers can be moved very easily. The Siberian land 
bridge, for instance, shortens the voyage between Europe and the Far East by up to fifteen 
days compared to an all-water voyage via the Suez Canal
15
 while the Trans-Siberian Land 
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Bridge which also links cargoes moving between the Far East and Europe cuts the transit 
time by up to seven days compared to voyages via the Panama Canal. Moreover, issues 
related to its expenditure are also controlled. A voyage, for example, between Japan and 
Europe via the Siberian land bridge is twenty per cent cheaper than by ocean voyage. 
Despite the fact that goods are transported in containers, trains and trucks, for 
instance, this can also be done by using Freightliner. However, when road transport is 
involved, the operation is more expensive, since the transport of each container needs one 
truck in combination with one driver. Therefore, extra cost is incurred for this task. 
Another version of a land bridge is the mini-bridge, which includes only one sea 
leg. By virtue of this, the overland portion is either the first part of the voyage or the second 
and last. In the case of the Trans-Siberian Land Bridge, for example, mini-bridges are 
operated by the Trans-Siberian Container Service (the transit container service which 
provides container handling facilities) for cargoes moving between Europe and the West 
Coast and between the Far East and the East Coast. What is the financial cost of building 
them though? Is any environmental damage considered when they are built? Moreover, it is 
not only canals, lands and seas that are involved in this revolution, but also lakes.  
It is worth adding that the Constantza water basin terminal development, although 
still small in terms of throughput, was estimated to handle around three hundred thousand 
TEUs in 2004. It is the Black Sea’s largest container terminal and has the potential to 
become an important multi-modal transportation hub for the economic region
16
. 
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Revolutionary advances are taking place at Constanza, existing container terminal facilities 
are being replaced and new marketing strategies are evolving to attract new container lines. 
What is interesting about this port though, and has legal implications, is the fact that 
it is developing Free Trade Zone Activities. In order to function legally, bilateral 
agreements have been made, particularly with Russia, Central Asia and Tran-Caucasus, 
while co-operation agreements have been concluded with the Ports of Poti and Batumi in 
Georgia to start RO-RO and regular container services. 
  Furthermore, in October 2003, a New Container Terminal was constructed on the 
southern part of Pier II South, port of Constantza, which can accommodate Post-Panamax 
Container Vessels, which will handle 1.000.000 TEUs when it reaches its final stage
17
. It is 
worth mentioning that this is taking place in an era where in contrast, some ports physically 
restrict these vessels. 
According to Mori
18
, the size of vessels in some ports is physically restricted, 
especially in river-based ports in China. At this point, a new issue comes to light, since it is 
worth considering how we can harmonise the permission (the “green light”) with the 
restriction (the “red light”). Efficiencies gained by larger vessels are cancelled in restrictive 
areas. A fair solution is the use of feeder ships.  
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Feeder-ring has taken different dimensions and it is developing, according to 
Georgiakis
19
. Feeder-ships provide a flexible way of transferring goods and certain 
individual requirements can be met. New feeder operators are entering in the regional 
networks of the Mediterranean Sea and Aegean; but, it is an issue whether it really provides 
a solution.  
If we could imagine a Post-Panamax container vessel launching from the port of 
Constantza to reach its final destination in the ports of China, we should take into account 
not only the expenses for the particular ship’s operation but also the cost of fuel 
consumption of the feeder ships. Furthermore, the legal cost of having multiple documents 
as against one MT Document, which covers the entire journey, should be carefully 
considered. 
However, if we accept the words of the Director of Med Feeder Italia, Jol F. (1998, 
p. 79, quoted by Georgiakis above), it should be realised that feedering is not as flexible as 
it seems. For example, restrictions take place in certain ports, like the need for an Italian 
flag vessel between Sicily and Italy, changes in consortia and hub terminals, which can 
create problems. Therefore, a company must provide a variety of vessels. By applying Jol’s 
initial query on how larger main line vessels affect the balance of feeder services, and then 
starting from a “lake legal framework” (law of inland navigation), going on to a maritime 
legal framework (the Hague-Visby Rules perhaps) and then to a “river legal framework” 
(law of inland navigation), gives some indication of the many issues to be resolved.  
Shippers escape from this restriction somehow by assigning cargo to more than one 
line or consortium, so they do not necessarily have to send more cargo using only the Post-
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Panamax vessels, unless freight rates decrease. Furthermore, ports may not be doing 
enough to handle large containerships. Perhaps, there should be discrimination against 
those ships themselves when deciding on the law concerning multimodal transport 
documents. Thus, an issue now arising is whether a Post-Panamax container vessel should 
follow the same legal regime as a feeder one. 
How do huge containerships affect the economy? It should be explained that in 
order to increase market share, the carriers created significant overcapacity, resulting in 
price competition and, in so doing they depress the freight rates. Therefore, the market in its 
attempt to escape this pressure, pursues economies of scale and generally orders more 
vessels with even greater capacity; hence the manufacture of the Post-Panamax vessels
20
. 
Going even further when discussing the financial change, it should be mentioned 
that these giant containerships can be utilised profitably only if they are full. Yet, what 
happens when carriers cannot fill them on a regular and stable basis that would add to their 
revenues? Economies are obviously negatively affected under these circumstances. 
Definitely, it is not in the best interests of the financial sector for incomes to grow 
occasionally and sometimes to gain nothing. Obviously, the global economy should be 
stabilised and it is a matter for discussion how this can be achieved and what solutions 
society could render. On replying to this question, it is interesting to look at the attitude of 
the Select Committee
21
 when discussing the contribution of ports to the British economy. 
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Containerisation urges improvement in ports and this should in the long run lead to 
additional economic and environmental benefits. It is logical that an effective port will 
provide economic gain. 
Although the Modern Ports Policy document states that “it is not the Government’s 
job to run the ports industry,” the Select Committee argues that there are significant factors 
to be addressed on how the ports can be operated in the public (regional and national) 
interest, with strategic and planned investment and development. The most recent 
UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport
22
 points out that pressure is being exerted to 
reduce port costs and to provide adequate services for the new giant container-vessels. 
These factors are accelerating the development of transhipment hubs and feeder ports -all 
of which require substantial investment in infrastructure and highly efficient intermodal 
connections. 
Moreover, the European Union has recognised its responsibility with regard to the 
revolution of the new technology which containerisation launches and is actively promoting 
several trans-European networks. According to a recent survey
23
, twenty-six trans-European 
transport networks have been identified for an indicative total cost of eighty two thousand 
million euros and an additional thirteen thousand million euros should be invested in energy 
distribution networks. 
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Therefore, it is definitely society’s role and particularly the role of the government 
to render any financial aid to this undertaking. A port that would not keep up with the pace 
of change elsewhere in Europe, particularly at a time of increased globalisation and 
consolidation within maritime markets is obviously about to become “user-unfriendly,” 
using the term, the Select Committee employs. So, attention should be paid to those ports 
which are not in the position to integrate their transport policy -especially when other 
countries are developing their own initiatives in this area. 
Whilst taking into account the fact that port authorities do play an important role in 
economic development, it is clear that society is heavily involved in the strengthening the 
financial status of domestic and international shipping particularly containerisation; hence the 
existence, for instance, of the Indian Tariff Authority for Major Ports, which approved the 
proposal of the Nhava Sheva International Container Terminal Limited (NSICT) to revise 
its scale of charges. This Indian Tariff Authority had jurisdiction over shipping, by virtue of 
Section 48 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (38 of 1963).
24
  
A dramatic intervention of society into the economy took place in South Africa, 
which created a significant amount of controversy concerning how restrictive society 
should be on its control monopolies in the cartage of containers
25
. More specifically, 
Durban experienced the monopoly of the South African Railway and Harbours 
Administration (the “Administration”).  
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According to an amendment in 1976 to the South African Railways and Harbours 
Act 8 of 1957, the “Administration” was given the power to “undertake the business of 
cartage contractors or carriage agents to and from any container stacking area in Durban 
harbour to the exclusion of any other carrier.” The successor to this Act was enacted in 
1981 under the name of the South African Transport Services Act (No. 9) which created 
SATS, which in 1989, under the terms of this Act was legally succeeded by Transnet 
Limited. 
Furthermore, the companies themselves found their own solution by collaborating 
and creating mergers and joint ventures. Co-operation has a main advantage of keeping 
costs under control. The costs of negotiation and contract can be regulated more efficiently 
when there is co-operation. Merged firms can transact at much lower costs than one 
company itself and  the high level of risk linked with the investment of capital in ships is 
shared and handled by many instead of one, as is further demonstrated by Slack (et al. 
2002), securing thus the economies of scale
26
.  
 Nevertheless, there is still a drawback in this situation that might keep the market 
unstable, as Midoro and Pitto (2000)
27
 discuss. The lack of differentiation of the partner’s 
roles and the absence of harmonisation of marketing and sales still prevent alliances from 
playing a major role in the alleviation of market instability. 
The figure (1) below, taken from Notteboom (2004, p. 6)
28
, demonstrates the 
situation nowadays in relation to the alliances.  
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By alliances, shipping companies are somehow protected from financial risks while 
the economy is affected by the existence of different tariffs. For example, a shipping line 
might have a different tariff for independent customers than it has for those in the 
alliance
29
. 
 
Moreover, Poon
30
 supports the “joining alliances” approach, because of additional 
potential cost savings including container handling costs, feeder costs and equipment.  
On describing the figure (1) and according to Poon, the New Grand Alliance is the 
world’s biggest shipping alliance and OOCL Netherlands is currently operating with it in 
Europe/Asia
31
. 
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 Additionally, the economy is affected by transactions among shippers and carriers 
and their competitiveness growth on the one hand and on the other those who eventually 
bear the shipping costs. For instance, in order to tranship from the mother ship to a feeder 
ship many factors need to be considered. Carriers might be attracted to the sophisticated 
“sea-sea hub-and-spoke network system” (Notteboom 2004, p. 10) but it also depends on 
who is paying for this. Usually, it will be for the shipper to bear transhipment costs via 
extra Terminal Handling Charges (THC) (Brooks 2000)
32
.  
Under the “sea-sea hub-and-spoke network” system, containers are transhipped 
from mother vessels to smaller feeder ships in the defined centre (hub) port and then the 
containers are delivered to regional ports by feeder ships. THC can be defined as a tariff, 
charged by the shipping lines to the shippers and which should cover part or all of the 
terminal costs, paid by the shipping lines to the terminal operators (Notteboom 2004, p. 10, 
n. 8). As it seems, the economic development and the implementation of the ports mainly 
depend on the balance of power among shippers and carriers.  
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Therefore, when implementing this system there is a cost advantage on behalf of the 
carriers but not necessarily on behalf of the shippers, a matter which may lead to the 
instability of the shipping economy. 
 Moreover, governments can get involved when the THC are not fair. For example, 
the government of Hong Kong has pledged to increase pressure for a resolution to the on-
going dispute over the THC and to reduce the price differential between Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen ports. This differential is US $100 per container, a substantial sum considering 
that moving a 20 feet equivalent unit box across the Pacific from Hong Kong costs about 
US$2,140. The container handling charge levied by the shipping line represents about 
eighty per cent of the overall THC
33
.   
 The shippers might be cautious about cartel abuse and they can complain of a lack 
of transparency in THC settling but it is difficult to get more information since contracts 
among shipping lines and terminal operators are deemed confidential agreements. This is 
where the problem starts and where global economy can be affected in a critical negative 
way. The Deputy Secretary for Economic Development and Labour of Hong Kong, 
Raymond Fan Wai-min strongly suggests that the governments should take a tougher line 
in seeking information on the charges when urgency calls. 
But, the port of Hong Kong did not only get involved in the THCs. It set another 
record, handling almost twenty two million TEUs, although it had to confront its rival, the 
port of Shenzhen. When discussing how ports can affect the economy, it is worth 
mentioning the impact of Associations in Container Terminals.  
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The economy of ports would improve if lower costs, particularly in trucking fees, 
were involved and direct shipments increased. A throughput growth is feasible, as long as 
careful handling takes place. Implementing international transhipments and cargo shipping 
via barges to the port of destination are sensible ways of enriching a port, since both are of 
low economic cost
34
. 
Containerisation has also affected society, initially by the creation of a new road and 
rail infrastructure, and the expansion of ports. As a result of the launch of containerisation, 
new transport policies have been implemented taking into account the needs of 
containerisation. Therefore, many factors and indicators throughout this process transform 
the characteristics of society
35
.  
The container revolution did not happen at once though, nor did it happen 
unnoticed. For instance, in East London between 1960 and 1985, when many social 
changes were taking place in England, all the docks of the biggest port in Britain were 
closed to cargo shipping as containerisation led to relocation downstream at Tilbury, 
Felixstowe and Rotterdam. This directly affected the infrastructure of the British society
36
.  
The sequence of transport improvement needs to be examined as much within the 
socio-economic context as in the stricter field of trade evolution. Meanwhile, the canal 
revolution has started to affect containerisation and its processes (Freeman 1983, p. 25).  
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In practice, ports did not usually choose which goods they would handle and which 
they would not. 
Technological developments brought about huge changes, not only in the modes of 
loading, carrying and discharging of cargo, but also in the institutional structure of 
maritime transportation and certainly the infrastructure of ports. Containerisation has 
brought a revolution to international trade meanwhile, if the term “revolution” may be so 
defined. Nowadays, there is a revolution also in containerisation itself. So, it might be 
relevant to mention that the notion of revolution can be seen in the way that 
containerisation is a revolutionary method in international trade since the containerships 
and the Ro/Ros are used, the door-to-door transportation is recommended, and the piling of 
the goods in the containers is implemented. 
“Door-to-door” is an expression that the market has understood to refer to a carriage 
of goods from a place situated inland outside the port of loading to another place inland 
outside, even far away from the port of destination (Alcantara 2002, p. 401). It involves 
transportation by more than one mode, which normally are land and sea or railway and sea. 
However, that is not necessary always the case, as “door-to-door” may also fit with land 
transportation only (Alcantara 2002, p. 401), though using one or several carriers and with 
two or more modes of transportation without involving a sea leg. 
We may also mention the “revolution” in containerisation itself. The notion of 
“revolution” derives from the new methods that are used nowadays and will be used in the 
future in containerisation, so as to improve this kind of undertaking technically and to 
support it financially. For example, the manufacture of containerships was a revolution in 
the earlier years in international trade though the manufacture of Post-Panamax vessels is a 
revolution in containerisation itself. 
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Furthermore, we could also refer to the revolutionary methods in the legal regime of 
container law, which one day might exist, at an international level. Therefore, the term 
“revolution” in international trade may take different dimensions. Containerisation brought 
a revolution in international trade and the new modern shipping methods are bringing a 
revolution in containerisation itself while revolution also lies in the international law that 
governs this kind of trade. The legal side is falling behind compared to the technical side. A 
new international legal regime that can adequately and globally govern containerisation is 
needed. When and if this legal regime is established, this will truly be a “revolution” and 
will “save” the process of this undertaking.    
 Finally, Herman (1983, p. 145) has observed an important aspect of the container 
revolution, namely the integration of land transportation with sea carriage, often described 
as Intermodalism. According to Mahoney (1985, p. 1), intermodality is “the science that 
deals with the movement of goods between and among various modes of transport”. In 
combination with Alcantara’s view (2002, p. 402)37, intermodal transport can take place 
when the carriage of goods is done in one and the same loading unit or road vehicle, which 
uses successively two or more modes of transport without man’s interference when modes 
are changing.  
Intermodality is connected with the integration of logistics
38
, since shippers demand 
value-added services. These include intermodal inland coordination between shipping, rail 
and trucks, and in this way containerisation is linked with intermodalism and the economy. 
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Flexibility on feeder-ring (Jol 1998, p. 79) might also take an intermodal aspect at 
sea. If, for example, a feeder service operates between ports for three times per week, then 
this should not be considered as a feeder connection but as an intermodal connection by 
sea.   
 Nevertheless, entering on the rail industry and combining it with the world of 
containerisation, ports may strengthen their rail connections so as to promote intermodality 
and attract new customers. What happens in this situation is that the port increases the 
volume of business moved to and from the port by rail and an on-dock rail facility is 
established which expands this process
39
. Therefore, in order to achieve better intermodal 
rail results, the truck and barge rates should be comparable with rail and it is useful that 
shipping lines have three modes of transport, on wise rates. 
 This issue also occupies the European Commission which attempts to develop a 
pan-European railway system capable of competing more effectively with other transit 
modes and actually in 2001 international freight services for intermodal cargo became 
obligatory at its first package
40
. The EU has gone even further apart from considering rates, 
so that a new draft directive deals with the certification of locomotive drivers, the creation 
of internationally acceptable “drivers’ licences” and minimum quality standards for rail 
freight services on intermodal transport.   
                                                 
39 See DORTO J (April 2004) “The Port of Virginia: Rail Results,” Containerisation 
International, pp. 93-96, at p. 93.   
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 According to EC (April 2004) “Further Boost for Pan-European Rail,” Containerisation 
International, p. 25. 
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 According to Double
41
, the strength of the euro should have an adverse effect on 
westbound trade while the decline of the dollar has been encouraging growth in the 
opposite direction.  
What happens in this field is that even if the euro is strengthened, the recovery of 
economies in the EU is still slower than in the US and could take the edge off eastbound 
volumes as European companies source from Asia instead. Carriers add that while the 
exchange rate factor is improving eastbound volumes, it has not caused a decline in 
westbound traffic. Exports from Eastern Europe, which are forecast to become an important 
market, could also be offsetting the stronger euro. Although the weakness of the dollar 
means a fall in profits, as freight rates are paid in dollars, still some operational costs and 
profits are reported in local currencies. 
Finally, on commenting about the dawn of the US dollar, it should be added that 
non-US shippers might have an advantage, since despite the 18% decline in the dollar’s 
value merely over the last year, ocean carriers were only asking for 20% increases and this 
could be seen as reason for negotiations. As a shipping expert foresaw “even if shippers pay 
more in dollars, they will still pay less in real terms.” Therefore, carriers are in a strong 
position to charge CAFs (Double 2004, p. 39). The Currency Adjustment Factors (CAFs) is 
quite an issue that occupies the maritime industry. 
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 See DOUBLE Z (April 2004) “Money, Money, Money!” Containerisation International, 
pp. 34-39, at p. 34. 
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D.) DEFINITIONS 
Containers may be described as metal boxes of 20 feet long and 20 feet high
42
. This 
kind of transport needs a stable legal term (multimodal, intermodal, combined) and a 
unified international legal regime, which will harmonise the national and regional different 
“laws”. Terminology in containerisation is quite varied. Two names may exist in the same 
document (Combined/Multimodal Transport Document). Additionally, it is still unsettled 
how the legal cases will be solved and according to which legal regime liability will be 
judged and what will be the legal role of the different states. 
A new trend that is emerging, and is increasingly accepted, is “integrated logistics.” 
It is important to define what “integrated logistics” is. Integrated logistics is about 
considering the supply-chain from raw materials to the final customer, even if they are in a 
foreign country and making sure that it works effectively and efficiently. Working in 
“functional silos,” the purchasing departments obtain raw materials, the manufacturing ones 
make the products, the sales departments sell them and the shipping ones despatch them
43
. 
When small exporters cannot achieve this in the normal course of business, they create 
business relationships, the already mentioned alliances, so they can satisfy the customers 
who are in a foreign country. 
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 See CANADINE C. (Spring/Summer 1998) “The Importance of Integrated Logistics,” 
International Container Review, pp. 9-10, at p. 9. 
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E.) THE INFLUENCE OF THE INSTITUTIONS 
 Many associations are getting involved with Containerisation meanwhile some of 
them are introducing new terms and there are also non-governmental organisations
44
 that 
play an efficient role.  
Accordingly
45
, the Zentrum fur Logistik und Unternehmensplanung GmbH is 
responsible for all ground transport investigations and the logistics consultancy. The 
International Scheldt Faculty (ISF) is responsible for all shipping regional enterprises and 
governmental departments. The European Intermodal Association (EIA) is a non-
governmental association which promotes intermodal freight transport and is responsible 
for the provision of the practical experiences of their members. Furthermore, the 
KRAVAG-LOGISTIC, Germany’s leading insurance company for truck and carrier 
liability insurance, is responsible for all liability questions. The European Logistics 
Association (ELA) is a federation of about thirty national logistics associations and 
responsible for the contact with logistics service providers. 
Apart from them, the IMO
46
, the International Maritime Organisation, is primarily 
concerned with the safety of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution, but the 
organisation has also introduced regulations covering liability and compensation for 
damage, such as pollution, caused by ships. Furthermore, the Legal Committee is 
empowered to deal with any legal matters within the scope of the Organisation. It was 
established in 1967 and consists of all the Member States of the IMO.  
                                                 
44
 See WILLETS P. (4
th
 January 2002) “What is a Non-Governmental Organisation?” 
UNESCO Encyclopaedia of Life Support Systems, Output from the Research Project on 
Civil Society Networks in Global Governance, City University, London; also 
http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM  
(7
th
 December 2004, at 12:30). 
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 Supra, n. 23, p. 3.  
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 Visit http://www.imo.org/home.asp. 
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The Legal Committee is also empowered to perform any duties within its scope, 
which may be assigned by or under any other international instrument and accepted by the 
IMO. The IMO was established in 1948 when an international conference in Geneva 
adopted a convention for this organisation, which entered into force in 1958. The original 
name actually was Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation, or, the casual 
IMCO that we find in journals, which was changed in 1982 to IMO. 
 With the launch of Containerisation, social problems can arise. An organisation that 
specialises in social care and labour is ILO
47
, the International Labour Organisation, which 
seeks the promotion of social justice and internationally recognised human and labour 
rights. It was founded in 1919 and is the only surviving major creation of the Treaty of 
Versailles, which brought the League of Nations into being, and it became the first 
specialised agency of the UN in 1946. The ILO, the International Transport Workers 
Federation and the European Transport Workers Federation can also influence labour legal 
rules. 
These organisations can for example fight EU Directives, as recently happened in 
the case of the EU Directive on market access to port services, which could affect the work 
of seafarers and dockers
48
. It should be added that Containerisation encountered labour 
union objections. According to Mahoney (1985, p. 16) the labour unions did their part to 
retard the progress of containerisation, because they were afraid it would lead to 
longshoremen losing their jobs. 
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 See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/index.htm. 
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 Visit HASTINGS P. (24
th
 November 2004) “Unions to Oppose EC Proposal to Port 
Labour,” TP International Publishing, Times Business Limited, as in 
http://www.cargonewsasia.com/cnx-asia/getNews.asp?id=5376  
(24
th
 November 2004, at 17:42:45). 
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One of the main organisations that influence the legal procedure of containerisation, 
apart from the European Union, is the United Nations Conference of Trade and 
Development. UNCTAD
49
 has made a recent survey on how the legal problems could be 
solved. It is researching on problems such as the liability of Multimodal Transport 
Operators, the appropriate legal regimes that should be adopted and the mandatory scope of 
these instruments
50
. 
 Moreover, the second major body that is involved is the International Chamber of 
Commerce (the ICC), a Paris-based body that has recently revised the INCOTERMS. 
“INCOTERMS” is an abbreviation of international commercial terms, which are trade 
terms and basic elements for contracts of sale, since they inform the consignors and 
consignees how to cope with respect to the carriage of goods from the sellers to the buyers. 
They also advise on export and import licence when needed (Ramberg 1999, p. 10)
51
. 
INCOTERMS are written in plain language for inexpert people and therefore they 
are not as difficult to understand as the more complicated statutory rules but they must also 
be incorporated into the contract (Bridge 1999, pp. 8-9). This also happens with 
UNCTAD/ICC Rules 1992, which act as the present multimodal transport legal regime
52
. 
UNCTAD and ICC also co-operate for the economic development of international trade in 
poorer countries. They have set up an Advisory Investment Council for the least-developed 
countries.  
The ICC has also been involved with the Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credits.  
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 See chapter 4.    
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 See chapter 4. 
51 See chapter 3.  
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 See Chapter 3(D).  
 49 
The UCP Rules are a detailed collection of rules relating to letters of credit (Bridge 
1999, p. 9). They also have to be incorporated in the contract, but sometimes are implied, 
adding a touch of uncertainty. The ICC does not only influence containerisation, but also 
the global economy, since its activities cover a broad spectrum and it has direct access to 
national governments internationally through its national committees
53
. 
Moreover, the Committee Maritime International (CMI) made an attempt by its 
Draft Instrument on Transport Law 2001 to provide a solution. This Draft was prepared in 
advance of the CMI Conference in Singapore in February 2001 and a Revised Draft Outline 
Instrument dated 31
st
 May 2001 (“the May Draft”) was circulated for comment to all 
national associations and a number of international organisations, including consultative 
members of the CMI. The preparatory work of the CMI on Issues of Transport Law came 
to an end with the submission of the CMI Draft Instrument on Transport Law to the 
Secretariat of UNCITRAL on 11
th
 December 2001. The revised Draft Convention of 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods [wholly or partly] [by sea] was formally 
approved by UNCITRAL, in its forty-first session, on 3
rd
 July 2008, in New York. The 
Legal Committee of the General Assembly also adopted this Draft Convention on 14
th
 
November 2008
54
. This Draft Convention is open for signing in Rotterdam in September 
2009 and will be known as “the Rotterdam Rules.” 
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The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is the 
main legal body that is occupied with the harmonisation and unification of the law of 
international trade. UNCITRAL had prepared the main draft according to which the 
members of the United Nations at Hamburg adopted the United Nations Convention on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978, known as the Hamburg Rules. The UK is not a party to 
the Hamburg Rules
55
. Meanwhile UNCITRAL with the collaboration of the International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) responded with a draft for the 
preparation of the United Nations Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport 
Terminals in International Trade adopted on 17
th
 April 1991 and opened for signature on 
19
th
 April 1991 by a conference at Vienna. 
 Furthermore, the OECD, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, established in 1960 currently consists of thirty member countries but up to 
ten countries are expected to join in the near future as part of an enlargement and enhanced 
engagement initiative. The OECD works on territorial economic surveys and focuses on the 
benefits of economic growth and sustainable development. Recently, in collaboration with 
the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT), the OECD carried out a 
survey on container terrorism. Generally speaking, after the September 11
th
, 2001 terrorist 
attack in New York, the security of international trade has been the concern globally of 
these institutions and new measures have been taken
56
. 
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 Quiet a lot of controversy was created as to whether September 11
th
, 2001 could act as a 
turning point in international and domestic law. Additionally, Singapore is responding to 
international terrorism and action is taken in co-operation with IMO and the US to 
strengthen maritime security by joining the US Container Security Initiative; FAIRPLAY 
(2002) “Singapore Takes Decisive Steps,” 346 (6193), Fairplay, pp. 22-23; cf. BOCKO R. 
/RAY H. (2002) “United States: New Challenges for Shipping” 3(4), S & TLI, pp. 7-9.    
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 Additionally, the OECD recommends that the ECMT Ministerial Declaration on 
Combating Terrorism in Transport, the 2001 Ministerial Conclusions on Combating Crime 
and the ECMT Resolution No 97/72 on Crime in International Transport contain 
regulations, which should be taken into account. Ultimately, the States should apply the 
recent ISPS Code and the amended SOLAS Convention, both of which deal with security 
measures for international ocean-going vessels.  
Finally, an association that influences the financial aspects of containerisation is the 
International Association of Maritime Economists (IAME)
57
 which is an international 
forum for the exchange of information and views among those interested in the economic 
aspects of shipping, ports and other related issues.  
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F.) CONTAINERISATION & TECHNOLOGY 
 In order to understand containerisation many factors need to be taken in account. 
 Firstly, containerisation cannot take place without the use of containers
58
. Defining 
a container, the United States Supreme Court stated in Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles 
[1979] 441 US 434 that “a container is a permanent reusable article of transport equipment 
durably made of metal and equipped with doors for easy access to the goods and for 
repeated use. It is designed to facilitate the handling, loading, stowage aboard ship, 
carriage, discharge from ship, movement and transfer of large numbers of packages 
simultaneously by mechanical means to minimize cost and risks of manually processing 
each package.” A widely acceptable definition of it was given in Co v. Caputo [1977] 432 
US pp. 249-271, when the Court adopted northeast marine terminology explaining that “a 
container is a modern substitute for the hold of the vessel.”59 However, one of the main 
characteristics of containers is that they are movable and portable and this is one of the 
most important elements in multimodal international transportation.   
Accordingly the definition given in Caputo may be open to debate. 
Nowadays technology has evolved greatly, not only in the manufacture of 
containerships, but also in the development of the containers themselves. Thus, the more 
sophisticated ones are insulated, heated, refrigerated and ventilated (1HVs) and cellular 
pallet wide containers, 20 or 40 feet serve containerisation. Additionally, “container - like” 
items are employed such as portable tanks and flats, which share the basic container frame 
in order to facilitate handling by standardised equipment.  
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 The containers are metal boxes usually 20 feet high and 20 feet long. There are also 
containers, which are 40 feet high and 40 feet long; see BRODIE (1996, p. 35). 
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 Also supra, n. 5, p. 428. 
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 The cellular pallet wide containers are shipping containers designed to carry an 
optimum number of euro pallets. This can be accomplished because of their dimensions; 
they are 2.5 metres wide, wider than standard containers, which are 2.44 metres. It is to be 
questioned why their shape is so significant. Technology intervened at this point and 
deliberately cut this type of metal box away at the corners to reduce the width. By 
modifying their corners, they are effectively allowed to be fitted in the cells of the ships 
specially designed for them, the cellular containerships, as Brodie (1996, pp. 26-27) vividly 
demonstrates. The “cell” of a vessel is a compartment in the hold of a container ship into 
which the shipping containers can be fitted exactly. The cells are also known as “slots.” 
The latter term is used, when referring to the number of such compartments on a ship and 
the arrangements made between different shipping lines to pool capacity or between a 
shipping line and a groupage operator or non vessel operating carrier (NVOC) to make use 
of space on the ship; hence, the “slot charter parties.”    
 In reality, the containers are sent from the manufacturers to the Multimodal 
Transport Operators, who are usually the charterers, according to Harrington (1982, p. 4
60
). 
Then, the MTOs send them to the shippers empty and clean at central depots, the Container 
Freight Stations (CFS) inland. In order for door-to-door or house-to-house transportation 
(Harrington 1982, p. 2) to take place, the MTOs or the freight forwarders load the 
containers on the shippers’ chassis and a receipt is issued showing the containers’ apparent 
good order and condition.  
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 See HARRINGTON S. (1982) “Legal Problems Arising from Containerisation & 
Intermodal Transport,” 17, European Transport Law, pp. 3-27. The modern term used is 
“door-to-door;” Harrington refers to some more variations of carriage like “house-to-
house,” “pier-to-pier,” “pier-to-house,” and “house-to-pier.” If the MTOs load and unload 
the containers the transit is named “pier-to-pier;” if they only stuff or de-stuff, the carriage 
is “pier-to-house” or “house-to-pier” accordingly. 
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The shippers return to their warehouses and they fill the containers with the 
commodities, seal them and return them to the depot where another interchange of receipts 
takes place. 
The MTOs or the inland carriers remove the containers from the shippers’ chassis 
and then transport them by rail or road to a seaport where they are delivered to the terminal 
operators against yet another interchange of receipts. The terminal operators load them onto 
the ship, which is designed to satisfy containerisation needs, particularly for on-deck 
carriage. At the port of destination, a similar process is followed and a variety of 
interchange receipts change hands once more until the receiver finally returns the empty 
container to the MTOs’ central depot at the place of final delivery and the leasing contract 
is concluded. 
 Containerisation has also had an effect on world shipbuilding. The latest Capesize 
container vessel is the most vivid evidence of the evolution in technology. How is it 
different from normal ships? A sophisticated example of recent new building is the Hapag-
Lloyd’s “Hanover Express” which was built according to the company’s “ship operation 
system.” “Hanover Express” has special areas for working and living and it is handled from 
a forward projecting “pulpit” at the starboard side of the ships operation centre. From a 
traversing seat, the “multi-purpose” officer can reach all necessary ship and machinery 
controls and view displays. Back-up positions and chart tables are positioned elsewhere in 
the centre, which also oversees all safety matters.  
This ship can carry 1,000 TEUs more than comparable sized vessels in her hull and 
in all 4,407 units can be carried, despite the fact that the beam was restricted to allow 
Panama Canal navigation. The vessel has seven cargo holds fitted with cell-guides to 
accommodate 2,282 TEUs and a fifth one designed to carry refrigerated containers, 452 of 
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which may be loaded either in that hold or on deck, as Lingwood
61
 describes (1992, p. 29). 
Its deadweight is 55,590 tonnes on a design draught of 12.50m at which service speed is 
23.80 knots.  
What is even more interesting about this particular ship, and should always be taken 
into consideration when manufacturing new ones, is the fact that it has been equipped with 
strict environmental controls, ensuring that clean and oily bilge
62
 water are separated. It 
also has special storage tanks to contain any leakage to the bilges from dangerous cargoes. 
Furthermore, dry refuse is baled for off-loading ashore and wet (galley) waste is crushed 
and discharged overboard in accordance with MARPOL rules
63
. 
 Container vessels are not only used for just ocean trade. New building is also taking 
place for short-sea shipping and inland navigation. Technological equipment is also 
provided for container trade in lakes and rivers
64
. For instance, a German Operator ordered 
three 3,200dwt vessels designed specifically for trade with the Finish Saimaa Lakes from 
Paatje Shipyards of Waterhuisen. 
These have a container capacity of two hundred and nineteen TEUs and a new 
feature of these ships is that they are ice-strengthened, which means their shell plating is 
thicker and their bows are reinforced, so as to be able to navigate in ice conditions (Brodie 
1996, p. 84).  
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Waterway Productions Ltd., pp. 29-31.   
62
 The “bilge” is defined as the area at the lower part of a hold where liquids collect and are 
pumped out at regular intervals (BRODIE P 1996, p. 7).  
63
 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified 
by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78) as in 
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=678&topic_id=258  
(05/07/2005, at 14:00). 
64
 See MacDONALD M (May 1999) “Coastal & Short-Sea Commentary,” Ships, Burton-on-
Trent, Link House Magazines Ltd., pp. 16-19, at p. 19. 
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These ships have the maximum level of ice-strengthening possible. The maximum 
deadweight of the vessels when operating in the Saimaa Canal will be 2,270 tons.  
Ice-strengthening was also carried out the “Hansa Lubeck,” designed for 
unrestricted service including navigation on the River Rhine
65
. 
These are recent ice-strengthened ships: 
 
Photo 1  
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 See LUCAS J (June 2000) “Specialised Vessels for Intensive Paper Service,” 74 (654), 
Sea-Breezes: the Magazine of Ships and the Sea, Braddan, Print Centres Ltd., p. 226. 
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Photo 2  
Technology has ensured that they can meet the increasing needs for shipping 
between North Africa and Europe, challenging traders to choose short-sea shipping rather 
than road transport. These ships have a capacity of 506 TEUs, and their dimensions are 
114m in length x 20m beam x 6.5m (draught) and most significantly, their holds are 
constructed with technical ventilation in order to be useful in carrying unripe fruit and 
vegetables. They are powered by Bassoon MAN/B & W 8L40L45 geared diesels driving 
controllable-pitch propellers and are designed to operate with a crew of twenty.     
At this point, some of the terms that are specific to the shipping industry and are 
encountered frequently when discussing containerisation should be explained. The 
“deadweight” of a ship is the difference between the ship’s loaded and light displacements, 
consisting of the total weight of cargo, fuel, fresh water, stores and crew which a ship can 
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carry when immersed to a particular load line, normally her summer load line. This 
“deadweight” is expressed in tons or tonnes (Brodie 1996, p. 43). 
            Furthermore, when the term “draught” of the ship is used, it means the depth to 
which a ship is immersed in the water; this depth varies according to the design of the ship 
and will be greater or lesser depending not only on the weight of the ship and everything on 
board, such as cargo, ballast, fuel and spares, but also on the density of the water in which 
the ship is floating. A ship’s draught is determined by reading her draught marks, a scale 
marked on the ship’s stem and stern. The term “draught” is also used to describe the depth 
of water (Brodie 1996, p. 51). 
Accordingly, the draught marks can be viewed on this ship, shown below (Photo 3). 
 
 
Photo 3 
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Additionally, when we refer to the “ship’s beam” we mean her maximum breadth. 
As Brodie indicates (1996, p. 7) this is sometimes a factor in determining whether a ship is 
suitable for a particular port and, consequently, whether it can be used on a particular 
voyage. The beam may need to be measured against the width of locks and the outreach of 
cargo-handling equipment.  
 Technology has led to a number of further improvements on these ships such as the 
strengthening of the hatch-covers to support containers, as Lucas indicates (2000, p. 225) 
when referring to the “Polar Star,” although he points out that consideration must also be 
given to the manoeuvrability of these ships, when describing the “Spaarneborg” (Lucas 
2000, p. 224). As the name suggests, hatch covers cover, or close the hatchway of a ship. 
There are various types, such as wooden boards laid across the hatchway, or steel sections 
which roll to one side or to one end (Brodie 1996, p. 78). They are very important in the 
construction of a container vessel since they keep out rain and water breaking over the ship 
and they are installed on the weather deck and tween deck. The weather deck is the 
uppermost deck exposed to the weather, extending the length of the ship (Brodie 1996, p. 
185). The tween deck is the deck which separates the hold of a ship into two, making an 
upper hold and a lower hold. Its purpose is to provide two separate levels of stowage for the 
cargo, giving ease of access and helping to avoid compression of cargo caused by direct 
over-stowage (Brodie 1996, p. 177).  
Modern technology has played an important role in the design of special vehicles 
and equipment used in the container industry. The metal boxes, or containers, are 
transported empty by specially designed trucks to container freight stations where they are 
stacked before continuing their journey by road or rail to the container terminals. At these 
terminals, the containers are placed on container berths. 
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Specially designed equipment is used to load the containers onto the container 
ships. Then, the containers are moved from the warehouse to the loading bay along a 
moving strip, known as the conveyor belt. Moreover, when the containers reach the 
container berth, modern transit methods are used to transfer them to the ship. 
In relation to conveyor belts, an upgrading in the port of Miami took place and is 
demonstrated below: 
 
Photo 4 
This photo shows the job of the conveyor belts within a modern bay. Each 
horizontal bar is a conveyor belt. The conveyor belt is a moving strip along which goods 
are moved to deliver them from one area, such as a loading bay, into a warehouse (Brodie 
1996, p. 41).  
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Moreover, special machines have had to be designed to lift and move heavy 
weights. These are called cranes and they can be mobile, floating or fixed either to the 
shore or the deck of a ship. Each crane has specific operating features such as the maximum 
allowable lift, known as the Safe Working Load (SWL) and the outreach or maximum 
distance, which the crane can reach to pick up or put down cargo (Brodie 1996, p. 43). 
There are many types of crane. The main ones are: the “bridge crane,” the “cantilever jib 
crane,” the “crawler crane,” the “floating crane,” the “gantry crane,” the “heavy lift crane,” 
the “jib crane,” the “multi-purpose crane,” the “portal crane,” the “stacker or straddle 
crane” and the “transporter crane.”66 However, containers can also be “rolled on and rolled 
off,” with the aid of special self-propelled vehicles used for towing trailers. Ports employ 
special machinery to move road trailers onto and off RO-ROs. New technology has led to 
the invention of the “straddle carrier.” This is a wheeled vehicle specially designed to lift 
and carry shipping containers and is used for moving and sometimes stacking containers at 
a container terminal.  
Obviously, the evolution of modern shipbuilding does not stop here. Technology 
was first used to modify existing ships in the 1960’s, as it was the most economical 
solution. However, technology soon took the lead by developing giant container-vessels
67
, 
as containerisation entered the 21
st
 century. Economies of scale led to the construction of 
the Panamax (in 1985), the Post-Panamax vessels, and the 5
th
 generation vessels, the Post-
Panamax Plus which serve Containerisation nowadays and have a capacity of 5000-8000 
TEUs. 
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 The fifth generation vessels of the 21
st
 century encounter many problems, which are 
serious but not insoluble. Initially, the ports that can handle these giants are few and far 
between. A Post-Panamax ship requires deep-water ports and the initial cost of creating the 
necessary high-efficiency transhipment infrastructure is extremely high. But, even if the 
transhipment issues can be resolved, money still remains an important issue since increases 
in speed cannot be increased without increases in energy consumption. This means that 
those speeds are on average between twenty and twenty-five knots, something which 
Herman (1983, p. 135) has also referred to in the past. So, perhaps increases in speed are 
not gained by these giants in the end, but their capacity is what sells compared to the 
smaller ones.  
When considering speed, size, and the scope of fast ships, there are also 
implications alongside the quays; for example, berth length, lift height, outreach of the 
cranes and the size of the terminal, and definitely in the inland waterway. Technology 
should find a way of speeding up the larger vessels, so that terminal operators will not be 
under pressure to turn the ships round as quickly as current safety procedures allow
68
. 
Technology could be used to solve this problem devising faster cranes and ground-handling 
equipment fleets to facilitate faster turn-around times.  
Accordingly, NASSCO has provided its ships with cargo configurations and how 
they can be upgraded, and most importantly, how uniqueness can be combined with cost-
effectiveness
69
.
                                                 
68
 See “Drive to Bigger Containerships,” 
 http://www.worldcargonews.com/htm/n2001107.041922.htm (14/01/2005, at 14:00).   
69
 See http://ww.nassco.com/cdc/cs.html (03/01/2005, at 15:30). For an illustration of a 
recent low-cost design which adds to the new era of containerships visit 
http://www.nassco.com/cdc/pfeiffer.html (03/01/2005, at 16:00); 
cf. http://www.shumsw.tripod.com. 
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 The illustration that follows shows the development of shipbuilding in 
containerisation in the five generations
70
: 
 
 
Figure 2 
                                                 
70
 Supra, n. 67. 
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 Moreover, RO-ROs can help here since they are the safest and most inexpensive 
way to handle, and transport, oversized or special project cargo. They are extremely useful 
in door-to-door transportation, as shipments often move as one unit using specialised 
trailers from origin to port of destination. What should be considered when manufacturing 
containerships is the securing of garage decks for the entire voyage so no exposure to water 
can take place, especially when they are designed for RO-RO shipments.  
 The modern multipurpose RO/RO Containerships, also known as CON-RO ships 
(Brodie 1996, p. 139), were designed to carry shipping, wheeled, palletised and unitised 
containers and have cell guides within which accommodate them. They also provide decks 
to fit roll-on/roll-off cargo and they may also be used for heavy weights such as special 
projects and unusual shipments. On demonstrating how powerful and dynamic these ships 
are it is worth mentioning that the Atlantic Container Line (ACL)
71
 has carried out two 
shipments so far with these kinds of ships; the first was in June 2004, when the ACL 
transported aboard its “Atlantic Compass” a powerboat set to break the Round Britain 
World Record.  
                                                 
71
 Visit http://www.acl.com (27/12/2004, at 01:00).  
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G.) A JOURNEY IN TIME 
a. The Past… 
Once upon a time, in 1992 “the world’s first Panamax size open hatch’ container 
ship was classed with Lloyd’s Register;” her name was Nedlloyd Asia and was scheduled to 
begin its maiden voyage on the 10
th
 December, sailing from Kobe to Singapore (Shaw 
1992, p. 8). Her ancestors and successors were and are being designed for carrying 
containers whereas these metal boxes themselves go back a lot further than 1992. A 
container service was running in the USA as early as 1906. A little later, in the 1920’s 
Seatrain Lines launched the rail wagon service (Greenman 1992, p. 14). An argument took 
place recently concerning the evolution of the new trade methods as to which was the first 
“purpose-built” container ship. According to Greenman (1992, p. 14), the first container-
ship was Clifford J. Rogers
72
, owned by the British Yukon Navigation Co. Its voyage was 
between Vancouver and Skagway (Alaska) and in 1966 was joined by a larger ship, 
carrying larger containers. Furthermore, on this journey in the evolution of 
containerisation, the ex-Sealand (new joint venture known as Maersk-Sealand
73
) company 
promoted the first waterborne containers in April 1956
74
.  
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 It had cellular compartments designed to carry one hundred and sixty eight (168) steel 
boxes, but the small size of these boxes, 5ft square, might create a second argument as 
whether they were truly “containers” in they way we know them nowadays (Greenman 
1992, p. 15). 
73
 As interviewed by an ex-employee in Hanjin Shipping in Tokyo, Tomoko Yi. 
74
 As Mahoney also completes (1985, p. 13), on April the 26
th
, 1956, a converted tanker 
carrying fifty-eight trailer vans on its specially adapted decks, sailed from Newark, New 
Jersey to Houston, Texas -touching off the container revolution- a landmark in history of 
intermodal transportation, since the expansion to major shipping routes is beginning and to 
routes throughout the world. It is in 1956, when the commercial revolution starts, since it is 
publicly demonstrated that standard containers can move cargo successfully on a land-sea 
intermodal journey; about container technology and history view WOOD S. (2000, p. 244).   
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The first service using a fully containerised vessel, the “C2” conversion Gateway 
City, was established in 1957 followed by the first offshore service in 1958 (Greenman 
1992, p. 15). Further back in time, Elizabethport, one of Sealand’s largest container ships, 
was the first container vessel to cross the Panama Canal. As it seems in the past, the 
problem of the new Post-Panamax Container Vessel did not exist
75
.  
 The beginning of the container ship era is usually regarded as dating from 6
th
 May 
1966
76. However, I submit that there is ample evidence that ‘container’ ships were used in 
ancient times. It can also be argued that a type of containerisation existed even in ancient 
times. Research
77
 shows that in the Classical World, people in the shipping industry were 
using amphorae as containers. So, the concept of containerisation might not be as new as 
we are often led to believe. It is interesting to note that the problems, which existed in 
ancient times, have still to be resolved.   
 Later, in the medieval period, trade took place on or near navigable water. The 
economic growth of the 17
th
 or 18
th
 centuries was never so explosive that improving and 
extending river navigation could not meet it. Nature was utilised as long as possible, with 
some inconvenient transhipment breaks being tolerated surprisingly late into the canal age. 
Certainly, one should take into account the fact that eras are changing, containerisation is 
taking on different dimensions, and the needs of transport vary depending on the various 
                                                 
75
 Information about the Post-Panamax Container Ship’s issue is taken from the Greek 
DVD, where it draws the line up to which point the Panama Canal can be rebuilt to fit the 
21
st
 Century’s container vessels; supra, n. 11.  
76
 See DINGER F. “What Shall We do With the Drunken Sailor? EC Competition Law & 
Marine Transport,” 61, BASLERSCHRIFTEN Zur Europaischen Integration, 
EUROPAINSTITUT der Universitat Basel, as in 
 http://www.europa.unibas.ch/fileadmin/pdf/BS61.pdf.  
77
 See photo with ancient amphorae and comments at Appendix 2. 
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methods of transport. It is worth remembering that since World War II, this kind of trade 
has been defined as “revolutionary.” 
 Meanwhile, containerisation and mostly intermodal transport also brought changes 
to highways (Freeman 1983, p. 49). It was in 1727 when ‘turnpike trusts were set up to 
provide better roads but the age lacked experience in engineering, especially since 
technology saw no substantial advance until the nineteenth century. While canals and 
railways were more expensive, turnpikes did not usually cost huge amounts of money’. The 
demands of the building industry gave rise to an entire range of coastal shipping cargoes.  
 Timber from the Baltic was transhipped into coasters at Hull and goods were sent 
by coaster rather than by land because it was decidedly cheaper. Water carriage was to a 
certain degree cheap because the capacity of a canal barge or coasting vessel was so very 
much greater than that of a wagon (Freeman 1983, p. 160). Inland waterway transport was 
more frequently complementary to, rather than competitive with, coastal shipping. 
As containerisation started to develop, shipping agreements and contracts were 
produced. In 1979, a busy year for bilateral shipping agreements and negotiations (Herman 
A. 1983, p. 213), many agreements were inspired by the UNCTAD Code
78
 as developing 
countries established the administrative and legislative procedures to govern the operation 
of their maritime trades. The Ivory Coast, for instance, negotiated agreements with 
Belgium, Spain, and Italy. The protectionist policies adopted by countries such as South 
Korea, Morocco, and Brazil also provoked a spate of negotiations meanwhile Denmark 
                                                 
78
 The United Nations Convention on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was established 
in 1964 as a permanent organ of the UN General Assembly. The UNCTAD’s Code stresses 
the importance of consultations between shippers and conferences and tends to disregard 
the role of shippers’ councils when it comes to choosing the carriers.    
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concluded a Maritime Agreement with Korea. The United States and China engaged in a 
series of negotiations for a bilateral agreement. 
 When exploring the intermodalism of the early 1800s, it is worth mentioning that 
intermodal containerisation developed as part of the solution for moving people and goods 
between the water and land portions of a journey. The Pennsylvania Canal between 
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, which opened in 1839, involved both water and overland 
segments. Barges carried a mixed load of passengers and cargo which operated as 
intermodal containers since they were moved as a unit sequentially aboard horse-drawn 
wagons, railroads, canals, cable railways and additional canals to provide city-centre-to-
city-centre transportation (Mahoney 1985, p. 5). Later, after World War I, a number of 
railroads developed LCL container service (Mahoney 1985, pp. 5-6). 
Carriage of freight by intermodal truck trailers on railroad flatcars took place 
initially in 1926 on the Chicago North Shore and Milkwaukee Railroad. Piggyback services 
grew slowly but steadily until the mid 1950s when the pace got faster. After the mid 
1950’s, three prominent companies developed the piggyback rail truck intermodal 
transportation; the Railway Express Agency, the Flexi-Van and the Trailer Train (Mahoney 
1985, p. 9). 
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b. The Present… 
 Nowadays container transport continues to evolve resulting in efficient international 
trade, since exporters can load container vessels with different types of cargo (in bulk, 
metal boxes, or even heavy equipment, like forestry products on flat-racks). The most 
current legal framework is a combination of the ICC/UNCTAD Rules in the Multimodal 
Transport. However, this does not constitute the essential legal framework, necessary for 
the future of containerisation. 
 According to Fogel’s thesis79, which is supported by Freeman (1983, p. 18), the 
railroad is not such a vital ingredient of the American economic growth and, as is the case 
today, transport demands can be satisfied by other means, such as an improved and 
extended inland waterway system. Inland waterways and canals are constructed to ease 
container transport and thus lessen traffic congestion. The only international legal 
framework that exists today for inland waterways is the Convention on the Contract for the 
Carriage of Goods by Inland Waterway (CMN)
80
, which is not yet in force. 
 Finally, the CMI Instrument on Transport Law, known as “The Rotterdam Rules,” 
is a recent attempt at unification but it has not been considered as container law yet as it 
supports mainly the carriage of good by sea, as further analysed (chapters II & IV).    
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 See FOGEL RW (1964) Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in 
Econometric History, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
80
 The CMN (Convention Relative au Contrat de Transport de Marchandises en Navigation 
Interieure) was originally signed at Geneva, on the 6
th 
February 1959 and modified by so-
called Regles de Strasbourg, February 1973.   
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c. The Future … 
 The technical methods and support of containerisation will continue to develop. 
Regarding the legal aspect, the future seems murky, because of the continuing existence of 
legal technicalities. As the containers become bigger, the means of transport used to 
transport them must also become bigger, which means that more of the natural environment 
will be destroyed to accommodate containerisation. 
Problems may exist in many fields of Combined Transport in practice, and are 
sometimes difficult to resolve when law comes to play its role. Comparing the variety of 
national legislation, and exploring overseas schemes that are being applied to ameliorate 
some of the major difficulties created by containerisation (which will probably be 
multimodal, intermodal and/or combined) might be a good starting point. 
 What should always be taken into account is the fact that the successful future of 
shipping companies will be decided on their ability to satisfy the demands of their 
customers, particularly the customers who are based in a foreign country, since this is the 
precise aim of containerisation. Besides, as suggested below (chapter III) “if you need 
special treatment, you must tell us in advance.” Therefore, it is the customers’ job to tell 
shipping lines what they want, so that customers’ requirements will receive the “special 
treatment.”81    
In terms of the types of goods being shipped, it seems logical to assume that feeding 
services will change and be able to survive by amalgamating. However, it is possible that 
new joint services might arise a new era. This may lead to the formation of new global 
alliances, something that will dictate further changes. 
                                                 
81
 See HOWARD B., CEO Safmarine & SMBT Lines (SCL) (Spring/Summer 1998) 
“Commentary” International Container Review, p. 43. 
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H.) REMARKS 
As already discussed, the effect of world containerisation in global economy is 
distinguished by the constant elimination of trade barriers and the liberalisation of markets. 
This also led to calculations in costs to take place on certain projects upon containerisation 
meanwhile solutions and patterns are provided by national authorities, when it is necessary 
for a national authority to interfere. 
Moreover, alliances have been created since the advent of containerisation which 
brought a new era in shipping trade, since they lead to potential cost savings in the future 
including handling costs, feeder costs and equipment under a global level. Technological 
developments brought huge changes about, not only in the modes of loading, carrying and 
discharging of cargo, but also in the institutional structure of maritime transportation and 
certainly the infrastructure of ports. 
Furthermore, the future revolutionary container law should be universal and under a 
uniform level. Therefore, the term “revolution” in the international trade takes different 
dimensions. Containerisation brought a revolution in international trade and the new 
modern shipping methods are bringing a revolution in containerisation itself, as also stated 
above, while the revolution also lies in wait for the container law that will govern all 
aspects of container traffic in the future. Nowadays, however, it has fallen behind compared 
to the technological developments. When and if this future container law is established, the 
notion of a “revolution” will be truly justified. 
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Chapter II 
LIABILITY AND PACKAGE LIMITATION 
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A.) INTRODUCTION  
With the advent of Containerisation, many problems were created in the field, 
particularly as to who is liable for the loss of or damage to the cargo. The implications of 
the modern carriage of goods by sea and the development of the multimodal transport 
greatly affected the calculation of the liability of the carriers. Here, certain legal regimes 
play their role, such as the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) and especially the 
Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules in relation to package limitation which is an important 
issue, because it affects the calculation of the liability. This, therefore, raises the important 
question, whether the container is a package or not. 
At the outset it may be useful to describe the background to the enactment of the 
Hague and Hague-Visby Rules. Therefore, the role of the COGSA 1971, and the discussion 
of what constitutes a package will follow. On the latter a case-study has been conducted 
and relevant approaches, which derived from certain jurisdictions, have been formulated, 
leading to the “metal package” approach, a term which will have much significance for the 
remainder of this thesis.  
Finally, it will be demonstrated, why Containerisation and the evolution of the new 
technology in container-ships have affected the regimes governing maritime transport 
directly or indirectly on the issue of the limitation of the liability of the carriers. This is of 
major importance, if we are to achieve the draft of a new uniform container law especially, 
for containerisation. Moreover, the definition of the tonnage limitation will be considered in 
sub-chapter C (c.). 
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a. Historical Background  
In the 14
th
 century, the bill of lading appeared as a non-negotiable receipt for cargo 
received, issued by a ship-owner, to merchants who did not intend to travel with their 
goods
82
. 
By the 18
th
 century, the bill of lading had acquired its third characteristic, the one of 
being negotiable
83
 while the incorporation into the document of the terms of the contract of 
carriage in order to resolve the disputes inevitably arose between cargo owners and carriers. 
In actual fact the traditional ocean bill of lading has been an important commercial 
document for many centuries.  
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 See BORL M. (1997) The Bill of Lading - A Document to Title of Goods, London, LLP, 
pp. 1-19; GASKELL N. /ASARIOTIS R. /BAATZ Y. (2000), pp. 145-151; SEALY LS 
/HOOLEY RJA (2003) p.14; PAMPOUKI A. (1995), pp.197-216 as in Ocean Bills of 
Lading, edited by Yiannopoulos AN; the document issued for a multimodal transport is 
sometimes termed “document” and at others “bills of lading.” The term “bill of lading” is 
used mostly for documents drafted by associations of professionals and great enterprises 
(for instance FIATA BL, Combiconbill) while the term “document” fits better to 
multimodal transport (Pampouki 2000, p. 49). The term “document” avoids confusion with 
bill of lading, which is usually connected with sea carriage, or anyhow it may be issued 
only in cases provided by the law. For example, the Hague-Visby Rules are applicable in 
principle to contracts, which are covered by a bill of lading or any other document of title. 
A bill of lading as a written instrument may have certain very important functions -namely 
those of a negotiable instrument and document of title- the question is whether or not a 
document for a multimodal transport. According to Pampouki (2000, p. 51) this 
“document” will serve as a document of title and it will be negotiable. 
83
 See JI MacWilliam Co Inc v. Mediterranean Shipping Co SA; the Rafaela S [2005] 2 
ALL ER 86; per Lord Bingham of Cornhill, “where, however, the court is considering a 
bona fide mercantile document, issued in the ordinary course of trade, it will ordinarily be 
slow to reject the description which the document bears, particularly where the document 
has been issued by the party seeking to reject the description. This document called itself a 
bill of lading. It was not a bill transferable by endorsement, and so was not “negotiable” in 
the somewhat inaccurate sense in which that term is used in this context (Kum v. Wah Tat 
Bank Ltd. [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 439 at p. 446);” cf. Non-negotiable sea waybills 
(GASKELL 2000, pp. 727-733). 
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As a contract, it has given the ship owner the means to qualify duties and mitigate 
liabilities, which could otherwise be imposed upon him under stringent common law 
rules
84
. 
At the time, the liability of the carrier under a bill of lading contract to transport the 
cargo safely to its destination was strict, subject only to what were known as the common 
law exceptions, namely, acts of God, public enemies, or inherent vice. Sometimes these 
exceptions might cause debate. For instance, a peril of navigation might not be an act of 
God or a public enemy. As shown in Liver Alkali v. Johnson [1874] LR 9 Exch 338, per 
Blackburn J, a fog might be a peril in navigation but it could not be called an act of God or 
a public enemy. In this case, the question raised was whether the defendant was under the 
liability of a bailee for hire to take proper care of the goods, in which case he was not 
responsible for this loss. Also, it was questioned whether he had the more extended liability 
of a common carrier to carry the goods safe against all events, but acts of God and the 
enemies of the Queen.  
In Nugent v. Smith [1876] 1 CPD 423, a mare was being carried on the deck of a 
ship and in the course of the voyage the ship encountered rough weather and the mare 
received such injuries that she died. The court held that the carrier does not insure against 
the irresistible act of nature, nor against the defects in the thing carried itself. Therefore, the 
carriers may discharge themselves from liability, if they prove that either the act of nature 
or the defect of the thing itself or both taken together formed the sole direct and irresistible 
cause of the loss
85
. 
                                                 
84
 Refer to Crutcher BM (June 1971) “Admiralty Law Institute: Symposium on Carriage of 
Goods by Water; the Ocean Bill of Lading - a Study in Fossilization,” 45, Tulane Law 
Review, pp. 697-732. 
85
 Refer to sub-chapter 2B (f). 
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Accordingly, if the carrier is guilty of any neglect to take precautions against the 
processes of nature, then the loss ceases to be by act of God, since human action has 
contributed to the loss.  
But, in Nugent v. Smith, the carrier was clearly not answerable for a loss occasioned 
either by an inherent quality of the item itself or by the act of God. Consequently, the 
carriers remained liable if their negligence or other fault had contributed to the loss or 
damage to the cargo. At this point in time, the carrier’s liability under a bill of lading 
contract for safe custody of the cargo was identical to the ship owner’s corresponding 
liability under a charterparty. 
By the 19
th
 century, however, the carrier was able to take advantage of his superior 
bargaining power under the bill of lading, by introducing clauses into the contract of 
carriage, which, to an increasing extent, excluded common law liability. Until 1855, limited 
liability was the exception, not the rule. Debate was raised on whether it was desirable to 
prohibit, by law, persons from dealing together “on the terms that liability of one or more or 
all” should be limited. As Lord Bramwell stated86 limited liability would impose no 
compulsion and would merely remove a restriction in the law. He also said “for the purpose 
of protecting the parties themselves, (…) the State ought not to interfere, but to leave every 
man to the most zealous and best informed of all protectors, himself” (Atiyah 1979, p. 565).  
This could easily result in the jeopardising of cargo-owners’ rights, since the 
carriers sought to exempt themselves from liability, or even from liability for losses 
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 See ATIYAH P (1979), pp. 230, 564-565; also, “First report of the commissioners 
appointed to inquire and ascertain how far the mercantile laws in the different parts of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland may be advantageously assimilated and also 
whether any and what alterations and amendments should be made in the law of partnership 
as regards the question of the limited or unlimited responsibility of partners.” P. 468; 1854 
(1791) XXVII.445 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers. 
 77 
resulting from their own negligence in the care of cargo. This led to the drawing up of 
certain rules such as model bills of lading and the introduction of legislation designed to 
control this power. The first example was the draft of the Harter Act 1893 in the USA
87
.  
The Harter Act was enacted to prevent the carrier from avoiding its common-law 
responsibilities by the device of securing agreements that included exculpatory clauses, 
such as those relieving vessel owners from liability for damage due to their negligent 
actions transporting cargo.  
The object of the Harter Act was to modify the relations between the vessel and the 
cargo. This targeted the exclusion of carrier liability for loss resulting from errors in the 
care and custody of the cargo. Similar legislation was passed in some Commonwealth 
countries
88
. 
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 February 13, 1893 ch. 105, 46A, ch. 8, section 190-126; also read Mannesman Denmark 
Corp. v. M/V Concert Express, 200 A.L.R Fed. 699 (5
th
 Cir. 2000).  
88
 The Australian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1904, the New Zealand Shipping and 
Seamen Act 1908 and the Canadian Water Carriage Act 1910 (Wilson JF 2008, p. 114, n. 
1); per Lord Bingham, supra, n. 83, at n. 8.  
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b. The Role of the COGSA; the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules 
Despite all these efforts, legislation was still inadequate to curb excessive freedom 
of contract. So, abuse of the carrier’s stronger bargaining position during the 19th century 
resulted in the formulation of the Hague Rules in 1924. In particular, the Maritime Law 
Committee of the International Law Association at a meeting held in The Hague drafted the 
Hague Rules in 1921 which were incorporated in an International Convention signed at 
Brussels on 25 August 1924 by the major trading nations
89
. It is remarkable though that 
even from that time concerns about the rapid development of trade and the legal protection 
of the consignors and the consignees had begun to surface. Crutcher
90
 captured the spirit of 
this when he remarked that we “have no notion what ocean transportation will be like fifty 
years from now, except that it will be very different from anything described.” 
The International Convention marks the beginning of efforts to unify rules relating 
to bills of lading, and to establish a minimum degree of protection for the cargo-owner from 
the widespread exclusion of liability by sea carriers. Consequently, both parties retained the 
power to negotiate their own terms as regards those aspects of the contract not specifically 
covered by the Rules.  
The major maritime nations introduced legislation to give effect to the Hague Rules 
which, in the case of the United Kingdom, took the form of the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act 1924
91
. The Hague Rules appear as a compromise between the interests of the ship-
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 See Wilson JF (2008, pp. 114, 173); De Wit R (1995, p. 76, n. 416); Tetley W (1998, pp. 
573-581). According to De Wit, actually, although reactions against the use of such clauses 
had already come by way of statutory intervention in the United States with the 1893 Harter 
Act, 46 USC, App. 190-196 (still in force today), the Hague Rules were a compromise 
between shipping and cargo interests which put an end to an era of incredibly wide-ranging 
exclusion clauses in bills of lading. 
90
 Supra, n. 84. 
91
 See Scrutton on Charterparties 20
th
 ed., pp. 404-417. 
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owners and the cargo-owners (Selvig 1961, p. 140). The Hague Rules reflected a view, 
widely shared among cargo interests that carriers, in issuing bills of lading
92
 containing or 
evidencing the terms of carriage contracts, had routinely, included conditions exonerating 
themselves from liability to an extent which was unacceptably prejudicial to the other 
parties to such contracts. However, there was still a need for greater uniformity 
internationally. 
Over the years, dissatisfaction grew with the limited nature of the protection 
afforded to cargo owners by the Hague Rules. Criticism mainly centred on the narrow area 
of operation of the Rules, since in the majority of countries they only applied to outward 
bills, while in US and Scandinavia relevant legislation was also applied to inward bills, and 
covered only the tackle-to-tackle period. They were only applicable to certain aspects of the 
contract of carriage rather than providing a comprehensive code, and cargo owners alleged 
that the underlying philosophy of the Rules was still biased in favour of the carrier. 
Opinions were, however, divided as to how progress could be achieved. On the one 
hand, the major ship-owning nations were opposed to any radical change in the framework. 
Instead, they favoured selective adjustments to the Hague Rules in order to remove the 
most obvious ‘blemishes’. This approach resulted in a series of draft amendments to the 
Rules, which were incorporated into a document known as the Brussels Protocol, the text of 
which was agreed at an International Conference held in Brussels in February 1968. The 
revised rules incorporating the amendments contained in the Brussels Protocol are known 
as the “Hague/Visby Rules.”  
Subsequently, some leading cargo providing countries, the majority of whom are 
drawn from the so-called Third World, drafted a new comprehensive Code covering all 
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 About the Bill of Lading, see The Rafaela S; supra, n. 83. 
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aspects of the contract of carriage by sea. This Code was incorporated in a Convention 
(known as the “Hamburg Rules”), which was signed at an International conference held in 
Hamburg in March 1978. However, the United Kingdom and some of the Western 
countries have adopted the Hague/Visby Rules. Belgium ratified the Visby Protocol on the 
6
th
 of September 1978, France on the 10
th
 of March 1997, the Netherlands on the 26
th
 of 
April 1982, the United Kingdom on the 1
st
 of October 1976, and Germany on the 14
th
 
February 1979 (De Wit R. 1995, p. 85, n. 479).  
In the case of the United Kingdom, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924, which 
gave effect to the Hague Rules has been repealed and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
1971 now gives effect to the Hague-Visby Rules. As Sec 1(1) COGSA 1971 reads ‘in this 
Act “the Rules” means the International Convention for the Unification of certain Rules of 
law relating to bills of lading signed at Brussels on the 25
th
 August 1924 as amended by the 
Protocol signed at Brussels on 23
rd
 February 1968 and by the protocol signed at Brussels on 
21 December 1979’.  
Despite this, there are still some countries, such as the USA (De Wit, p. 85), which 
give effect to the Hague Rules and it is common still to see the Hague Rules incorporated 
into charterparties by express contractual agreement in the form of a “Paramount Clause.” 
Unfortunately, all these efforts are not sufficient to control liability limits when it comes to 
containerisation and multimodal transport, since there is a great deal of debate regarding 
which convention is applicable. This hinders the development of international trade and a 
greater degree of uniformity would be desirable. This though may imply that we should 
produce new law in order to cover gaps. 
The single most important purpose of international conventions is to have uniform 
laws throughout the world so that no matter where a suit is brought, the outcome will be the 
 81 
same. However, such uniformity of approach will not be achieved simply because of the 
existence of a convention. The uniformity is dependent first of all upon the level of 
uniformity that has been achieved by the convention itself. Secondly, it is dependent upon 
the particular convention’s interaction and consistency with other international conventions 
on similar or related matters. Thirdly, it is dependent upon the national implementation of 
the convention and its relationship with other national laws (Xia Chen 2001, p. 129).  
The international convention framework in maritime law is not as uniform as it may 
seem to be. In the area of limitation of liability, although there are international 
conventions, a number of factors exist that may adversely influence the effectiveness and 
uniformity of the conventions. It is true that international law with respect to ship-owners’ 
limited liability is not as uniform as it should be (Xia Chen 2001, p. 130), since one source 
for lack of uniformity comes from the fact that there are several conventions on global 
limitation of liability currently in operation.  
The initial international effort to unify laws concerning limitation of liability 
resulted in the 1924 Convention. Although this convention never achieved its goal of 
uniformity of approach in the area of limited liability, it was adopted at the time by some 
countries, e.g. Brazil. The other two Conventions on global limitation of liability are the 
1957 and 1976 Conventions, both of which reached a high level respectively (Xia Chen 
2001, p. 130). Most recently, the 1996 Protocol to the 1976 Convention has been adopted 
by the International Maritime Organisation and has been open for signature since 
September 1997. Lack of uniformity may occur when a convention contains optional 
provisions, which allow the contracting States to provide otherwise in their respective 
national laws governing certain areas.  
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Such options are usually the results of certain compromises which are reached in 
order for the majority of the convention provisions to be accepted by the international 
community. Therefore, any attempt for uniformity of approach may be inherently 
unsuccessful. Additionally, uniformity of international law may also be impaired by 
national implementation of international conventions (Chen 2001, p. 131). 
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c. Statutory Provisions; the Hamburg Rules. 
However, from 1970 onwards, there was movement towards the replacement of the 
Hague Rules by a totally new convention. In 1971, it was decided to have such a 
convention drafted under the auspices of UNCITRAL, a United Nations agency. The new 
cargo convention was signed at Hamburg on 31
st
 March 1978 and subsequently became 
known as the Hamburg Rules. These new Rules have been met with both acclaim and 
criticism (De Wit 1995, p. 89). These Rules recently entered into force after having been 
ratified by the required twenty countries. The problem is that these Rules were ratified by 
states which represent only a negligible interest in international shipping, which may create 
conflicts within global trade. The fact that these states adopt these Rules, while the others 
are adopting the other legal frameworks may cause confusion, although a number of 
shipper-oriented states are currently planning to ratify the Hamburg Rules
93
. But that does 
not mean the problem is solved. However, many of the provisions in the Hamburg Rules 
were later copied into the new Multimodal Convention 1980.  
After a lot of debate, it had become clear by mid-1972 that no convention on 
multimodal transport was to be expected. This prompted a number of private organisations 
to start working again on standard terms or model rules regulating multimodal transport. 
The International Preparatory Group (IPG) consisted of sixty-eight states which had been 
appointed according to customary UN methods and which worked according to the 
customary UNCTAD principle of groups of countries.  
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 See Herber R (1992) “Gedanken zum Inkrafttreten der Hamburg – Regeln,” Transport 
Review, pp. 381-390, as in De Wit R. (1995, p. 89, n. 505); Waldron AJ (1991) “The 
Hamburg Rules- a Boondoggle for Lawyers?” Journal of Business Law, pp. 305-319. 
 84 
The IPG started its work in October 1973 and after six laborious sessions and a total 
of fifty-three meetings, it produced a draft convention in March 1979 under the name of 
United Nations Conference on a Convention on International Multimodal Transport.  
Negotiations were extremely difficult in the light of such completely different 
points of view. At the third session of the proceedings the IPG’s President, the Norwegian 
Professor Erling Selvig, advanced a so-called Common Understanding which outlined the 
subject areas that the various groups could agree to include within the Convention, such as 
the scope of Convention’s application and the multimodal transport operator’s liability for 
loss of, damage to or delay of the goods. The Draft Convention was presented at a 
diplomatic conference, which took place in two sessions from 12 to 30 November 1979 and 
from 8 to 27 May 1980 and was attended by eighty-three states. The Convention was 
finally concluded in Geneva, on the 24
th
 of May 1980. The structure of the UN Multimodal 
Convention 1980 and the Hamburg Rules only differed where it was necessary to include 
specific provisions for multimodal transport
94
. 
Two more Conventions were drafted to attempt to settle the multimodal muddle. 
Initially, the UN Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in 
International Trade was concluded in 1991. The aim of this Convention was to facilitate the 
movement of goods by establishing uniform rules concerning liability for loss of or damage 
to, or delay in the handling of such goods while they are in the charge of operators of 
transport terminals and are thus not covered by the laws of carriage arising out of 
conventions applicable to the various modes of transport. 
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 See SELVIG E. (1978) “The Influence of the Hamburg Rules on the Work for a 
Convention on International Multimodal Transport,” in The Speakers’ Papers for the Bill of 
Lading Conference, London, Lloyd’s of London Press, at p. 10. 
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This Convention under ideal circumstances would cover the last element of the 
transport chain (the other elements being the Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal 
Convention). However, it has been signed only by five states (France, Mexico, Philippines, 
Spain, USA) and ratified by Egypt, Gabon, Georgia and Paraguay, and has not yet entered 
into force
95
. 
Secondly “the Rotterdam Rules,” as demonstrated above (Chapter I), is a recent 
attempt at unification. This new Convention covers a limited perspective of multimodal 
carriage involving sea carriage and raises difficult issues of how this Convention will 
interact with existing carriage conventions such as CMR (Baughen 2009, p. 151). 
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 http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,2340,en_2649_34367_1866267_1_1_1_1,00.html, 
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B.) WHAT CONSTITUTES “PACKAGE”? 
When it comes to limitation of liability in carriage of goods by sea, two interlinked 
methods seem to appear; initially, the “package” limitation and secondly the “tonnage” 
limitation
96
. Article IV Rule 5 of the Hague Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules and art. VI 
of the Hamburg Rules restrict the right of limitation to claims for loss or damage incurred 
in connection with the goods carried and the limit is calculated with reference to particulars 
of the cargo (Griggs/Williams 2005, p. 132).  
 Thus, “neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any 
loss or damage to or in connection with goods in an amount exceeding £100 per package or 
unit…”  Since the current legal regime is not adequate to satisfy modern trade needs, we 
need new law; the current problems and a lot of controversy have arisen as to the “package” 
limitation. The debate has centred more on whether or not such a cargo or part of it can be 
described as a “unit.” 
The problem though is less acute in the United States where the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act 1936, section 4(5), provides that the carrier can limit his liability to: “…$500 
per package…or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary freight unit.”97 In 
the United Kingdom, the COGSA 1924 reads “…£100 per package or unit…” That was up 
to 1971, since the draftsmen of the Hague/Visby Rules abandoned the pound sterling in 
favour of the Poincare franc in an attempt to devise a “currency” which would retain its 
value during a period of inflation. The franc was defined in Art. IV Rule 5(d) as ‘a unit 
consisting of 65.5 milligrammes of gold of millesimal fineness 900’ and it was further 
                                                 
96
 See below sub-chapter 2C. 
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provided that the date of conversion of the sum awarded into national currencies should be 
governed by the law of the court seized of the case. So far as the United Kingdom was 
concerned, the problems of conversion were simplified by s 1(5) of the COGSA 1971 
which empowered the Secretary of State periodically to specify the conversion amount in 
sterling by statutory instrument.  
Now, the Poincare franc has in turn been replaced as the unit of account by the 
SDR; Special Drawing Right. The SDR was defined by the International Monetary Fund, as 
the result of s 2(4) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1981, giving legislative effect to the 
Brussels Protocol of December 1979 to which the United Kingdom and twenty-one other 
nations are parties. The SDR has been preferred since the unit is based on a basket of 
currencies, the value of which is probably more sensitive to the trends of inflation that the 
fluctuating market price of gold.  
According to art. IV Rule 5(a) of the Hague/Visby Rules, “unless the nature and 
value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the 
bill of lading, neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any 
loss or damage to or in connection with the goods in an amount exceeding 666.67 units of 
account per package or unit or 2 units of account per kilogramme weight of the goods lost 
or damaged, whichever is the higher.” In the USA, the COGSA reads “...$500 per 
package… or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary freight unit.” 
When the US COGSA was passed in 1936, it essentially adopted the Hague Rules 
of 1924. Although the Hague Rules were amended in 1968, their influence is evident in 
COGSA, and contracts for carriage continue to incorporate them as their governing regime. 
The Hague Rules, like COGSA, fail to define the term “package” and the package problem 
plagues the Hague scheme as well (Leary M. 2003, p. 191). 
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However, according to COGSA 1971, a new paragraph (par. c) in art. IV Rule 5 of 
the Hague/Visby Rules provides that “where a container, pallet or similar article of 
transport is used to consolidate goods, the number of packages or units enumerated in the 
bill of lading as packed in such article of transport shall be deemed the number of packages 
or units for the purpose of this paragraph as far as these packages or units are concerned. 
Except as aforesaid such article of transport shall be considered the package or unit.” 
But, despite the existence of this paragraph, the problem persists. Furthermore, 
some other countries do not have similar wording as in the US COGSA
98
, and the word 
“unit” might be interpreted differently, either as the physical unit received for shipment or 
the “freight unit” despite the absence of the word “freight.” In the case of containerised or 
palletised cargo there would seem to be no reason in principle why the container or the 
pallet itself should not be considered a “package” or “unit.”99 
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a. The US Approach; the New US COGSA  
          Many States have now developed their own systems. The Scandinavians, as 
Ramberg
100
 reveals have opted for a kind of merger between the Hague Rules and the 
Hamburg Rules systems so that they could still continue to adhere to the Hague Rules (as 
amended by the 1968 and 1979 Protocols, the so-called Hague/Visby Rules with the 
“SDR”-addition) but with added provisions taken from the Hamburg Rules. The 
Scandinavian strategy differs greatly from the proposed US COGSA
101
. 
The US COGSA seems wiser, since it entails a good objective. All the parties 
engaged in the movement of goods from point to point are in principle subjected to the 
same legal framework, which may facilitate claims handling for the shipper, but complicate 
recourse actions for the parties in the expanded family of carriers. Still, one may ask if it is 
possible or indeed prudent to shelter all these different trading partners under the same 
model. Difficulty to meet this objective also shows when exceptions have to be made in 
view of the particular frameworks applying to US rail and road carriers. And, the problem 
grows bigger when parties to a service contract may agree on different limit from that 
suggested for the US COGSA, which is equivalent to the liability under the Hague/Visby 
Rules. Meanwhile such exceptions would not apply to overseas carriers who, quite 
surprisingly, have to follow rules contrary to their respective mandatory rules (like the 
CMR carriage of goods by road in the EU).  
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 90 
Although the Hague/Visby Rules framework is not absolutely perfect, mainly 
because it was the result of a compromise reached amongst the various interest groups in 
the maritime field, still, because it is a compromise, it has gained increasing support from 
all sectors of industry that recognise the urgent need for the US to modernise its laws on 
carriage of goods in foreign trade
102
. Accordingly, bold steps need to be taken in regard to 
other proposals, like the Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules, since these are out-of-date with 
today’s technological advances, such as containerisation. 
Therefore, the proposal for the US COGSA may not be perfect but it is probably 
what the modern industry wants to see in an up-to-date legal framework that will serve such 
technological advances. Moving a step forwards, the new US COGSA removes the defence 
of Error in Navigation and Management, despite its historical significance. It is true that 
with the modern container vessels and the technological evolution of equipment the ship-
owners can be in instant contact with their vessels and crew. Therefore, this defence is 
ineffective if raised today. It seems the new US COGSA wants to bind the ship-owners so 
they are not absolved from liability if their crew was negligent. 
Also important is the fact that the US COGSA will also provide for land and 
generally intermodal carriage of goods. It is to be queried whether we should assume at this 
point that the US COGSA is probably wiser than the CMR (Art. 2)
 103
 and/or the recent 
“Rotterdam Rules,” which is introduced to cover the sea leg initially, within limits for 
other modes, as shown in Articles 5 and 82.  
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Usually, the cargo interests pursue those participating in the land carriage by 
pleading the claim in tort, since cargo interests are not in direct privity of contract with the 
sub-contractors selected by the ocean carrier to perform different aspects of the through 
carriage. Furthermore, since many shipments involved in domestic carriage either originate 
from or are destined for overseas destinations, the legislators requested the US Department 
of Transport (DOT) to study intermodal and Multimodal transportation liabilities. How is it 
possible to achieve “Multimodal Harmony” since shipper interests collide with the carrier 
interests? Shipper interests (particularly, The National Industrial Transportation League) 
were not willing to adopt a fixed-value liability system and preferred full-value liability on 
the part of carriers. Carrier interests (The American Trucking Association) advocated a 
statutory liability standard of US$2.50 per pound for LTL (less than trailer loads) and 
US$1.10 per pound for TL (trailer loads), citing Canada’s National Transportation Act and 
Europe’s CMR Convention as models104. 
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the US COGSA sidesteps a conflict with 
laws governing land carriage by truck, such as Canada’s Transportation Act and Europe’s 
CMR, by exempting the actual land carriers from its application. Instead contractual carriers 
(Multimodal Transport Operators and Freight Forwarders), whose liabilities are not 
governed by any statutory national law, are subject to the COGSA carrier liability 
framework, i.e. the greater of 2 SDR (C$4.00) per kilo or 666.67 SDR (C$1,334.00) per 
package, during the entire transport, including any land leg. 
                                                 
104
 See “Multimodal Liability: Extracts from a Statement by the CIFFA Sea-Freight 
Committee,” Multimodal Transport: Canadian International Freight Forwarders 
Association Position Paper, as in http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/multim.htm 
(19/04/2005, at 23:00).  
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Canada seems very concerned with the new COGSA as it governs intermodal traffic 
to and from Canada through US ports as well as traffic to and from the United States 
through Canadian ports. Its intermodal liability conflicts with provincial jurisdiction over 
road transport liability and federal jurisdiction over rail transport liability. In this regard, 
CIFFA has identified this conflict as one of three fundamental objections to US COGSA.   
 On the other hand, the freight forwarders or MTOs -as “contractual carriers” 
arranging a “chain of transport”- should be liable for the actions of the individual carriers. It 
is only reasonable that such assumption of liability by a contractual carrier does not impose 
a greater liability than that of the individually sub-contracted carrier, or actual carrier, 
whose liability is governed by national law or international convention. This is where the 
new US COGSA fails, since it evolves a liability framework, which applies only to the 
contracting carrier and its subcontractors called “performing carriers,” despite the fact that 
there are relevant national laws that govern the carriage. Nevertheless, this is what we need; 
a mandatory convention that will unify transport. 
The drawback created is that the new US COGSA works against harmonising 
inland liability frameworks of trading partner nations. Therefore, two identical shipments 
damaged in a truckload will have two different claims settlements if one is under an 
international contract of carriage subject to COGSA, and the other under a domestic 
waybill. Moreover, it would subject US freight forwarder to an inland liability framework 
different from its own existing law. The United States seems to have traced an easy way to 
satisfy the cargo interests. Accordingly, they impose an increased uniform limitation upon 
the “contracting carrier” for the land segment of the transport.  
In the US, the cargo interests are not happy with the relatively lower limit of 
liability under the national laws and seek paths to extend the higher limits set by the Hague-
 93 
Visby Rules for inland loss and damage. It is remarkable that the cargo interests in the USA 
actually want the CMR Convention, as well as for Canada’s provincial trucking regulators 
to increase their liability frameworks to that of the Hague-Visby Rules in order to “achieve” 
uniformity. 
In the USA, it is debatable whether a container can be a COGSA package and limit 
the carriers’ liability accordingly, since this technological development was never foreseen 
by COGSA drafters. Terminology problems in the interpretation of law appear if the 
container was damaged in transit, since there is not a unified legal regime to control 
containerisation and the outdated COGSA does not serve these needs nowadays
105
. 
Nevertheless, it seems the USA does not want to abandon the old and out-of-date 
Hague Rules and even nowadays some other States also continue to apply these Rules
106
. 
But, this problem might be eliminated if the USA adopted the latest version of the 
Hague/Visby Rules where an effort is made to identify the container as a package in 
relevant circumstances, since the package limitation is a “Hague Rules” problem and not a 
“Hague/Visby Rules” one. 
Generally, the American Courts accept that “package” is each package inside the 
container of the number of packages listed on the face of the bill of lading (Tetley W. 1988, 
pp. 642-643)
107
. However, in Mitsui & Co., Ltd. v. American Export Lines, Inc. 636 F. 2d 
807 (2
nd
 Cir. 1981), the court notably relied on the 1968 Visby Rules, which state that when 
the bill of lading does not show how many separate packages or units there are, then the 
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article of transport - the Container - shall be deemed the package, to reinforce its holding
108
 
and to promote international uniformity. 
In Mitsui, the problem was that stacks of ingots, though described as bundles on the 
bill of lading, did not conform to the usual meaning of the term “package” and, in the exact 
wording of the courts decision, stacks of ingots consisting of fifteen ingots each weighing 
seventy-five pounds did not constitute “packages” as defined by COGSA, although they 
were described as “bundles.” That was due to the fact that the shipper had done nothing to 
hold them together, as being the custom even after containerisation, notwithstanding that 
piling ingots reduced ground and facilitated loading and unloading. Many ships, including 
the Red Jacket
109
 are so constructed that shipments must be made in containers. Therefore, 
in the case of Mitsui, the container is characterised as “functionally a part of the ship.” The 
Supreme Court, though, has further observed, “the container is a modern substitute for the 
hold of the vessel.” 
As demonstrated, the “said to contain” clause was established to solve the package 
problem. What is important here is the fact that the items contained in the container should 
be considered as “COGSA package.” As listed in the bill of lading in question, “two 
containers said to contain thirty bundles of ingots.” However, since the ingots were not 
banded or strapped together, there is no “bundle” and no item inside the container, but, 
according to Mitsui, that does not finally mean that the container should be defined as 
package
110
.  
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It is true that the shipper is in a better position to be able to estimate the value of the 
cargo than the carrier; therefore the shipper can decide whether to shift the risk to the 
carrier by declaring a higher value for its goods in the bill of lading, or to place the risk 
with a third-party insurer (Leary M 2003, p. 191). This seems to be an alternative to dealing 
with possible conflicts of interest since again it is up to the parties concerned to decide how 
the damages will be compensated. The only disadvantage is that if the shippers declare a 
higher value for their goods on the bill of lading, they will necessarily pay a higher rate for 
shipment of the goods
111
. 
This was the outcome in Fishman & Tobbin, Inc v. Tropical Shipping (not reported 
in F.Supp.2d) (SDFla 1999), where the District Court of Florida held that neither the term 
“unit” nor the term “dozen” could be construed in any way as preparation for 
transportation, thus effectively making the container a package for COGSA purposes. In 
this case, there were two bills of lading; the first listed the contents as “One forty feet 
container said to contain 5,000 units of men’s jackets.” The second bill of lading listed its 
contents as “dozens” of pairs of pants; more specifically, it stated, “one forty feet container 
said to contain 39 big packs containing 27,908 units of boys’ pants.” 
The container with the 5,000 jackets was lost overboard in transit from the 
Dominican Republic to Florida. It was asserted that each individually wrapped jacket 
constituted a package, and that the Tropical Shipping was liable for the shipment to the tune 
of $231,557.96. However, the Court concluded that the container holding the jackets is the 
COGSA package with respect to the shipment. What was really striking in this case is that 
Fishman and Tobbin were asserting for each bill of lading whatever was most to their 
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advantage in terms of possible compensation for the loss, rather than following a coherent 
line on what constitutes a package.  
Since they were affirming that each individual wrapped jacket
112
 was a package -
because each jacket was placed on a separate hanger and individually enclosed in plastic 
wrap inside the container according to the first bill of lading- then they should have been 
consistent and affirmed that each pack inside the container was the package for the second 
bill of lading. 
The Court followed the precedent that had been established in previous cases, for 
example, in the Binladen BSB Landscaping v. M/V Nedlloyd Rotterdam 759 F. 2d 1006 (2
nd
 
Cir. 1985), where a bill of lading described the quantity of packages as “1” and the goods 
as “one 40 feet container said to contain “7,990 live plants.” In this case, it was held that 
the plants were not separate packages, even if some of the plants might have been prepared 
in ways entitling them to treatment as packages.  
They were happy with the fact that Binladen initiated the rule of uniformity for 
vessels that often travel between different jurisdictions
113
. 
 Furthermore, the problem of interpretation increases when the container contains 
smaller physical units.  In the US, the Court of Appeal has ruled that, for purposes of the 
$500 package limitation under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the number of packages 
was not the total number of boxes in a container, but the number of pallets into which those 
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boxes were packed. However, the decision in the words of court involves navigation 
through “muddy waters” to determine the meaning of the word “package” under COGSA 
as shown in Group Chegaray v. P &O, Sea-Land and others 251F. 3d 1359 (11
th
 Cir. 
2001).  
In this case, it was the shipper’s insurer that paid for the loss under a cargo 
insurance policy and brought a subrogation action against, among others, P&O and Sea-
Land
114
. Accordingly, it was held that the number of pallets within the shipping container, 
rather than the container itself or number of cartons contained on each pallet, represented 
the accurate number of “packages” for which the shipper was liable under the COGSA 
limitation of liability provision, despite the fact that the bill of lading referred to the fact 
that the pallets contained 2,270 cartons. The bill of lading described the pallets as 
“packages” and the decision to wrap cartons onto pallets was made by the shipper.  
 If a bill of lading is ambiguous regarding what constitutes a “package” under the 
COGSA, then the ambiguity is resolved against the carrier, by virtue of the COGSA, 46 
App. U.S.C.A. “section” 1304(5). The Group Chegaray case, already mentioned above, 
involved an eight-ton, 40ft container filled with perfumes and cosmetics shipped from 
France to Florida that mysteriously disappeared between December 26 and 28, 1992, while 
deposited in a marine terminal at Port Everglades, Florida. Although subsection 1304(5) of 
COGSA may limit the carrier’s liability to $500 “per package”, it fails to define the term 
“package”. Therefore, the district court deemed each of the 2,270 cartons, all but two of 
which were wrapped onto a total of forty-two pallets, a “package” for the purposes of 
liability under sub-section 1304(5).  
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 In addition to the lack of statutory guidance, unforeseeable technological strides 
in the shipping industry since 1936 have contributed to the frustration of many courts 
attempting to define a COGSA package.  
 When goods are shipped in containers, courts usually consider the inner contents 
of the container, instead of the container itself, to be the package
 115
. 
 In Commonwealth Petrochemicals, Inc. v. S. S. Puerto Rico 607 F. 2d 322, 327-
28, the court enforced a contractual provision that defined “package” more broadly than it 
is defined by COGSA and extended COGSA’s $500 per package or per unit limitation to 
that definition of “package.” In Mori Seiki USA, Inc. v. M/V Alligator Triumph 990 F. 2d 
444, 447-48, the court allowed the extension of COGSA’s $500 per package or per unit 
limitation to the period after a lathe was discharged from the ship but before it was released 
from the carrier’s custody. 
 The two parties are merely parts of the same whole and should be treated as such. 
If the owner is entitled to liability limitations under COGSA, but the in-house vessel 
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became strained by technological advances in the shipping industry. 
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manager is not, then the cargo interests have an essentially unlimited claim against the 
same party, the shipowner that COGSA seeks to protect
116
. As the wording in the Bill of 
Lading is important in order to decide the limits of liability, in the particular case the US 
Court of Appeal held that the forty-two pallets described as “packages” in the bill of lading 
for the missing container, plus the two loose boxes were the COGSA packages. Moreover, 
although accepting that the wording in the Bill of Lading is what decides the package 
limitation, the US Court of Appeal listed five more matters that should be taken into 
account when dealing with such cases.  
Among the matters to be taken into account were what the parties agreed to as 
indicated in the bill of lading. A COGSA package should be the result of some degree of 
preparation to facilitate its transport and handling. Additionally, a container can be 
considered a COGSA package only if there is clear agreement to that effect. Unless 
otherwise agreed, when goods are placed in containers without being described as 
separately packaged, they would be regarded as goods not shipped in packages.  
Finally, when a bill of lading is ambiguous, then, in view of the widely accepted 
understanding that the original purpose of the limitation was to protect shippers against 
carriers, the ambiguity would be resolved against the carrier. 
During the debate about what a “package” is, the container took many terms. As 
further demonstrated in the Leather’s Best, Inc. v. S. S. Mormaclynx 451 F.2 d 800, 815 (2nd 
Cir. 1971), a container is usually supplied by the carrier and was characterized as 
“functionally a part of the ship”. This case involved a shipment of leather packed in cartons 
strapped together, and shipped in a container. The court held that each “package” was a 
                                                 
116
 As in Charest D. (February 2004) “A Fresh Look at the Treatment of Vessel Managers 
under COGSA,” 78 Tulane Law Review p. 885. 
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carton, since the bill of lading described one container with ninety-nine bales of leather. 
Moreover, in Northern Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo 432 U.S. 249, 270 (1979), the 
US Supreme Court characterised the container as “a modern substitute for the hold of the 
vessel.” Criteria, like the functional economic test (analysed in sub-chapter 2B (b)), were 
also established and theories, which still do not solve the problem since in some cases these 
criteria might be too narrow
117
. 
The existence of the Hague/Visby Rules has not deterred attempts by carriers and 
ship-owners to lessen, or limit their liability for loss or damage to goods, by inserting 
various forms of “limitation” clauses into bills of lading. Nevertheless, the consensus 
among courts from Canada, England, France, and the United States, which have confronted 
such limitation clauses, has been remarkably uniform. Recognising that the Hague/Visby 
Rules set forth minimum standards of liability for carriers, these courts have been 
universally reluctant to permit a carrier to prescribe a lower standard for himself. Hence, 
courts have not hesitated to invoke article III Rule 8 of the Hague/Visby Rules, to 
invalidate any clause that has the effect of relieving, or lessening the carrier’s 
responsibilities under the Rules. 
In certain circumstances, the carriers themselves are able to define the container as a 
package, by simply describing the shipment on the bill of lading as “one container.” 
However, they should be careful not to insert such a clause in the general clauses of the bill 
                                                 
117
 Cf. Complaint of Norfolk, Baltimore & Carolina Line 478 F. Supp. 383 (DCVa 1979) 
where Clark J concluded that the determination whether a particular container is a COGSA 
package cannot be controlled by a talismanic formula but necessitates analysis of the facts 
of each case in light of congressional policy, when commenting that containerised shipping 
was “but a gleam in the eye of maritime technology when Congress enacted COGSA; see 
Paul Edelman (Winter 1982) “Cargo Claims and Limitation Liability,” 17, Forum, p. 719; 
also supra, n. 5, p. 447. 
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of lading, since this would result in the clause being declared null and void according to art. 
III Rule 8 of the Hague or Hague/ Visby Rules. Such a clause would be invalid even if the 
container was packed by the shipper. 
There is also controversy about whether or not it should be left to the will of the 
parties to decide how their liability will be calculated
118
. Actually, some parties, usually 
forwarders, often attempt to claim that they are carriers within the definition of COGSA. In 
determining whether a forwarder can be considered a carrier under COGSA, courts have 
distinguished two types of forwarders: 
 Forwarders who consolidate freight and act for the shipper to secure 
carriage. 
 Forwarders who contract with shippers to carry the goods to their destination 
and subsequently contract with a carrier for the carriage-namely Non-Vessel 
Operating Common Carriers (NVOCCs). Courts have uniformly held that 
the first type of carriers is not COGSA carriers, but some have held that the 
latter type is. Liability is limited to 17 SDR per kilo under CIM-COTIF and 
8.33 SDR per kilo under CMR; unless the shipper can establish that the loss 
was caused by the carrier’s gross negligence or wilful misconduct119. The 
liability under COGSA is limited to 17 SDR and $500 under the US 
COGSA. 
It is worth noting that nowadays the intention of the parties is seriously considered 
in certain circumstances and sometimes private settlements between the consignor and 
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 Cf. Pannell v. United States Lines Co. 263 F.2d 497 (2
nd
 Cir. 1959); in this case a yacht 
on deck was lost. The parties have defined what “package” meant within a clause in the bill 
of lading which was declared void. 
119
 As per Parigi, supra n. 115.  
 102 
consignee take place. This is reasonable, since the law does not yet govern containerisation, 
but, the parties must be careful not to insert clauses concerning the package issue that may 
be void in the bill of lading. 
It is a general phenomenon in practice that the various courts of appeal develop 
rules of interpretation in order to apply the original COGSA standard to containers and 
other unitised cargo (Schoenbaum T. 2001, p. 635). In order to deal with this matter they 
are guided by practical considerations of the parties’ expectations when entering into a 
contract of carriage, as well as the desirability of principles that correspond closely to 
international practice. Furthermore, as established in Stolk Containers, Inc. v. Evergreen 
Marine Corp. 962 F.2d 276 (2
nd
 Cir. 1992), a container can also be a package when the 
cargo is not capable of being stored in smaller sub-units. 
However, in St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. 745 F. Supp. 186, 
189 (SDNY 1990), the Court called for a re-examination of the view that the $500 per 
package, or per customary freight unit, should not apply to a container said to contain 
packages. Carriers have drafted bills of lading using a wide range of terms relating to its 
applicability to container shipments. The resulting variety of language, and the fact that 
certain circumstances applied to the issuance of bills of lading, introduced additional 
problems of interpretation in this matter. For reasons of reduction of cost and prevention of 
theft or damage, containers have become a “customary freight unit.” 
What the Court actually suggested during the St Paul case was that if carriers pack 
and seal the containers themselves they should not seek to use a beneficial interpretation of 
the terms of the bill of lading to apply the $500 per package COGSA limitation to 
containers.  
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However, this limitation should apply if shippers like the NVOCCs pack the 
container. A distinction on this basis would eliminate fraudulent claims, reduce litigation 
costs, allow shippers of goods to select carriers offering the lowest rates of carriage, and 
encourage shippers of high value goods to pack carefully and insure accordingly; although, 
that would be between the insurers of the shippers and the carriers. 
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b. The Canadian Approach 
In Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerland 483 F. 2d 645 (2
nd
 Cir. 1973), the 
Canadian Court held that the ocean carrier was entitled to limit its liability to $500, for the 
theft of three hundred and fifty packages of adding machines from a container, because the 
container was loaded and sealed by the shipper, who described the shipment in the bill of 
lading as “one Container said to contain Machinery.” Since the bill of lading mentioned 
only the container, then the container is deemed the package for limitation purposes.  
In this case, Oakes J developed a new approach, the “functional economics test.” 
Under this test, the courts initial inquiry is “whether the contents of the container could 
have feasibly been shipped overseas in the individual packages or cartons in which they 
were packed by the shipper.” If the shipper’s own packing units are functional, there is a 
presumption that a container is not a package. This presumption may be overcome by 
evidence supplied by the carrier that the parties intended the container to be a package. 
When the shipper’s own units are not suitable for safe transportation, there is a presumption 
that the parties intended the container to be a package. This results in a shifting of the 
burden to the shipper to show why the individual units within the container should be 
considered packages. 
The Second Circuit also applied the functional economics test in Cameco Inc. v. S. 
S. American Legion 514 F 2d 1291 (2
nd
 Cir. 1974) by assessing that this test is not 
conclusive since it merely affects the burden of proof. In this case, a cargo of tinned hams 
was packed in corrugated cartons. Some of these cartons were strapped on pallets. All of 
the cartons were put in a refrigerated container, which was loaded aboard the S.S. 
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“American Legion,” a containership with no internal refrigeration system120. The problem 
here was that the refrigerated container was not shipped in the proper ship, such as a reefer. 
It was customary for canned hams to be shipped in corrugated cartons, whether the cartons 
are shipped in containers, on pallets or breakbulk. 
Furthermore, corrugated cartons were the form of packaging for breakbulk 
shipments before the use of containers became widespread. It is one of the exceptional 
situations where the burden of the proof is put on the carrier to supply evidence that the 
parties intended to treat the container as a package. But according to the court’s decision 
here each carton was held to be the package.  
However, if the carriers are not involved in the packing or piling and stuffing of the 
container then they should not be liable. Indeed, as shown in Rosenbruch v. American 
Export Isbrandtsen Lines 543 F. 2d 967 (2
nd
 Cir. 1976) the shipper’s agent alone loaded the 
container which he got from the carrier. The metal box was loaded with the shipper’s goods 
only, and not those of any other shipper.  
 The shipper’s agent was also the one who selected the voyage and the vessel for 
the shipment. He stated on the bill of lading that one package or container was involved and 
described the contents as “used household goods.” 
 The carrier was not involved at all in packing the container and perhaps, in these 
situations, the carriers should not be liable. According to Armstrong (1981, p. 441), when 
deciding who to blame for the loss or damage in the undertaking of containerisation and 
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 As interviewed by TSARDAKAS J., representative of Maersk in Volos, Greece 
(10/10/2008) this is one of the most major practical problems that freight forwarders and 
less developed ports meet since there is lack of financial support to provide them with the 
appropriate equipment. About “the functional economics test,” refer also to STILL CRAIG 
(September 2001) “Thinking outside the Box; the application of COGSA’s $500 per-
package limitation to Shipping Containers,” 24, Houston Journal of International Law, pp. 
81-138.   
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when deciding if the carriers are indeed liable, it should be taken into account whether the 
carrier’s representative (i.e. the shipper and not the shipper’s agent) had an opportunity to 
supervise stuffing. Also, it should be taken into account whether the carrier’s representative 
had an opportunity to view or tally the container’s contents. This should occur, particularly, 
if the carrier was present
121
. 
 Traditionally, the North American courts have approached the question on the 
basis that the manner in which the cargo is described in the bill of lading is “entitled to 
considerable weight,” as also held in Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg 
Sudamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts -Gessellschaft & Columbus Lines, Inc. [1967] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 193, where the shipment consisted of nine pallets, each pallet comprising six 
cartons of forty tuners strapped to pallet boards. But, in this case, was the “package” the 
carton or the pallet
122
? The Court accepted that a “package” is what was stated on the dock 
receipt, which in this case was the bill of lading, and also what was stated on the libellants’ 
claim letter. The libellants-appellants were Standard Electrica, S.A.  
 This was an appeal by the libellant, Standard Electrica, S.A. where McLean J 
dismissed its claim against the defendant, Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts-
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 For issues of rendering liability when the employees of the shipper had stuffed the 
containers and “the Himalaya Clause” see chapter III; cf. Matsushita Electric Corp. v. S. S. 
Aegis Spirit 414 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Wash. 1976); as it was held in this case, per Beeks J, 
“the undoubted objective of 46 USC par. 1304 (5) was to establish a minimum floor below 
which carriers subject to the act could not reduce their liability for cargo damage. If carriers 
alone, or even carriers and the shippers together, are allowed to christen together something 
“package” which distorts or belies the plain meaning of this word as used in the statute, 
then the liability floor becomes illusory and negotiable.” What remarkably Beeks J states in 
this case, we should discern whether it is the parties’ characterisation of the shipment or the 
court’s interpretation of that statute that counts. Or if I may go even further what if the 
parties themselves give a fair characterisation on this issue and the courts agree with them 
or the other way around they disagree. Beeks J concludes “it is not the parties’ 
characterisation of the shipment, but the court’s interpretation of the statute, that controls.”  
122
 See TETLEY W (1988, pp. 882-883). 
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Gesellschaft for $13,300 as additional damages in respect of the loss of seven pallets 
comprised of cartons of television tuners shipped from New York to Rio de Janeiro. 
McLean J held that each pallet was a “package” within the meaning of the U.S. Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act, 1936, Sect. 4(5), and that the libellant could not recover more than $500 
in respect of each pallet. Since the parties had agreed each pallet as a package that 
characterisation was entitled to considerable weight. 
 What is remarkable about this case is how the court applied the statute and 
suggested its future modification. Per Chief Judge Lumbard, since the word “package” 
fairly included the pallets as made up for shipment in Standard Electrica, SA it was not 
deemed important that the drafters might not have foreseen this precise application at the 
time that this provision was enacted thirty years ago
123
. If through the passage of time, this 
statutory limitation has become inadequate and its application inequitable, a revision must 
come from Congress, and it should not come from the Courts. 
Besides, it was accepted in International Factory Sales Service Ltd. v. The Ship 
“Aleksandr Serafimovich” and Far Eastern S.S. Co. (“The Aleksandr Serafimovich”) 
[1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 346, per Smith J, that the $500 limit on each package had become 
unsatisfactory, since those who set the $500 per package rule had no doubt had in mind the 
                                                 
123
 cf. Cain v. Bowlby 114 F. 2d 519, at pp. 522 and 523 (10
th
 Cir 1940); as held a statute 
relating to a person engaged in transportation by motor vehicle applied to companies 
operating high-powered and capacious busses catering to long distance transportation, 
despite the fact that such transportation was unknown at the time of the enactment of the 
statute. See also Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston 227 Iowa 50, 287 N.W. 278 (1939), where 
it was held that a statute providing that an action might be brought against any railroad 
corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars in any county through 
which such road or line passed or was operated, applied to a company engaged in the 
operation of freight trucks of semi trailer type upon a fixed schedule and over a regular 
route, although that kind of transportation came into being long after the statute was 
enacted. 
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types, sizes and shapes of packages in common use at that time, and now technological 
changes had completely altered the situation. Accordingly, it appeared that pallets, of the 
kind with which this case was concerned, were not in use at that time and more particularly 
the large metal containers only appeared on the scene in fairly recent years. 
In this case, one hundred and fifty cartons of sewing machine heads valued at U.S. 
$43.05 each were shipped at Kobe, Japan, on the vessel Aleksandr Serafimovich, for 
delivery at Vancouver. The cartons were strapped to three pallets, each of which contained 
fifty cartons. The cartons were numbered from one hundred and fifty-one to three hundred. 
The bills of lading included a heading “Packages” containing the words and figures “3 
pallets (150 cartons).” Whilst being discharged at Vancouver one pallet containing fifty 
cartons was dropped over the side of the vessel. 
It can be seen that the problem was becoming more serious even then. As Smith J 
continues in the relevant case, several judges had expressed the opinion that shipping 
methods had changed and were changing so greatly that the $500 rule should be thoroughly 
reviewed and that a solution should be reached by international agreement. Such a solution 
might well come from a quite different approach to the problem of providing a modicum of 
protection to cargo-owners. 
However, an international solution, even if sought with good will and energy, is 
scarcely possible in the future
124
. In the mean-time, the courts must wrestle with the 
situation, as it continues to develop. But, they cannot change the statutory figures of $500, 
since this can only be done by the legislature. It is always difficult to apply a rule designed 
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  And as PAMPOUKI stated in our interview (26/12/2006, at 12:30), this will never take 
place, although I prefer the quotation of the judge; it is scarcely possible in less than a 
period of years, but as sometimes accepted “never say never” and “nothing is impossible.” 
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for an existing set of known circumstances to a very different set of circumstances that 
were not even conceived of at the time of its enactment, but have developed over the 
intervening years. This is one of the functions of the Courts. 
Moreover, there is a good deal in Judge Hays’ point in his dissent in the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. The “Hong Kong Producer” & Universal Marine 
Corporation [1969] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 536, “that considering the container as the package 
promotes uniformity and predictability” -at least where it contains goods of a single 
shipper.  
Once more, in “The Aleksandr Serafimovich” above, importance is given to the 
intention of the parties as indicated by what is stated in the shipping documents, and things 
said by the parties in the course of dealings between them. The court though in the 
particular case decided that the pallet is not a package. This was decided, since the 
description of the goods, the numbering of the cartons and their visibility from outside the 
pallet in this case indicated the governing factor in the minds of the parties. Thus, for the 
package limitation purposes the court considered the goods described to have been one 
hundred and fifty sewing machine heads, each packed in a separate protective carton, rather 
than the wooden pallet on which fifty of them were stacked and to which they were 
strapped. And, accordingly, the defendants were not entitled to limit their liability. 
Moreover, the COGSA was enacted
125
, but the metal containers were unknown at 
the time it was enacted. However, a small container, approximately three-by-three-by-
three-feet, is much closer to the pallets involved in Standard Electrica, than the huge 
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 Cf. Mallory v. Pioneer South-Western Stages 54 F. 2d 559, where motorbuses were 
unknown at the time the statute was enacted; cf. Appendix 2. 
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container considered in the Mormaclynx, as shown in the Sperry Rand Corp. v. 
Norddeutscher Lloyd, 1973 A.M.C. 1392, 1398 (SDNY 1973) (not officially reported). 
The Canadian courts also appear to have concluded that either the container or their 
contents could be limitation packages, as also accepted in J. A. Johnston Co. Ltd. v. The 
Ship “Tindefjell,” Sealion Navigation Co. S. A. and Concordia Line A/S (“The Tindefjell”) 
[1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 253126. Accordingly, a shipment of shoes was carried on board the 
Tindefjell from Bilbao to Montreal and on discharge of cargo in the latter port, some of the 
shipment was found to be damaged. It is true that the problem demands a better solution 
than the courts can afford, since nobody in 1936 foresaw the change in the optimum size of 
shipping units that has arisen as the result of technological advances in the transportation 
industry
127
. 
Per Collier J (p. 257), it is proper in such a case as this to determine if the cargo-
owner and the carrier intended that the container should constitute a package for purposes 
of limitation, or whether the number of packages in the container was to be the criterion 
and it is immaterial, how many packages the container includes, if we accept the fact that 
the container is indeed a package. 
In this case, priority is given to the intention of the parties in respect of the contract 
of carriage, which seems fair. Consequently, where the shipper knows the goods are to be 
shipped by container and specifies in the contract (usually by means of the bill of lading) 
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 Cf. Lufty Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. (The “Alex”) [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 106; 
for transportation of containers by rail, where 400 pieces of knitted nylon piece goods were 
stowed in a container and loaded on to a railway wagon. When the goods were delivered to 
the plaintiffs were in a damaged condition due to water damage as a result of holes in the 
roof of the container. In this case, the container loaded on to a railway wagon is not deemed 
to be a package; see HARRINGTON S. (1982, pp. 6, 24-26). 
127
 See RAMBERG J. (1980) “The Implications of New Transport Technologies” 15 ETL, 
p. 119; HARRINGTON S (1982, p. 3, n. 1). 
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the type of goods and the number of cartons carried in the container, and where the carrier 
accepts that description and that count, then the parties intended that the number of 
packages for purposes of limitation of liability should be the number of cartons specified. 
A clause, which is invalid in some circumstances, may not revive in other 
circumstances. In Leather’s Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 476 (2nd 
Cir. 1971), a clause that was invalid during carriage is not permitted to revive after 
discharge. Specifically, the court found that when a carrier includes an invalid clause in a 
bill of lading, it should not properly expect the shipper to interpret the clause as sometimes 
invalid and sometimes valid. If a carrier seeks the benefit of a different measure of liability 
before loading or after discharge, fairness requires that it specifies that the limitation clause 
relates only to the periods not covered by COGSA. The judgment was upheld on appeal by 
a divided panel of the Second Circuit. It is possible nevertheless that an invalid clause may 
revive, depending on the wording of the clause and the circumstances of the case. 
Clauses that lessen the responsibility of the carrier are null and void as being 
contrary to article III Rule 8. According to Judgment of November 14, 1984, Cour d’ 
Appel, Paris, 1986 DMF 282, a container clause, which attempts to stipulate that a 
container is a package, was held to be without effect. Valuation clauses are invalid in two 
distinct instances: (1) when the clause sets the limit of liability at a specific amount per 
package which is lower than the amount specified by article IV Rule 5; and (2) when the 
clause purports to base the limit of liability on the invoice value of the goods.  
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c. The Australian and the Nigerian Case 
Unlike the Hague-Visby Rules, Article IV, Rule 5 of the Hague Rules does not state 
expressly that the “package” limit is to be calculated “per package or unit…lost or 
damaged” but merely “per package or unit” (Griggs 2005, p. 140). The question that arises 
is whether the limit to be calculated with reference to the total number of packages 
enumerated on the bill of lading or with reference to the number of packages actually lost 
or damaged. If the whole cargo described on the bill of lading has become a total loss, the 
question is academic, but the question is relevant if, for example, four of ten packages 
enumerated on a bill of lading have been damaged. It appears that both the Hague and 
Hague/Visby Rules will be construed in similar fashion and that the Hague Rules limitation 
will be calculated with reference to the number of packages which have in fact been lost or 
damaged. 
On the other hand, when settling the limit of liability, according to the Art. IV Rule 
5 of the Hague-Visby Rules, under sub-paragraph (a) the package limit is to be calculated 
with reference to the goods “lost or damaged.” This term does not differ much from the 
Hague Rules. As a result, it is the weight or quantity actually lost or damaged which is 
relevant, not the quantity or weight described on the bill of lading. In the case of a total 
loss, the distinction will normally be irrelevant, whereas in the case of partial loss or 
damage, the distinction will be highly relevant.  
However, the provisions of sub-paragraph (c) appear to create some confusion in 
relation to containerised cargo, since they seem to indicate that the details of quantity 
enumerated on the bill of lading are to predominate.  
As an example, if the number of packages enumerated in the bill was, say, twenty 
but only ten packages were in fact damaged or lost, then it would appear possible to say 
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that the relevant number of packages for limitation purposes was ten. On the other hand, if 
the goods were a total loss, then the number of packages for limitation purposes would 
appear to be twenty, even if in fact the container contained twenty-four packages. This 
seems to follow from the principle that the claimant cannot claim for more packages than 
the number deemed to have been shipped, but this may be unfair. 
Since the bill of lading is concerned with the enumeration, then that enumeration 
should entail the twenty-four packages lost because that is the actual number of packages. It 
seems that at this point the law should play its role and state that the actual total loss must 
be calculated and not what is superficially recorded on the bill of lading. If, for example, at 
the port of destination it is obvious that the container- when opened- included twenty-four 
packages, all of which were damaged and not twenty as the bill of lading enumerated, then 
the former number should be taken into account. 
Besides, it is not bulk cargo we are concerned with or transportation of layers of 
bricks which break when the container is damaged and no-one can discern how many 
bricks there were inside that metal box, but in cases of packages that can be identified -e.g. 
Cartons of Chinese vases all broken- then the actual total loss should be the total amount of 
the packages inside the containers that were found to be damaged.  
Alternatively, should it be concluded pursuant to the last sentence of sub-paragraph 
(c) that the container itself is to be the “package,” it would then appear to follow that even 
if it were ascertained after an incident that twenty packages inside the container had been 
damaged, they would be available to the claimant. But, as can be seen from the above 
example, the lighter the cargo, the less benefit the claimant can gain from this alternative. 
Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that there exists a precise description of the cargo 
on the bill of lading. 
 114 
Additionally, it would appear that the container would be treated as the package for 
the purposes of limitation if, for example, the bill of lading evidenced the shipment of “one 
container.” Where a ship laden with container cargo was stranded on the coast of Portugal 
and broke up with loss of life and total loss of cargo, the consignees sued on the cargo, 
which was subject to the Hague Rules. The contention that loss was to be calculated in 
terms of the Hague Rules Art. IV Rule 5 by reference to the number of items within the 
containers rather than by reference to the number of containers was accepted in the 
Admiralty Court Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the River Gurara v. Nigerian 
National Shipping Line Ltd, the “River Gurara” [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 53128. 
However, in PS Chellaram & Co Ltd. v. China Ocean Shipping Company; “The Zhi 
Jiang Kou” [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 413, (1990) 28 NSWLR 354, it was argued that the 
container was the relevant package or unit for the purposes of Article IV, Rule 5 of the 
Hague Rules. On researching the appropriate construction of the “package,” Mr. Justice, 
Carruthers held that where the carrier had provided the container and was made aware of 
its contents by the shipper, then the packing units within the container and not the container 
itself constituted the relevant “packages” for the purposes of calculating limitation of 
liability – notwithstanding that the container was packed by the shipper129. Since it is the 
“number of packages enumerated in the bill of lading” which is relevant, the same 
conclusion would seem to apply if the bill evidenced shipment of “one container containing 
boxes of clothes” or “one container containing sugar,” as demonstrated in “the River 
Gurara.”130  
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Furthermore, an important issue that arises through COGSA is that according to the 
Hague-Visby Rules, under Art. III Rule 3, the carriers of an FCL container may wish to 
utilise the right given to them to refuse “to state or show in the bill of lading any…number, 
quantity…which…they have had no reasonable means of checking.” They may therefore 
wish to issue a bill which records shipment merely of “one container” in which case this 
will probably be the “package or unit” for the purposes of Article IV, Rule 5(c). On the 
other hand, the shippers might not accept this since they will require a bill of lading 
describing the contents of the container as one of the documents necessary for the sale of 
their goods (Griggs/Williams 2005, p. 143). 
A solution to this problem is that the parties may often agree on a compromise by 
the issuance of a bill of lading recording the shipment of “one container said to contain” a 
number of packages or units. Still, it is debatable whether the inclusion in the bill of the 
number of packages qualified by the words “said to contain” amounts to an “enumeration” 
in the bill of lading for the purposes of Article IV Rule 5(c), since it would otherwise state 
that the container itself has to be “the package or unit.”   
According to Griggs/ Williams (2005, p. 141), it is arguable that the provisions of 
Article IV Rule 5(c) are intended to complement the obligations placed on the carrier by 
Article III, Rules 3, 4 and 5. These provisions clearly envisage an unqualified enumeration 
in the bill of lading of figures provided by the shippers. It has, however, been repeatedly 
held in this context that by the addition of words such as “said to contain” or “weight 
unknown” the number or weight of goods inserted in the bill of lading is not even prima 
facie evidence of the shipment of such goods and the onus is on the cargo claimant to prove 
by other evidence how much cargo was shipped. A bill of lading qualified in this manner is 
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not “such a bill of lading” as will provide prima facie evidence for the purpose of Article III 
Rule 4. 
The Hague-Visby Rules are intended to be construed as a whole and the provisions 
are intended to complement each other. It would therefore appear strange if a qualified 
enumeration, which would not be binding on a carrier under Article III Rule 4, would 
nevertheless be binding on him for the purposes of Article IV Rule 5(c). However, this is 
the conclusion reached in “The River Gurara” and accordingly it seems that the 
qualification “said to contain” does not in any way dilute or undermine the value of the bill 
of lading as “enumeration” for the purposes of defining the “package.”131 Additionally, the 
limitation of liability under the Hague Rules must be calculated by reference to the 
individual items within a container and not by reference to a container alone. It would strain 
the normal meaning of the word “container” to describe it as a “package.”132 
Sections 1(2) and (3) and (6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 provide that 
the Hague-Visby Rules as set out in the Schedule to the Act shall “have the force of law” in 
the United Kingdom in the circumstances described in the Act and the Schedule, so when 
the UK COGSA applies as a matter of law it is not possible for the carrier to impose a 
package limitation or weight limitation, which is more beneficial to him than that imposed 
by such Rules. This provides a good solution for the protection of the cargo-owners.  
                                                 
131
 See about the clarification of the status of containers in Nicoll CC (July 1995) 
“Significant Carriage of Goods by Sea Reform in New Zealand,” 26, Journal of Maritime 
Law & Commerce, p. 443. 
132
 Also in Court of Appeal –Civil Division (1998) “Limitation of Liability Package 
Container,” 33(3), European Transport Law, p. 383. 
 117 
However, when COGSA applies as a matter of contract
133
, then it is a matter of 
construction of the whole contract, whether the effect would be given to a clause lessening 
the carrier’s liability to a sum lower than that in the Rules.  
Concerning the matter of who is going to pay the cost of the cargo damage and 
particularly the limitation of liability of insurers, shippers and ship-owners, it is true that 
whoever drafted the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules on package limitation would be unable 
to achieve the uniformity demanded by containerisation. The development of technology 
has raised several issues that occupy maritime lawyers. Problems of what is a “unit” or 
“package” existed but the advent of containerisation brought a new dimension to this 
matter
134
. 
Accordingly, as recently held in El Greco (Australia) Pty Ltd. v. Mediterranean 
Shipping Company SA [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 537, [2004] FCAFC (Federal Court of 
Australia - Full Court) 202, the enumeration of the bill of lading should show how the 
“units” were packed and how many there were. Under Art. IV R. 5 of the Hague-Visby 
Rules, the words “package” or “units” cannot extend to mean individual pieces of cargo 
said to be in the container.  
The case of the El Greco concerned a claim for cargo damage. On the bill of lading, 
under the description of cargo, the container was said to contain “200,945 pieces of posters 
                                                 
133
 For instance, by virtue of the inclusion of a clause paramount. 
134
 See further “I say “package,” You say “unit”- UK Insurance Article in association with 
KENNEDYS, as in http://www.legal500.com/devs/uk/is/ukis_102.htm (26/04/2005, at 
22:30); see further Case Comment (1989) “A Container is not a Package,” 6(5) Cargo 
Claims Analysis, p. 75; additionally, in Mitsui at p. 816; also relevant SCHMELTZER & 
PEAVY (1970) “Prospects and Problems of the Container Revolution,” 1, Journal of 
Maritime Law & Commerce, p. 203. 
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and prints” but in the column entitled “no of pkgs,” the number one was entered. It was 
common knowledge that the 200,945 pieces had been put in “approximately” 2000 
packages -though there was no reference to this on the bill. The number of pieces shipped 
was not precise. When the parties state something on the bill of lading, whether it be the 
shipper or the carrier, they should be precise of what they mean and not, for example, what 
they wanted it to mean.  
The defendant argued that it was entitled to limit its liability under the Hague-Visby 
Rules, which refer to “damage…per package or unit.”  
The trial Judge decided that the mention of 200,945 individual pieces of cargo on 
the bill of lading amounted to an enumeration of “units” under the Rules. But on appeal, the 
majority of Judges (Black CJ and Allsop J) held that the reference to 200,945 pieces of 
posters was not an effective enumeration of contents “as packed” and that, for limitation 
purposes, the single container was to be regarded as the package or unit. Beaumont J 
dissented, holding that the relevant number was the “approximately” 2,000 packages that 
had actually been shipped. The issue was to see what the bill of lading has enumerated by 
way of packages and units as packed in the container, as the Federal Court noted.  
There are cases where despite the will of the parties and their clauses inserted in the 
contract, the Judges will follow their own interpretation according to the current legislation 
and they are able to declare certain clauses void, even if both parties have agreed to them. 
For instance, as was accepted in the River Gurara, the parties agreed that The Hague Rules, 
as incorporated into the legislation of the country of shipment, should apply -together with 
a provision to the effect that “notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the 
container shall be considered a package or unit…”  
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Although the Hague Rules seem to have applied as a matter of contract, Colman J 
held that the latter clause was void under Article III, Rule 8 of the Hague Rules. In reaching 
this decision, the judge was clearly influenced by the fact that he was following similar 
conclusions reached by US and Canadian Judges. However, it appears likely that such 
judges were considering cases in which The Hague Rules applied as a matter of law under 
the US and Canadian legislation. It does not appear to have been argued that the situation 
could be different if the Hague Rules applied as a matter of contract.  
Similarly, a bill of lading provision including containers within the meaning of 
“package” was invalidated in Cia. Panamena de Seguros, SA v. Prudential Lines 416 F. 
Supp. 641 (DCZ 1976). In this case, the Canal Zone District Court concluded that 
containers were not COGSA packages. Each container had been loaded with as many as 
5,000 smaller packages. Since these smaller packages would have been made into larger 
packages if the merchandise had been shipped break-bulk, the court found that they were 
not COGSA packages. The court alternatively based the carrier’s liability on customary 
freight units.     
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d. The “Said to Contain” Clause 
Consequently, where the bill of lading gives the number of “packages or units” in 
the container or pallet clearly and without qualification the relevant “package or unit” is 
likely to be the “smallest category of separately packed items so described” in the bill of 
lading (Griggs/ Williams 2005, p. 143). However, bills of lading are often qualified by 
provisions such as “weight unknown” or “quantity unknown” or “said to contain (STC)” 
and it is necessary to consider the effect of such qualifications. Still, a STC clause would 
not clarify things. Actually, the issue is further complicated by the uncertainty whether the 
words “said to contain” or “STC” which are normally found on container bills of lading 
have the same effect as “weight unknown” or “quantity unknown” (Griggs/ Williams 2005, 
p. 144).  
How much does the content of the bill of lading affect the court decision when 
judging liability issues as such? It should be stated that if the bill of lading acknowledges 
receipt of the contents of the container, without reserve, then the burden is upon the 
defendant. But if it makes reference to the contents of the container, couched in such terms 
as “said to contain,” “shipper’s load, stow and count,” it will probably go on to specifically 
provide that it acts as a receipt only for the number of containers received, and that the 
contents thereof, their weight, and number, are not known
135
. 
As was demonstrated in Ace Imports Pty v. Companhia de Navegaca Lloyd 
Brasileiro; The Esmeralda I [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 225, the FCL/FCL formula was used in 
combination with “the said to contain” formulation which enabled the carrier to deny the 
cargo-owners’ entries on the bill, thereby placing the burden on the cargo claimant to prove 
                                                 
135
 See HARRINGTON S. (1982, pp. 5, 10-11); a bill of lading may describe the goods 
invariably and indeed there may be a bulk cargo within the container. 
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the contents of the bill were true. Interestingly in this case an extra clause appeared for the 
condition of the cargo.  
When there is a statement “receipt in apparent good order and condition,” it is clear 
that the carrier cannot possibly comment on the apparent good order and condition of a 
package (and, of course, the quantity) already packed and sealed in a container. Certainly, a 
statement as such would not be nonsense, as it is presented for the defence of the carrier. It 
also shows that one cannot rely on the receipt mentioned, but definitely it is not the fault of 
carrier about defects of the goods.     
For example, the carrier of an FCL container (a container packed and sealed by the 
shipper before presentation to the carrier) is unlikely to agree to the inclusion of cargo 
details without such qualification since he has no means of checking the contents of the 
container. But, he may wish to utilise the right given to him by the proviso to Article III, 
Rule 3 to refuse “to state or show in the bill of lading any … number, quantity… which… 
he has no reasonable means of checking.”  
Therefore, he may wish to issue a bill which records shipment merely of “one 
container” in which case this will probably be the “package or unit” for the purpose of 
Article IV Rule 5(c). Nevertheless, this may be unacceptable to the shipper who will 
require a bill of lading describing the contents of the container as one of the documents 
necessary for the sale of his goods. As a result, the parties may agree on a compromise by 
the issuance of a bill of lading recording the shipment of “one container said to contain” a 
number of packages or units
136
.  
Furthermore, as was accepted in “the River Gurara”  the “said to contain” clause is 
not different to a qualification such as “contents unknown” or “weight, number, quantity 
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 See D’ARCY (2000, pp. 322-323). 
 122 
unknown” in that the description does not constitute prima facie evidence of the cargo 
loaded.  
However, Lord Justice Phillips felt it was at least arguable that “said to contain” 
does not prevent the description from being relied upon as providing prima facie 
evidence
137
. 
Accordingly, it remains uncertain whether the qualification “said to contain” dilutes 
or undermines the value of the bill of lading as “enumeration” for the purposes of defining 
the “package” to the same extent as “weight unknown” or “quantity unknown.”   
Besides, according to the Hague-Visby Rules, the wording of the bill of lading 
issued by the sea carrier is prima facie conclusive. If the bill only refers to “one container 
said to contain (specified merchandise),” then the container itself shall be considered as the 
package or unit, but if it enumerates the cargoes included in the container separately, each 
of those cargoes shall constitute a package or unit. If the bill mentions specifically one or 
two cargoes but not the other contents of the container, the separately mentioned items are 
regarded as separate packages for the purposes of maximum limitation of liability and the 
rest of the container falls under the general limitation (D’Arcy 2000, p. 322). 
The “said to contain” clause is the clause that gives emphasis to the matter of what 
the package is. When, for example, the bill of lading describes the goods as “a container 
said to contain (specified merchandise)” then the container is the package and to be more 
specific the container and its contents is the package. It seems that this clause is a powerful 
one in order to decide and define the container as a package. Under this clause the container 
is defined either to be a package or not, since this clause is the place that reveals how the 
container is being ascertained; either with general cargo inside or separate packages. 
                                                 
137
 See CARVER Carriage by Sea, 12
th
 ed. pp. 236. 
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But, what happens if the shipper ascertains “a container said to contain rice,” for 
example, but when the container is opened, this rice is already pre-packed in nylon bags, 
which are inside smaller cartons. If that is the case, then the onus should be on the shipper 
to prove that he did no wrong, stating this on the bill of lading for reasons of customs. 
Often the insertion of such clauses into bills of lading does not reveal the whole truth of 
what it is actually contained, rather than what it is said to be contained, till the metal box is 
opened, which is when the confusion begins. The question that arises is to whether phrases 
such as “STC” (“said to contain”) or “FCL” (“Full Container Load”) are to be regarded as 
nullifying any enumeration. What happens here is that these clauses simply mean that the 
carrier does not acknowledge the contents, with the result that the claimant must prove 
what was shipped if a dispute arise, and particularly in cases where the container was lost 
overboard.  
Therefore, the shippers must be very careful with the enumeration in the bill of 
lading and very precise, because if the enumeration is wrong, the liability must be 
calculated up to the maximum enumerated only, though if fewer goods are shipped than are 
enumerated, the enumeration should only apply to what was actually shipped. 
It is obvious that if the container can rank as a package, the carrier’s liability could, 
unless a higher value is declared, be very severely limited. This is illustrated by the PS 
Chellaram & Co Ltd. v. China Ocean Shipping Company; “The Zhi Jiang Kou” [1989] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 413, (1990) 28 NSWLR 354, stated above. There, the bill of lading stated “1 
container (20’) FCL/FCL, Shipper’s Load Count and Seal, said to contain: 900 ctns blank 
cassette tapes.”138 
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 Refer to UK MISC (1989) “A container is not a package,” 6(5), Cargo Claim Analysis, 
p. 75. 
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Additionally, the “per package” limitation can be nullified by virtue of a geographic 
deviation, as demonstrated in Spartus Corp. v. S/S Yafo 590 F. 2d 1310 (5
th
 Cir. 1979). The 
court reviewed a claim for damage to clock movements, which the shipper had packaged in 
small cartons and loaded into a container furnished by the carrier. When packing had been 
completed, the shipper sealed the container. The carrier then issued a bill of lading 
describing the cargo as “1 CONTAINER STC 385 CARTONS ELECTRIC CLOCK 
MOVEMENTS.” 
Later the container was placed on-board the S/S “Yafo” for transport to New 
Orleans. The vessel was diverted to Mobile pursuant to Israeli Government instructions. 
There the container was offloaded. It remained on unsheltered docks in Mobile and later 
New Orleans for more than a month. When the container was opened, inspection disclosed 
holes in its roof and partial wetting of its contents. The District Court held that the 
offloading in Mobile constituted an unreasonable deviation, but the COGSA package 
limitation was available to the carrier. This limitation became ineffective, however, because 
the trial judge applied it to the individual cartons rather than the container. 
After reviewing the historical development of deviation, the 5
th
 Circuit concluded 
that the offloading of the clock movements in Mobile breached the contract of carriage and 
rendered the $500 per package limitation a nullity. Because of this holding, it is 
unnecessary for us to consider Zim’s contention that the district court erred in finding that 
each of the three hundred and eighty-five cartons of clock movements constituted a 
package for the purpose of applying the limitation. As a result, the Court in the particular 
case refused to enforce the package limitation in both geographic and non-geographic 
deviation situations.  
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Whether the court would negate other limitations in an unreasonable deviation case 
remains for future decision
139
.  
Therefore, there is need for international uniformity and its accordance with 
common sense or current rational commercial arrangements. Additionally, as held in 
Canada and Dominion Sugar Company Ltd. v. Canadian National (West Indies) 
Steamships, Limited [1947] A.C. 46 (J.C.P.C.), although article III, Rule 3, requires the 
carrier to issue the shipper a Bill of Lading showing either the number of packages or 
quantity, or weight, as the case may be, as furnished in writing by the shipper, he is not 
bound to do so unless required by the shipper
140
. 
Additionally, what should also be stated is that inside the Hague-Visby Rules 
omissions occur which might also create debate. For example, in Article IV Rule 5(e) and 
Article IV bis Rule 4 there is no mention of “loss.” Throughout its other provisions the 
Hague-Visby Rules speak consistently of “loss or damage”, like in Article IV, Rule 5(a). It 
seems that Article IV Rule 5(e) is intended to restrict the general application of Article IV, 
Rule 5(a), since it apparently applies only to “damage” and not “loss” (Griggs/Williams 
2005, p. 138).      
Conclusively, a container is a package (Tetley 1988, p. 882), and actually a metal 
package designed specifically by technology to hold cargo, and since there is not a specific 
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legal regime to identify it at a global level, it rests on the agreement of the parties to decide 
how to declare it on the bill of lading. A pallet may be a package as well
141
.  
Beeks J in Matsushita Electric Corp. v. S. S. Aegis Spirit 414 F. Supp. 894 (W. D. 
Wash. 1976) concluded that a ruling, under which containers are packages, would distort 
the word’s plain, ordinary meaning. Also, he concluded that recognising the container as a 
ship’s transport equipment rather than a COGSA package negates the possibility of an 
unacceptable result where a container holds the packaged goods of many shippers
142
.  
Still, it is to disagree that containers are not packages, or, even complete the 
definition, in the future, by a ruling that containers are metal packages. The latter would 
serve for clarity in the whole problem. Furthermore, on the question what constitutes the 
“package” under the Hague Rules, Abdulrahim143 argues that  the term refers to any items 
of cargo which have been sufficiently packed for the purposes of being held and protected 
during transit. Still, such an assertion does not clarify this particular issue, since “any item” 
can be everything or nothing in metal, given that metal or steel is a container and such an 
assertion can easily exclude the container. Besides, it should be stated that containers are 
not packed; the correct term is that “containers are piled.” 
But, it still leaves open the question as to whether “any items of cargo” may exclude 
the containers. 
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Consequently, even if the language and purposes of COGSA left us in doubt as to 
whether carrier-furnished containers whose contents are disclosed should be treated as 
packages, the interest in securing international uniformity would thus suggest that they 
should not be so treated as held in the case of Mitsui. Expensive litigation will increase 
until a solution acceptable to shippers, carriers, and insurers is developed. It is true that if 
we accept that the containers are modern substitutes for the hold of the vessel, then we 
should not equate them with “packages” in the COGSA sense. 
Certainty and predictability become more easily attainable if adjustments in industry 
practices take place. For example, shippers and freight forwarders could be more careful in 
drafting bills of lading and other shipping documents- and in noting revisions and 
objections made by carriers.  
Carriers have and should gauge their rates to accommodate containerised shipments. 
Insurers must review and revise policies and premium structures to meet changing 
conditions. The industry remains young, and definitive pronouncements now seem 
impractical. Thus, periodic review and analysis of developments in the container revolution 
is vital
144
. What seems clear, however, is that, absent special circumstances, equation of 
containers with packages has become anachronistic. 
                                                 
144
 Supra, n. 5, p. 465. 
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e. The New Zealand Approach 
Furthermore, as established in Dairy Containers Ltd v The Ship “Tasman 
Discoverer” [2002] 3 NZLR 353 (New Zealand Court of Appeal), per Williams J since a 
contract is signed by the parties, it is up to them to contract on whatever terms they wish, 
meaning that they can incorporate any legal regime they prefer, such as the Hague Rules 
but they should be careful when drafting the contract to avoid what has been referred to as 
“the golden clause trap”, according to Article III Rule 8 (par. 9)145. A carrier that tries to 
use extra words to reduce the limits of liability will have to confront article III rule 8 which 
may declare these words null and void. In particular, any extra clause does not replace the 
combined application of art 4(5) and 9 of the Hague Rules and is otherwise not applicable 
by virtue of art. 3(8) of the Rules. Here is where the confusion in law stands, precisely 
because we do not have “the specific legal regime” which would handle things more 
evenly
146
. 
It is argued that the shipper should have an opportunity to declare a higher value
147
. 
Under the US COGSA provisions, the shipper may take advantage of the opportunity to 
declare a higher value on its cargo, and have such higher value placed on the bill of lading, 
thus avoiding any $500 limitation. This though will subject a shipper to a higher traffic rate, 
a gamble the shipper takes in these cases. 
However, if the parties are allowed themselves to define what a “package” is, this 
might allow them to limit liability to a level even less than that defined under the terms of 
COGSA (Tetley 1988, pp. 237-238)
148
.  
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This would take place, since a carrier could always limit its liability to $500.00 by 
merely extracting a stipulation from the shipper that everything shipped, no matter in what 
form, would be deemed a package for the purposes of limitation of liability.  
If it is a matter of construction of the whole contract whether the effect would be 
given to a clause limiting the carrier’s liability to a sum lower than that in the Rules, then, 
the parties can be free to agree that the Rules shall apply. But, a lower figure should be 
substituted for the figures in the Rules themselves, since both provisions would have equal 
force as contractual terms. In particular, with that clause the parties may agree on a lower 
sum, even if the Rules still may be applied and this lower sum will be valid, if contracted.  
However, a dispute could still arise as was also shown in “The River Gurara,” 
where the parties agreed that the Hague Rules as incorporated into the legislation of the 
country of shipment should apply, in combination with a provision to the effect that 
“notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the container shall be considered a 
package or unit…” Despite this clause, Colman J held that the latter Clause was void under 
Article III (8) of the Hague Rules
149
.  
What one can observe through this legal procedure is the fact that it is permissible 
to declare the container to be a package on the face of the bill of lading, but it is not 
permissible to enter a clause in the bill of lading since there is a possibility that this clause 
could be declared void. But, should that clause be declared void the moment that the bill of 
lading deems the container to be a package? 
 Shippers may be liable for the value that they may declare, if they follow the route 
of the Hague Rules by virtue of section 4(5) which provides that a package limitation 
exceeding $500 may be fixed by agreement between the carrier, or the master, or the agent 
                                                 
149
 See also Griggs/Williams 2005, pp. 137-139. 
 130 
of the carrier, and the shipper (as in 46 US COGSA par. 1304 (5)). This route though is an 
impractical one since the shippers will be called upon to pay freight on an ad valorem basis 
which is likely to be something like 3% of the declared value (Harrington S 1982, p. 19). 
Therefore, the shippers can profit more by spending their money on cargo insurance which 
covers more perils at less cost. In comparison, in Canada, for instance, it is incumbent upon 
the shipper to declare the higher value. 
 As held by the Canadian court in Anticosti Shipping Co. v. Viateur St. Amand. 
(1959) S.C.R. 372 (Supreme Court, Canada), per Rand J, “the responsibility for seeing that 
the value of the thing shipped is declared and inserted on the Bill is on the shipper and any 
consequential hardship must be charged against his own failure to respect that 
requirement.” 
 Still, it is under discussion whether the size of a container remains immaterial in 
such matters
150
. Friendly J does not agree so in the Mormaclynx, since he compared the 
sizes in this case and the pallets of Standard Electrica, ignoring as such Moore J. And, it is 
debateable whether we should distinguish between the container and pallet in order to 
define the package. A pallet is a package as well and since a pallet is a package as well, 
then the container is also a package or otherwise, if a container is deemed a package, then 
the pallet should be also deemed a package. Still, in the most recent “Rotterdam Rules,” the 
term “package” (of shipping unit when goods are carried in containers) is treated in Art. 59, 
par. 2, which reads like in the Hague/Visby Rules without any further additional 
explanation
151
. 
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f. The “Metal Package” Approach; a Term for the Future.  
The container is a big metal box, if not carton and since it is constructed from metal 
element, it should be termed a “metal” package. If new law dealing with containerships 
ever comes in force, that term should be used for liability purposes and new legislation 
should deal strictly with the carriage of goods in containers. Moreover, it would be fairer, if 
we had one legal regime, which deals with the carriage of good by sea with containers, the 
carriage of goods by rail with containers and the carriage of goods by road with containers. 
This legal framework should be accepted as mandatory worldwide.  
Furthermore, before containerisation, the package was easily identified; as the 
carton in which, for example, fifty boxes of pens are included. But still, problems regarding 
the package may also arise, if it is asserted that the carton is not the package, but the 
package is the tiny box of cacao included inside the carton. That is why we need a new law 
which defines the container as a “metal package” and assesses the limits of liability 
accordingly. But, we should not ignore The Hague or Hague-Visby Rules as they can be 
used for normal cargo transport. In support of this though, it is asserted in Japan Line v. 
County of Los Angeles 441 US 434 (1979) that a container is a permanent reusable article 
of transport equipment, durably made of metal and equipped with doors for easy access to 
the goods and for repeated use.  
However, when the parties decide that goods be carried in a container, using the 
modern shipping methods then a law must be drafted to reduce package limitation problems 
and the wording of the Hague-Visby Rules could be modified as follows: 
“Where a container is used to consolidate goods then the container itself will be 
deemed the “metal package” for the purposes of this paragraph” and accordingly this article 
should be amended calculating the limit according to the weight of the container which is 
 132 
more reasonable or fixing a certain tariff for this metal package irrelevant of weight. An 
acceptable formula must be found to set a certain tariff for a damaged container or for 
damaged goods inside the metal package. 
And, perhaps, the package limitation problem would be resolved if that new law did 
not place emphasis on the contents or the weight of the container. This tariff would 
generalise the issues. If the container is defined as the “metal package” then the tariff is 
calculated according to the metal and the package. Metal is an expensive element to carry 
cargo and a heavy one. Therefore, since cargo is agreed to be carried inside the container 
made of steel or any other metal material then the amount of limitation for this particular 
package should not be low and it should be fixed. 
 Since a customer accepts that his goods are carried via this modern method, 
quickly and on time, he should also accept that in case of cargo damage or loss the 
container would be the “metal package” for limitation purposes under the new law that 
would be produced to govern multimodalism
152
. The law that we actually need should be 
drafted solely for this kind of transport and thus avoid the troublesome conundrum, when is 
a package not a package and how this package should be treated, either as a sophisticated or 
an esoteric term of art
153
. 
In addition, we should not neglect the later paragraph in the Hague-Visby Rules 
which does refer to a container as a package as long as it is enumerated as such in the bill of 
lading. It seems that the United States do not want to consider the container as a package, 
but exactly the opposite. Amazingly in Belize Trading Ltd. v. Sun Ins. Co. of New York, 993 
F.2d 790 (11
th
 Cir. 1993) the court went even further, holding that COGSA requires a 
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carrier to issue a bill of lading showing the number of cartons and not merely the numbers 
of containers.  
Therefore, we cannot achieve uniformity if one states that the container is not a 
package, despite the enumeration in the bill of lading and the other states that the container 
is a package precisely because of this enumeration. 
 Moreover, it should not be forgotten that at least as far as the United Kingdom 
and the other states implementing the Hague/Visby Rules are concerned it is generally 
accepted that “…except as aforesaid such article of transport shall be considered the 
package or unit,” by virtue of the new Art. IV Rule 5(c). The container should be regarded 
as a package and even if we suppose that a convention might be drafted one day 
particularly for Containerisation and multimodal transport then the idea of defining it as a 
“metal” package would not be far away. 
Suppose we accept the container, this large metal object, as a “metal” package. 
Metal is a heavy element, much heavier than a carton or consolidated paper, although in 
Standard Electrica the pallet was held to be the relevant COGSA package. The solution 
here might rank among the package and customary freight unit. We need a definition in the 
middle of these two terms. By virtue of this, the “metal” package may adequately fit, but it 
is significant to view its fiscal dimensions. For instance, the financial package limitations 
may be converted. 
Schoenbaum (2001, p. 636) may be of the opinion that “absent a clear agreement of 
the parties so long as [the] contents and the number of packages or units [inside] are 
disclosed,” large metal shipping containers, since they are functionally part of the ship, are 
normally not COGSA “packages.” But there is more to be stated when technology will go 
even further than just a Post-Panamax container-ship.  
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And, we should not go far, since in Orion Ins. Co. v. The M/V “Humacao,” 851 F. 
Supp. 575 (SDNY 1994) the court held that a shipping container of resin in bulk would be 
treated as a COGSA package.  
Although the Mormaclynx held the position “that a container rarely should be 
treated as a package” and it was suggested that it would be inconsistent with congressional 
intent, in Kulmerland the container is presumptively the package where the units inside are 
not suitable for breakbulk shipment. Furthermore, law should keep pace with the 
technological advances. Also, taking for granted the evolution of the Post-Panamax 
container-ships, of which some are the successors of the transformed general purpose cargo 
ships to container-ships, then the position that a container is a “functional part of the ship” 
or a “portable hold” of the ship might not be entirely correct.  
Indeed, recent advances in technology places the container on the deck of the ship
154
 
as an individual metal object which carries cargo and not in the hold. A carton package is 
portable as well as the container. If the container is deemed a “portable hold,” it is to 
question why technology does not place it in the hold, then. Therefore, it should not be 
deemed as such, or the carton package. The carton package and the container are portable, 
but they are not holds. 
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C.) ARE THE CONTAINERS “CUSTOMARY FREIGHT UNITS”? 
a. Case - Study 
 Also open to debate is whether a container is a “package” or “customary freight 
unit.” The phrase “customary freight unit” has been read by most courts to mean the freight 
unit by which the freight was calculated in that particular case. In so-reading the phrase, 
they have relied on the bills of lading and tariffs as it was accepted in the past
155
. It was 
added by the Visby Protocol and hence does not appear in the Hague Rules. A gap in law 
may be shaped though between the Canadian Act and the US COGSA. In the former, the 
limitation provided amounts to $500 “per package or unit” while in the COGSA, it is $500 
“per package or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary freight unit.” “The 
customary freight unit” serves, when neither the container nor the items within are 
packages. In such circumstances limitation of liability in the USA would be calculated in 
accordance with the customary freight unit (Harrington S 1982, pp. 17-18). 
 Furthermore, the question arises whether the term “unit” intended to refer to a 
shipping unit, such as a crate, package, or container, or it would equally apply to a freight 
“unit”, i.e. the unit of measurement used to calculate the freight (Wilson J 2008, p. 195) 
while the conflict between “shipping” and “freight units” has been resolved by a clear 
statement that the unit at issue is a “package or other shipping unit” (Wilson J 2008, p. 
220). 
 There are cases where the courts found that entire shipping units constitute the 
customary freight units. For example, in Eaton Corp. v. S. S. “Galeona” 474 F. Supp. 819 
(SDNY 1979) a tractor and parts were shipped under a bill of lading to which COGSA 
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applied. The tractor, unboxed, was damaged and the issue became what was the customary 
freight unit.  
 It was accepted that the freight charge was based on a lump sum of $2,000 for the 
first 2,400 cubic feet and $30 per each 40 cubic feet of some 674 cubic feet remaining in 
fixing the space taken up by the units. The court found that the customary freight unit was 
40 cubic feet, and that this unit would better fulfil the purpose of COGSA.  Limitation of 
liability was not to be favoured, and the larger unit proposed by the carrier was not 
consistent with its tariff, which was ambiguous.  
 It seems that the “customary freight unit” reflects a compromise between those 
who thought that the package or unit limitation was obsolete and should be replaced by a 
weight limitation entirely, and those who wished it retained. There are several factors in 
favour of the weight limitation, while the package or unit limit is deemed as no more than a 
lesser alternative, preserved for cases where the packages or units have a very low weight. 
Since the United States have the word “unit” in the phrase “package or unit,” this is 
replaced by “customary freight unit” which provided a limit for bulk cargo described by 
tonnes and so forth. Furthermore, England would never accept that the word “unit” 
standing by itself could have this effect and the result would be no limit in the case of cargo 
shipped in bulk to which the words “packages” or “units” could not be applied.  
 The Visby Protocol now is set forth to provide such an alternative limit. But 
difficulties can still arise where the goods are partially damaged when it comes to deciding 
whether the limit should be calculated in reference to the weight of the damaged goods or 
by reference to the weight of the whole consignment. 
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The question that arises is whether the container is a “package” or “customary 
freight unit”. This may receive a positive reply, particularly in cases where it is stated that 
“the container said to contain machinery.” 
Indeed, as Harrington (1982, p. 5) states, a bill of lading may describe the goods in 
more general terms and it may not itemize the contents or indicate if they are packaged in 
any way. There may be a bulk cargo within the container and thus the container may be 
considered as “package.”  
As decided in “The Alex,”156 the “unit” mentioned in Art. V of the Hague 
Convention to serve as a base of calculation of the limitation of responsibility of the 
maritime carrier, applies to merchandise which in current language is not usually called 
packages, such as bales of wool or cotton, casks of wine, bags of produce. Furthermore, in 
the Aleksander Serafimovich, the American sub-section is very similar to the Canadian, but 
not identical therewith. The most significant difference is found in the expression 
“customary freight unit” in the American statute. Similarly, the Canadian statute uses 
simply the one word “unit,” which means a unit of goods, not a freight unit. 
According to Schoenbaum (2001, p. 641), the customary freight unit limit applies to 
bulk cargo as well as machinery and equipment shipped uncrated or unpackaged. Still, it is 
odd that the American court in Kulmerland did consider the container that carried 
machinery as a package and not as a customary freight unit, since the U.S. does not abide 
by the Visby Protocol and does not define the container as a package. 
 To summarise, the “customary freight unit” has also been considered as the basis on 
which freight had been calculated. However, as held in Gulf Italia v. American Export 
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Lines 79 S. Ct. 1285 (Mem)
157
 on many occasions the cargo owner will find it more 
profitable to invoke the “freight unit” alternative, as, for example, in circumstances where 
the freight units exceed the number of shipping units, although according to Petition of 
Isbrandtsen Company, Inc. Co. Inc. v. US “the Edmund Fanning” 201 F.2d 281 (2nd Cir. 
1953), this is not invariably the case.     
 As also held by Atkins J, in Inter-American Foods, Inc. v. Co-ordinated Caribbean 
Transport, Inc. and M/V Freight Consolidator, and M/V Freight Transporter, 313 F. Supp. 
1334 (Miami Division), each cardboard carton of frozen shrimps placed on a freezer trailer 
in Nicaragua for shipment to Miami -not the trailer- constituted “package” for purpose of 
limitation of liability provision of COGSA, since the carrier prepared and issued its own 
bill of lading a day or two after transportation had commenced and the shipper did not 
deliver a sealed trailer to the carrier but to the contrary the carrier dispatched its trailer to 
receive the cargo for which its driver gave a receipt. 
 Finally, the “customary freight unit” has also been considered as the basis on which 
freight had been calculated. However, as it was held in Gulf Italia v. American Export Lines 
[1958] AMC 439 on many occasions the cargo-owner will find it more profitable to invoke 
the “freight unit” alternative, as, for example, in circumstances where the freight units 
exceed the number of shipping units, while according to the Edmund Fanning [1953] AMC 
86, this is not invariably the case.     
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b. Containers and Estoppels 
 According to section 1304(5) of the US COGSA, carriers may limit their liability 
under certain circumstances. The estoppel may be a valid method of avoiding the $500 
limitation of liability provision of the US COGSA. 
 Estoppels can be essential to the final outcome of a case. As mentioned in 
Primary Indus, Corp. v. Barber Lines A/S 78 Misc. 2d 603, 357 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1974), since 
the shipper had described each bundle as a package, there was an estoppel which lay 
against the consignee as the shipper’s “agent.” Thus, the “bundle” which was not a bundle, 
since it was not strapped, was the package unit.  The lower court decision that the $500 
limitation applied to each bundle was affirmed, although the reason given was different.  
 Therefore, it is very important for shippers to be cautious in their statements in the 
bills of lading since an estoppel may also arise from statements about the condition of the 
goods. But if there is additional wording in the margin of the bills of lading, this estoppel 
may be enforced. For example, the bill of lading may include the extra clause, “signed 
under guarantee to produce ship’s clean receipt” as demonstrated in the Canadian National 
Steamships Ltd. case. The estoppel stands as the most important exception to the common 
law exceptions for present purposes, preventing the shipper from denying the truth of the 
appearance thus created
158
. 
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c. The Tonnage Limitation  
In addition to the method of the package limitation, the so-called “tonnage” 
limitation is available to the carrier under any statute “relating to the limitation of liability 
of owners of seagoing ships
159
. In particular, this form of limitation is applied to claims 
arising not only in connection with the carriage of goods, but to the many other forms of 
claim which may arise out of a maritime occurrence as well, for example, hull and property 
damage. There is no separate limitation fund for cargo claimants.  
A claimant against the “tonnage” fund is entitled to insist on the application of the 
“package” limit where applicable. This takes place, since the proportion which each 
claimant is entitled to recover from the “tonnage” fund should be calculated with reference 
to the legal liability, which each claimant has established against the “tonnage” fund160. In 
conference
161
, the Drafting Committee introduced a specified minimum liability for ships 
below a certain tonnage. It was considered that this change would be necessary in order to 
reduce the need for the HNS Fund to intervene in respect of damage caused by small ships, 
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 The use of “tonnage” limitation is a useful means of distinguishing this form of 
limitation from the “package” method of limitation. However, it should be appreciated that 
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while also ensuring that victims would be fully compensated for damage caused by such 
ships.  
With regard to the wording of a provision on this point, several delegates expressed 
support for the proposal contained in the report on the informal meeting held in Stockholm 
from 7-11 December 1981 (Document LEG 48/2/2, par. 61). Others supported a somewhat 
simpler text which would follow more closely the existing text of Article V 1 of the 1969 
Civil Liability Convention, which reads that “the owner of the ship shall be entitled to limit 
his liability under this Convention in respect of any one incident to an aggregate amount of 
X units of account for each ton of the ship’s tonnage. However, this aggregate amount shall 
not in any event be less than Y units of account and shall not in any event exceed Z units of 
account.”  
Moreover, in the light of the decision taken at the forty-seventh session in respect of 
the definition of “tonnage” in the draft HNS Convention, the committee agreed on the text 
that would be appropriate in the present context. That text was based on the 1976 
Convention and would be finalised subject to any changes in terminology that might be 
appropriate as a result of decisions taken by the Assembly and the technical bodies of the 
IMO. 
Several international conventions may contain provisions on identical or similar 
matters. The Hague Rules 1924, the Hague-Visby Rules 1968, the Hamburg Rules 1978 are 
all concerned with maritime liability and limitation regime. The system of limitation of 
liability as provided in these Conventions on carriage of goods by sea is very different from 
that under the Conventions on global limitation of liability (Xia Chen 2001, p. 130).  
The limitations scheme under the law for carriage of goods by sea is based upon per 
package limits in accordance with the tonnage of the limiting vessel. When a ship owner is 
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held liable for cargo damages, his right to limitation of liability may be subject to both legal 
regimes. 
Agreeing with Xia Chen (2001, p. 131), these conventions on carriage of goods by 
sea all provide that their limitation frameworks do not affect the rights and duties under any 
convention relating to global limitation of liability concerning sea-going ships. In other 
words, should any conflict of laws arise with respect to limitation of liability, the 
conventions on global limitation of liability shall take precedence over limitations on 
carriage of goods by sea. 
Prior to September 1, 1997, South African package limitation was based on the gold 
Franc value, following Article IV (Rule 5) of the Hague-Visby Rules, which comprises 
Schedule 1 to COGSA. The South African Shipping General Amendment Act (No. 23 of 
1997) changed the calculation of package limitation as well as that of tonnage limitation to 
a calculation expressed in SDR, reflecting the 1997 Protocol
162
. 
Consequently, there is nothing to prevent a carrier from relying on rights given by 
the Rules to limit his liability to the particular claim and then on the relevant “tonnage” 
statute to limit his liability to a sum which is lower than the “package” limitation available 
to him under the Hague or the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules. Such a right is 
expressly reserved to the carrier by article VIII of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules and 
art. 25(1) of the Hamburg Rules. This in turn may constitute a further problem; why should 
the ship owners have the freedom to limit their liability twice? 
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D.) TO SUM UP…  
The system of the carrier’s liability under the Hamburg Rules has been simplified 
compared to that of the Hague/Visby Rules. The liability of the carrier under the Hamburg 
Rules is based on the principle of presumed fault or neglect.  
The Hamburg Rules, which provide an express rule of limitation in the case of delay 
(Article 6(1)(b)), are not accepted internationally while in some countries the Hague Rules 
are adopted and others opt for the Hague-Visby Rules. Still, this does not cover the current 
needs of trade. That is why Containerisation and the evolution of the new technology in 
container-ships have affected the regimes governing maritime transport directly or 
indirectly for the limitation of the liability of the carriers. Since the current regimes are not 
adequate to cover problems as such, there is an urgent need for a new legal framework. 
What is needed is a new law that will be accepted internationally, that will be independent 
similarly by different courts and universal
163
. 
It should also be said that under the Hague-Visby Rules, omissions occur which 
might also create debate. For example, in Article IV Rule 5(e) and Article IV bis Rule 4 
there is no mention of “loss.” Throughout its other provisions the Hague-Visby Rules speak 
consistently of “loss or damage” (e.g. Article IV, Rule 5(a)). It seems that Article IV Rule 
5(e) is intended to restrict the general application of Article IV, Rule 5(a), since it 
apparently applies only to “damage” and not “loss” (Griggs/Williams 2005, p. 138).  
Finally, it should be stated that so far as container limitation is concerned, the 
Hamburg Rules have adopted the Hague-Visby solution preferring to construe the shipping 
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units as the individual items listed in the bill of lading or other document evidencing the 
contract of carriage. 
If the contents of the container or pallet are not separately listed, then the container 
or pallet together with its contents is treated as a single shipping unit. In the case of loss or 
damage to the container or pallet itself, this will be treated as a separate unit for limitation 
purposes, provided that it is not owned or supplied by the carrier (Wilson 2008, p. 220).  
 What is somewhat surprising is the fact that the Hamburg Rules adopt the 
Hague/Visby Rules in this important issue which means there is no serious development in 
this legal framework since it has the same wording as in the Hague/Visby Rules. The fact 
that they are ratified by most of the countries remains irrelevant, since the Hague/Visby 
Rules also apply and they have been ratified by England where the Hamburg Rules have 
not. 
 In conclusion, a container is a package (Tetley W 1988, p. 882), and more 
particularly a metal package designed to hold cargo, and since there is not a specific legal 
regime to identify it on a global level, the onus is on the parties to decide what they need 
and how to declare it on the bill of lading. The issue is further clouded by the fact that, as 
we have seen earlier, a pallet may be also considered to be a package. The container is a 
“metal” package. 
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A.) INTRODUCTION  
  Argument has arisen as to whether the courts should be strict when containers are 
carried on the deck of container ships but no specific instructions are stated in the Bill of 
Lading (BL), while deck cargo is duly declared if its stowage on deck has been specifically 
stated in the bill (e.g. by a “stowed on deck” stamp). With the growth of containerisation164, 
some courts have recognised that the carriage of containers on the deck of a specially 
adapted container ship does not constitute a breach of a contract of carriage, (see eg. Du 
Pont de Nemours International S.A. and E.I. du Pomt de Nemours & Co. Inc. v. S.S. 
Mormacvega [1973] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 267). This is still to be discussed in this chapter, under 
sub-chapter B (a. & b.). Additionally, it is important to analyse the issue on undeclared 
dangerous deck cargo, as demonstrated by virtue of Northern Shipping Co v. Deutsche 
Seereederei (The Kapitan Sakharov) [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255 CA case further below 
(sub-chapter B (c.)). This is significant, since specific regulation regarding dangerous 
substances within cargo sealed in containers must co-exist with or be replaced by the ideal 
future new container legal regime that might be created one day to govern multimodal 
transportation. 
Also, within this chapter, the relationship of custom and law in containerisation is 
discussed, both which have a high impact on maritime practice and it is important 
particularly on the deck cargo issue. As the consignors are shipping the goods, then they 
should acknowledge the fact that their cargo will be shipped by containers and if they 
acquire speed, technology and modernisation in shipping, then their containers are to be 
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Shipping & Transport Lawyer, pp. 4- 6. 
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stowed on board the modern containership. At this point, custom is acting as a major factor 
to perform the voyage without legal violations. 
Moreover, the shipping industry has their own methods of packing goods within the 
containers (see further sub-chapter C (a.)). The fact that potentially dangerous goods are 
sealed within the containers remains one of the most important problems in 
containerisation. Additionally, the affect of containerisation on INCOTERMS needs to be 
explored, since problems have been encountered, because containerisation has rendered the 
traditional FOB point as inappropriate (see further sub-chapter D).  
Finally, the issue of bailment in container carriage is also explored, since the notion 
of bailment is relevant to container carriage (see further sub-chapter E). It is also important 
to deal with the “Himalaya” clause, in the context of containerisation. Although many of 
the issues discussed pre-date containerisation, other issues have emerged subsequently. 
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B.) LIABILITY AND DECK CARGO 
a. Unauthorised Deck Carriage 
 Belgian law has always been very severe on carriers when damage or loss is caused 
to undeclared deck cargo. Verguts and Gossieaux (1998, p. 193) and Stevens (2001, pp. 
263-271) have criticized this jurisprudence and also for some time there has been doubt in 
the jurisprudence as to whether it also applied to containers carried on the decks of 
container ships. In particular, the Belgian Court of Cassation on the 1
st
 December 2000, in 
two decisions, closed the discussions by confirming the existing jurisprudence and 
specified that “undeclared deck cargo” also applies to containers on the deck of specialised 
containerships. Under the Belgian law a third party holder (including a named consignee) 
who receives a “clean” BL, which does not specifically state that cargo is stowed on deck, 
can expect that cargo to be carried in the hold (i.e. under deck) where it is not exposed to 
the risks it would run were it stored on deck
165
.  
The ruling stands even if the ship is a specialised container-ship. Such ships store 
containers subject to higher risks (e.g. waves, proximity to dangerous deck cargo) than 
those stowed in the hold. A carrier cannot escape this liability: an exception will be made 
only if the ship is a rare open “full container ship” without a deck as technically none of the 
containers can then be considered as having been stored “on deck,” thus no deck stowage is 
to be declared
166
. 
                                                 
165
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 Although the best terminology to demonstrate the way the modern container ships are 
manufactured is that they do not have a hold, but a deck. The hold is what is missing from 
them and not the deck. The deck is the covering of all or part of the hull of a ship into 
which hatchways are cut to give access to the holds (Brodie 1996, p. 47). Therefore, the 
new container-ships do not have a hold. 
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In Belgium, the only way for a carrier to escape liability, vis-à-vis a third party 
holder of the BL when the cargo is stowed on deck, is to specifically state this in the BL 
(e.g. by a stamp stating “stowed on deck”). The reasoning is that only then the BL duly 
warns the third party holder of the higher risk and they can act upon it (by, for example, 
seeking insurance for the higher risk, refusing the BL, etc.). Merely a “deck option clause” 
on the BL, stipulating that the carriers are allowed to stow the cargo on or below deck at 
their discretion, is insufficient because it does not inform the third party holder that the 
cargo has in fact been stowed on deck.  
With regard to declared deck cargo, the implication is that to escape liability, the 
carrier must overcome an extremely heavy burden of proof. They must show that the 
lashing equipment provided was in perfect condition, that the lashing (if undertaken by the 
carrier) was completed perfectly and that the weather conditions causing the damage or loss 
were unforeseeable and unavoidable. 
If a carrier can show, for example, that the cargo was damaged by waves during an 
exceptionally heavy storm (that was not, or was much heavier than, forecasted) and without 
any defects to the lashing equipment, the carrier will escape liability
167
. It is clear that the 
burden of proof is very heavy and should be reduced by having exemption and/or limitation 
clauses and an evidence reversal clause inserted in a BL. According to the Belgian Courts, 
which are very strict towards undeclared deck cargo, when this occurs without being 
specifically stated in the BL, the carrier is fully liable for any loss or damage.  
However, the evolution of technology and containerisation particularly, has shaped 
these giant containerships for container deck cargo.  
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Since one knows that cargo will be carried on a containership when the BL does not 
specify either on deck or not, the consignee should recognise that it is very likely the 
containers in these modern ships will be carried on deck, and probably this is where the law 
should act. If you are putting your cargo in a container, you should accept that it will be 
loaded on board a specialised containership with cells on the deck designed for this 
purpose.   
For clarification, the Belgian courts judged that when the containership has a hold, 
then the containers should be carried in that hold, if not stated otherwise (Van Aerde, 
August 2003, p. 14).  
Wilson (2008, pp. 177-178)
168
 has also asserted that stowage on deck should be 
clearly stated in the BL, but this, in my view, fails to take account of the nature of 
specialised containerships. Also relevant here is dangerous cargo
169
. When dangerous or 
toxic cargo is carried on containers, the temperature in the hold is an issue, especially when 
the vessel is not mechanically ventilated. In such cases, containers should be carried on 
deck to avoid overheating and explosions. According to Wilson (2008, p. 178), it is 
customary in maritime trade for timber or inflammable goods to be carried on deck. 
 According to Belgian courts, when a negotiable BL is to be issued and the cargo 
concerned has been stowed on deck to be carried to or from a Belgian port, or, if there is a 
risk that cargo claims will be heard by a Belgian Court or that Belgian law will be held to 
apply to the contract, it is necessary for the carrier to specifically state this deck stowage on 
the BL.  
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 This can be achieved by stamping the BL with the words “carried on deck” and 
preferably with the addition of “at shipper’s risk,” but that may be contrary to article III 
Rule 8 of the Hague/Visby Rules. Such an inserted clause in the BL will exempt the carrier 
from liability. 
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i) Practice & Custom  
In practice, deck stamps are sometimes used that state “shipped on deck at shipper’s 
risk” without there being any other clause in the bill of lading that exempt, reduce or limit 
the carrier’s liability or reverse the burden of proof. In such cases, the addition “at shipper’s 
risk” in the deck stamp implies that the carrier is liable only for damage or loss caused by 
his negligence but that may be contrary to Article III Rule 8 of the Hague/Visby Rules and 
should not be permissible. This is also applicable if the cargo is carried on the deck of a 
specialised and well-equipped container vessel and this is where the law must allow for the 
development of containerisation and modern trade.  
Custom does provide for such cases, but the question is whether the law so provides 
and whether it is necessary for the law to provide when custom adequately satisfies the 
needs of modern maritime trade. It should be questioned as to whether the custom is law or 
should be considered as law
170
. In Nelson Pine Forests Ltd. v. Seatrans New Zealand Ltd. 
(“the Pembroke”) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 290, a vessel loaded expensive machinery in 
open-top containers for carriage from Bremen, Germany to Nelson, New Zealand, the issue 
being whether the carrier was reckless within the meaning of Article IV Rule 5(e) 
Hague/Visby Rules, so as to be deprived of the benefit of package limitation. The court, in 
this case, held that there was a contractual obligation to carry the containers below deck and 
that the obligation was met on loading. 
However, when the vessel called at an intermediate port to load more cargo, one of 
the plaintiff’s containers was discharged and reloaded on deck. The vessel then proceeded 
to New Zealand via the Straits of Magellan and encountered severe gales during which 
machinery parts in the container in question suffered corrosion damage, which the court 
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held to be caused by contact with salt water. The court held that the Master would have 
known with certainty that the vessel would encounter very rough weather on the passage 
through the Straits of Magellan, and that there was an obvious risk that cargo on deck 
would be water-damaged. The court held that the Master was reckless within the meaning 
of Article IV Rule 5(e) to disregard this risk.  
The carrier argued that it had not personally acted recklessly in any way, but the 
court held, without elaboration, that it was the recklessness of the Master of the vessel that 
was in issue; recklessness for the purposes of the rules was not limited to the management 
of the carrier. Moreover, the Master had been in contact with the carrier by fax at the time 
of the intermediate port call and it seems that the court would have inferred that the carrier 
was in fact party to, and aware of the risks inherent in, the reloading of the container on 
deck. As a result, the carrier was found liable for the damage to the plaintiff’s machinery in 
full. 
Elsewhere in the judgement, the court confirmed that the doctrine of fundamental 
breach was not part of the law of New Zealand, so as to deprive a defendant of the right to 
limit its liability only if it could be shown that its actions were, as a matter of construction, 
outside the protective clauses of the governing contract. The judgement is of some 
assistance in determining whether conduct is reckless within the meaning of Article IV 
Rule 5(e) of the Hague-Visby Rules, since by custom a container may be placed on deck
171
. 
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 Cf. Belgium Approach. 
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ii) Belgium v. Mormacvega  
 It was accepted in the case of The Mormacvega [1973] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 267, that 
when goods are shipped under a “clean” Bill of Lading on the deck of a container ship built 
for the purpose of carrying deck cargo, such shipment does not constitute an “unreasonable 
deviation” from the contract of carriage and the shipowner is therefore not prevented from 
limiting his liability under the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (46 US Code, 
sect 1304 (5)), in the event of the goods being lost. 
In this case, the plaintiffs shipped thirty-eight pallets of synthetic resin liquid, which 
were packed in a container, on the defendant steamship Mormacvega, for a voyage from 
New York to Rotterdam. The vessel, which had originally been built for the carriage of 
general cargo, had been converted to a containership so that containers could be carried on 
deck and also in the hold. The container on deck was lost overboard. A “clean” BL had 
been issued to the plaintiffs, who claimed damages for the lost cargo. The defendants 
abandoned any defences which they might have, the sole issue remaining being whether the 
defendants could limit their liability under the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
(46 US Code sect 1304(5)), to $500 in respect of each pallet, i.e. $19,000 in total. 
The plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to $109,000 (i.e. the market value of 
the goods at Rotterdam) because of the custom rule that the carriage of cargo on deck, 
where a “clean” BL was issued, constituted an unreasonable deviation from the contract of 
carriage, thus preventing the defendants from relying on the limitation provisions of sect 
1304(5). The defendants, however, maintained that the plaintiffs, who had acted through a 
professional freight forwarder, were bound by the trade custom of stowing containers on 
deck, and such stowage would therefore not be an unreasonable deviation.  
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Moreover, in any event there could be no question of an unreasonable deviation 
because the vessel had been purposely constructed to carry deck cargo.  
It was held that the plaintiffs, although not having actual knowledge, did have 
imputed knowledge through the freight forwarder of the practice of shipping containers on 
deck. The practice, however, was not sufficiently customary to make it a trade custom and 
there was no oral contract requiring the plaintiffs’ container to be shipped under deck. 
Furthermore, the carriage of the container on deck was not an unreasonable deviation 
because the deck of a container ship was exactly where containers were reasonably 
intended to be carried. Consequently the defendants were entitled to limit their liability to 
$19,000.  
It is worth questioning what occurs when dangerous cargo is undeclared and is 
carried on deck, and which is also unauthorised according to the contract, and, therefore, a 
breach of the carriage for the undeclared dangerous goods is constituted. According to the 
Belgian approach, if a container is loaded on deck, it would normally constitute a breach 
for undeclared or unauthorised deck cargo but if that cargo contains undeclared dangerous 
goods, then a breach is not committed but, in fact, the opposite: the loader should be 
praised for saving the ship, the cargo and the crew from explosion.  
In Wibau Maschinenfabric Hartmann SA v. Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Co. (The 
Chanda) [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 494, which was a case of deviation in the form of 
unauthorised carriage on deck, Hirst J held that since the provisions of the Rules were 
intended to apply to under-deck carriage, Article IV, Rule 5 and the words “in any event” 
were to be construed purely in relation to such carriage and not to the loss or damage 
resulting from un-contemplated deck stowage. As per Hirst J, “clauses which are clearly 
intended to protect the shipowner, provided he honours his contractual obligation to stow 
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goods under deck, do not apply if he is in breach of that obligation” and according to his 
view the package limitation in the Hague Rules fell within that category with the result that 
“being repugnant to and inconsistent with the obligation to stow below deck was 
inapplicable.”   
According to Griggs (2005, p. 151), historically, unauthorised carriage of goods on 
deck has been treated as a deviation and it has been repeatedly held that the carriers guilty 
of such conduct are not entitled to rely on any exemption or limitation clause in the contract 
of carriage but are liable as a common carrier. However, nowadays containerisation has 
developed the use of the deck carriage and these views are out of date, resulting in the fact 
that COGSA may no longer serve current needs. 
Although unauthorised deck carriage was a deviation in the past, law should provide 
for the current situation since containers are now also loaded on deck. As was further 
demonstrated, in the case of Daewoo Heavy Industries Ltd. and another v. Klipriver 
Shipping Ltd. and another; the Kapitan Petko Voivoda [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, [2003] 
EWCA Civ. 451, an important issue is the effect on a contract of carriage on deck without 
the knowledge or authority of the cargo owner. This case serves as an example of the 
doctrine of fundamental breach under which exclusion and limitation of liability clauses 
would cease to be applicable (Wilson 2008, p. 21). In “The Kapitan Petko Voivoda,” the 
Court overruled “The Chanda” above, ruling that in a contract of carriage incorporating the 
Hague Rules 1924, Art. IV Rule 5 applied even where the effective cause of loss was 
unauthorised deck cargo. 
Under the English COGSA, Article IV Rule 5(e), a carrier may lose the benefit of 
the limitation of liability if their conduct was intentional in the sense that they had 
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knowledge that damage would probably result
172
. This article differs from that under 
Article III Rules 1 and 2 where the carrier is in breach of his obligations to exercise due 
diligence to make the ship seaworthy and to “properly and carefully carry” the goods. In the 
latter case, where there is only negligence on the part of the carrier or his agents, the carrier 
has failed to exercise due diligence. 
In imposing on the carrier an obligation to exercise “due diligence” the draftsmen of 
the Hague Rules adopted a term first used in the US Harter Act in 1893. The standard 
imposed by this obligation has been interpreted by the courts as being roughly equivalent to 
that of the common law duty of care, but with the important distinction that it is a personal 
obligation that cannot be delegated. As Tetley (1988, p. 391) confirms, “the carrier may 
employ some other person to exercise due diligence but if the delegate is not diligent, then 
the carrier is responsible”. As a result, the carrier will remain liable if the person to whom 
performance of the obligation is delegated is negligent, whether that person be a servant of 
the carrier or even a Lloyd’s surveyor as was accepted in  Union of India v N.V. Reederij 
Amsterdam (The Amstelslot) [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 223. It will be no defence for the carrier 
to argue that he engaged competent or reputable experts to perform the task or that he 
lacked the necessary expertise to check their work. 
It is perhaps not surprising to discover that carriers have frequently claimed that 
their liability under the Rules differs little from that at common law, which imposed on 
them an absolute duty to provide a seaworthy ship. Nevertheless, as shown in The Kapitan 
Sakharov [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255, where there was a shipment of undeclared dangerous 
cargo in a sealed container
173
, an important distinction arises where the carrier will not be 
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liable under the Rules if neither he nor his delegate has been negligent. As per Auld J, there 
is nothing in the Hague Rules or common law to make a carrier responsible for the un-
seaworthiness of its vessel resulting from a shipper’s misconduct of which it, the carrier, 
has not been informed.  
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iii) Remarks  
As already mentioned, if lashing equipment is adequate, there should be no problem 
for deck cargo; declared or undeclared, by custom.  Belgian courts should consider that 
safety arrangements are in some ports poor and work is frequently performed in dark, 
windy, rainy or icy conditions. There is a necessity to standardize lashing equipment and 
this must be carried out within the International Standardization Organisation (ISO) in 
order to achieve the necessary international impact
174
. Standardization work within the ISO 
is on-going. ISO published the Standards Handbook about Freight Containers in January 
2007, detailing over thirty ISO International Standards. This will, it is hoped, result in safer 
working conditions for stevedores and will reduce cargo losses significantly.   
According to Andersson
175
, lashing equipment is needed equal to adverse weather 
conditions which often prevail when containers are to be handled and secured. For 
example, problems arise with mixed equipment and especially twistlocks
176
 with different 
locking directions, one of the biggest problems on board a ship that could create danger. 
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 Twistlocks are used to take up forces in all directions. The horizontal forces are taken up 
by the collars which fit into the corner fittings. The compression forces are taken up by the 
intermediate plate and the tensile forces by the lock itself; see figure below from 
Andersson’s; also BRODIE (1996, p. 177). 
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Certainly, problems exist related to semi-automatic twistlocks when a container is 
unevenly
177
 settled, the twistlock then locks and the container is fixed. The crane becomes 
blocked and the semi-automatic twistlock must be released manually. If some semi-
automatic twistlocks are unlocked by mistake some of them cannot be locked again without 
discharging the containers. Low quality lashing equipment sometimes creates problems, 
because of intolerance and inadequate contact surfaces which may damage the corner 
fittings of the container. 
The strength of the lashing equipment is a matter of widespread discussion 
(Andersson 1999, p. 195). Should it be stronger than the corner fittings of the container 
with consequent damage to that container or should it be weaker and leave the containers 
unharmed but perhaps create alternative dangers? Ideal equipment would withstand any 
forces to which it may be subjected during transport and handling. 
In the case where it is known that a container is required to be stowed below deck in 
an open-top container (with higher risk of exposure and naturally inclined to receive rust 
and damage) it should be placed under cover. Technology and law should co-operate to 
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resolve this issue. For example, when the vessel is a Post-Panamax, or modern container 
vessel without a hold, then naturally the containers are carried on deck and that should be 
accepted by law, as a valid discharge of the carrier’s obligations. However, if the container 
vessel provides a hold, then the open-top containers should be placed in that hold, 
particularly if that is the contractual obligation. There is still need to modernise the law at 
this point, since technology requires the containers to be carried on the deck of the 
containerships.  
There appears to be no compatibility between technology and law on these issues 
and it is questionable if there ever will be. This is due to the fact that the safest way to load 
an open-top container cannot be decided upon. The cargo of an open-top container will 
always remain at higher risk than cargo in closed-top containers. Certainly, the placement 
of an open-top container in the hold seems more secure in many respects but it should also 
be taken into account that the new modern containerships do not have a hold as such; they 
are single plat-formed. Therefore, the law should provide for this technological 
advancement, and certainly custom or commercial practice should be made law for the 
smoother operation of this undertaking. 
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b. Undeclared Dangerous Goods; Undeclared Dangerous Deck Cargo 
The situation worsens when undeclared cargo is also dangerous as shown in the 
case of The Kapitan Sakharov [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255 CA. The trial Judge clearly found 
that the vessel was unseaworthy because of the undeclared dangerous cargo in a DSR 
container on deck. There was no warrant for extending a carrier’s duty of due diligence as 
to the structure and stowage of its ship to a physical verification of the declared contents of 
containers or other packaging in which cargo is shipped unless put on notice to do so. 
Besides, the containers were in any event closed with a custom’s seal and were not capable 
of internal examination by the carrier or his agents (see p. 272, cols. 1 and 2). 
 Furthermore, the question arising is whether ship-owners are entitled to be 
indemnified by shippers where the shipped goods include undeclared dangerous cargo and 
if they exercise due diligence in connection with such shipment. This was the case with The 
Kapitan Sakharov, where it was common ground that the explosion resulted in the cracking 
open of hatch three and a fire which despite vigorous fire fighting by the ship’s crew spread 
down into hold three in the aft
178
 section of which there were eight CYL tank containers of 
isopentane. Isopentane is a liquid more flammable than petrol having a flash point well 
below zero (0) deg C and a boiling point of about twenty-eight (28) deg C.  
 Ambient temperatures in the Gulf, where The Kapitan Sakharov was sailing would 
have been well above that boiling point so the isopentane would have been under pressure 
and any escape of it would have been in the form of vapour.  
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 Defining the aft, one could say it is at or towards the stern or after end of a ship: see 
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(first and second defendants) & CYL (third defendants) operated together a world-wide 
container service in which one or other of them shipped containers for carriage of good on 
ocean vessels; in the particular case, on NSC’s (the plaintiffs) container vessel The Kapitan 
Sakharov. 
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 The degree of risk of such vapour combusting and contributing to a fire in the hold 
depended on how well it was ventilated. There was no mechanical ventilation in the holds 
of “The Kapitan Sakharov,” something which technology must still resolve. The intense 
fire that developed in the ship’s hold led in turn to overheating of diesel fuel in her tanks 
causing one or both of them to explode and breach the bulkhead separating holds three and 
two thus allowing them to flood. The fire-fighting water directed into hold three by the 
crew and the fire-fighting vessels passed into and accumulated in hold two as well, causing 
the vessel to sink. The trial judge stated the explosion and resultant fire on deck caused 
damage to part of the ship and the cargo and they were an effective cause of the sinking and 
loss of the vessel and most of the cargo. However, those further losses would not have been 
caused if NSC had not stowed CYL’s isopentane below deck. 
 The Court of Appeal held there was no basis on which this Court could disturb the 
trial judge’s finding that the explosion and fire on deck was caused by an undeclared and 
dangerous cargo in a DSR container and also that the explosion resulted from a dangerous 
cargo, probably an unstable chemical, and that none of the containers stowed at or near the 
point of explosion had declared the cargo to be dangerous. 
 On a balance of probabilities, the undeclared cargo responsible for the explosion 
was in a DSR container and the trial judge was entitled to infer that the contents of SENU 
or another DSR container caused the explosion (see p. 263, col. 2; p. 275, col. 2).  
 Besides, there was no sensible basis on which it could be said that the carriage 
under deck of highly flammable liquid in containers was less dangerous on container ships 
than on any other type of ship especially where the holds were unventilated. Also, the 
equipment of the vessel with cell guides to hold the containers secure was no protection 
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against the activation of pressure valves by heat or against the resultant accumulation of 
highly combustible vapour in the holds (as per p. 265, col. 2). 
 The general provision in “The Kapitan Sakharov’s” technical certificate relating to 
the transportation of specific hazardous cargo in tank containers, dealt only with whether 
the vessel might carry dangerous cargo in certain types of package, not where on the vessel 
they might be carried; the technical certificate did not qualify the general prohibition in 
MOPOG (the Russian version of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code) from 
carrying tank containers of isopentane in an unventilated hold whatever the nature of the 
vessel (see p. 266, col. 1). The clear purpose of MOPOG was to reproduce without 
distinction the provisions of SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea, 1974) and IMDG (International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code), its preamble 
expressly stating that it complied with them. Like SOLAS and IMDG, it regulates the 
carriage by vessels of dangerous cargo, including that in tank containers. 
 It provides that specified dangerous cargoes, including isopentane, may be carried 
in tank containers and that if dangerous cargo is carried in a hold there must be a 
mechanical ventilation system. Particularly stringent provisions are made for highly 
inflammable liquids, including and without distinction, those carried in tank containers, and 
for the dangers of escape and ignition of flammable vapour in unventilated conditions (art. 
13). 
 It prescribes, by reference to an attached document called a “KTRP sheet” where 
particular types of cargo unit (i.e. packages and open and closed containers etc.) should be 
stowed on different types of ship. The certificate, towards its end, did refer specifically to 
tank containers in the following standard provision applicable to various types of vessel: 
“Transportation of specific hazardous cargo in tank containers, special liquid and solid bulk 
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containers, and in rail containers on ferries is permitted if the cargo in question is indicated 
in Appendix 17 (which includes isopentane) or Section 8 of the Regulations on 
Transportation of Hazardous Cargoes by Sea.” 
 Moreover, according to Richardson
179
, if the goods to be shipped are dangerous or 
hazardous, it is essential that they are not presented to P&O Nedlloyd for carriage until 
written instructions are presented to P&O Nedlloyd by the shipper. These instructions must 
detail the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Classification and United Nations 
(UN) Number, together with a full description of the goods (including the correct technical 
name as well as any trade name). Afterwards, P&O Nedlloyd agrees to carry the goods and 
give instructions for their receipt. Special documentation is also required if dangerous or 
hazardous goods are to be carried. A Dangerous Goods Note (DGN) and Container Vehicle 
Packing Certificate are required in lieu of a Standard Shipping Note (SSN) if the goods are 
of a hazardous nature. In the UK, the SSN (Richardson 1998, p. 26) must always 
accompany the goods.  
 Additionally, the Container/Vehicle Packing Certificate section must be completed 
for any Shipper-packed FCL
180
 containers and must be signed by the Shipper. For FCL 
containers, the driver must present to the packing point four labels of the appropriate class 
in accordance with the U.K. road regulations, (on occasions additional labels may be 
supplied).  
It is a legal requirement that the labels are affixed to the container. LCL
181
 requires 
no further action by the shipper, provided a completed DGN accompanies the goods. 
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Similarly, dangerous/hazardous goods are subject to the same international regulations and 
controls on the continent as in the UK. 
On the inland transport document and on the transport emergency (TREM) card, 
which is accompanying the goods, the Accord European relation du transport international 
des merchandise Dangereux par Route (ADR) classification and UN number must be 
shown as well as the description of the goods. These cards are prepared by the European 
Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) of Brussels according to the regulations of the ADR. 
 The stowage of the tank containers of isopentane under deck clearly contravened 
SOLAS, IMDG and MOPOG
182
 and was not permitted by the technical certificate. The 
consequences of the introduction of isopentane to a fire in a poorly ventilated hold are 
particularly serious, not only because of its high flammability and volatility, but also 
because the fire is likely to become a general vapour fire not readily extinguishable by 
water. Therefore, Clarke J correctly found that the stowage of isopentane below deck 
rendered “the Kapitan Sakharov” unseaworthy (see p. 266, cols. 1 & 2; p. 275, col. 2) and 
it was due to NSC’s lack of due diligence (see p. 269, col. 2; p. 270, col. 1). 
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i) The isopentane unseaworthiness as a novus actus interveniens 
 As to NSC’s contention for DSR’s undeclared deck cargo, the Judge began by 
referring to the improbabilities of anyone shipping an undeclared cargo of a dangerous 
chemical like calcium hypochlorite from China, via Hong Kong, to the Arabian Gulf.  
Briefly, these were: that there was no evidence why anyone might have wished to ship such 
an undeclared consignment to Saudi Arabia. There were no restrictions on the importation 
of such chemicals into that country. The savings, if any, in freight charges for the carriage 
of declared dangerous cargoes were insignificant. There was no evidence that calcium 
hypochlorite or similar chemicals were manufactured in China or any evidence of any trade 
in them between that country and Saudi Arabia.  
 In addition, that the documentation relating to container SENU, on which NSC 
focused its case at trial, indicated, that unless there had been an elaborate and widespread 
conspiracy, a perfectly legitimate sale and shipment of rubber hose and nothing else. 
Certainly, nobody can judge such cases one hundred per cent and not all relevant facts are 
known and there is not, therefore, an exhaustive list of options from which, logically or as 
matter of common sense, a choice of improbabilities may be made, having regard to the 
burden of proof.  
 The vessel was not reasonably fit to withstand the ordinary incidents of the voyage 
with isopentane stowed under deck. Obviously, it was unseaworthy in that respect, because 
the master and cargo officer permitted the isopentane to be stowed under deck in 
circumstances in which, if they had exercised reasonable skill and care, they would not 
have done so. Therefore, the plaintiffs were in breach of Article III, Rule 1 of the Hague 
Rules.  
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 Art. III, Rule 1 of the Hague Rules requires a carrier, before and at the beginning of 
a voyage, to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy. Article IV, Rule 6 of the 
rules renders the shipper of inflammable, explosive or otherwise dangerous goods, who 
gives no notice of their nature and dangerous character, liable to the carrier “for all 
damages and expenses directly or indirectly arising out of or resulting from … (their) 
shipment”. The shippers are so liable irrespective of their knowledge of the dangerous 
nature of the goods
183
. 
 Moreover, in Mediterranean Freight Services Ltd. v BP Oil International Ltd (The 
Fiona) [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 506, the explosion was caused by the unseaworthiness and 
(at least indirectly) by the shipment of dangerous cargo. Here the sinking (as opposed to the 
explosion) was caused by the unseaworthiness and (at least indirectly) by the shipment of 
dangerous cargo.  
 Since the Court of Appeal held that Article IV Rule 6 could not be construed as 
giving an indemnity to the ship owners in respect of the consequence of the explosion in 
The Fiona, it follows that it cannot be construed as giving an indemnity to the plaintiffs in 
respect of the consequences of the sinking here. It makes no difference that it was held on 
the facts of The Fiona that the dominant cause of the explosion was unseaworthiness. 
 The principle is the same as that applicable to a breach of art III, Rule 1, resulting in 
damage to or loss of cargo where the ship owner pleads an excepted peril under art IV, Rule 
2, where it is for the ship owner to establish that the whole or a specific part of the damage 
or loss was caused by the excepted peril
184
.  
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 As the House of Lords held in the pre Hague Rules’ case of Smith Hogg & Co Ltd v 
Black Sea & Baltic General Insurance Co Ltd. [1940] 67 Lloyd’s L Rep 253, the obligation 
to furnish a seaworthy ship is the “fundamental obligation.” 
 The unseaworthiness will in all or most cases precede other causes, since it must 
exist at the commencement of the voyage. As Lord Wright put it in Monarch Steamship Co. 
Ltd. v. Karlshamns Oljefabriker (A/B) [1942] 82 Lloyd’s L Rep 137 at pp. 155-156, from 
one point of view, unseaworthiness must generally, perhaps always, in a sense be a 
“remote” cause. To satisfy the definition of unseaworthiness it must exist at the 
commencement of the voyage. It must, however, still be in effective operation at the time of 
the casualty, if it is to be a cause of the casualty, and from its very nature it must always 
operate by means of and along with the specific and immediate peril. That is because the 
essence of unseaworthiness as a cause of loss or damage is that the unseaworthy ship is 
unfit to meet the peril. In other words, the vessel would not have suffered the loss or injury 
if she had been seaworthy.   
This issue would only have arisen for decision in the double event of upholding the 
Judge’s finding that DSR is liable for the initial explosion and fire and if The Fiona had 
been distinguishable as to render DSR liable under that rule for the loss of the ship and all 
its cargo.  In that event DSR would have contended that the total loss of the vessel is still 
the responsibility of NSC because its wrongful act in stowing the isopentane under deck 
was a novus actus, so entitling it to recover the whole of its loss from NSC. 
Bad stowage endangers a ship and renders it unseaworthy. Certainly, though, bad 
stowage was not the cause of the danger here, but the presence in an otherwise good stow 
of concealed, dangerous cargo. As held in Ingram & Royle Ltd v Services Maritimes Du 
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Treport, [1913] 1 KB 538, per Mr Justice Scrutton at p. 543, bad stowage endangering a 
ship may take the form of stowing an otherwise harmless cargo in a place which renders it 
dangerous, because of its weight and the effect of that on the stability of the ship or because 
of its nature which may be adversely affected by the place of stowage, or simply because it 
is dangerous wherever and however it is stowed. 
Unseaworthiness is a physical state. The shipper’s knowledge or ignorance of 
characteristics of the cargo which make it dangerous if stowed in the wrong place or 
anywhere on its ship cannot determine that state. But, it is material to the question whether 
the carrier has exercised due diligence and, therefore, of his responsibility for the 
unseaworthiness. The present case is concerned with the application of Art. III, Rule 1 of 
the Hague Rules and not with principles of English, or even Scottish, common law. On the 
other hand, principles of common law very often coincide with principles of common sense 
and the present case affords no exception, given the potential scale of the catastrophe if, as 
a result of a breach of MOPOG, vapour from isopentane stored below deck in unventilated 
conditions catches fire. 
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C.) LIABILITY & DEFECTIVE GOODS  
a. Unsuitable Containers, Defective & Sensitive Goods  
The European Council, being aware of the problems associated with the cargo of 
dangerous goods, adopted a directive to make sure that adequately trained drivers perform the 
carriage of dangerous cargo by road. According to the directive, Council Dir 89/684/EEC, 
drivers (other than in the armed forces) involved in the national or international carriage of 
dangerous goods by road are required to hold the appropriate vocational training certificate
185
. 
 The order party to the contract is usually called the “merchant” a term designed not only 
to include the shipper, but also the cargo owner, consignee and Bill of Lading holder (Harrington 
1982, p. 5). The “merchant” is frequently a freight forwarder who consolidates separate cargoes 
into a sealed container. Meanwhile, where there is a bailment of the container by a carrier to a 
shipper, for example, FCL stuffing, then there is an implied term as to its fitness for purpose 
under the United Kingdom Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982. The application of this 
statute is not usually expressly excluded by the terms of typical liner Bills of Lading (BL). 
However, other BL terms that address the liability of the carrier for defective or unsuitable 
containers
186
 are inconsistent with any current legislation, and so may, by implication, exclude 
any duty on the ocean carrier to supply a container fit for the purpose of carrying the merchant’s 
goods. If one packs a container, one is liable for any injury or damage caused by one’s failure to 
do a good job and insurance against this potential liability is therefore essential
187
.  
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 See Law Society’s Gazette (December 1989) “Carriage of Goods,” 87 (14) European Update, 
p. 49. 
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 Sometimes there is delivery of containers for food carriage- milk- and the containers are not 
properly clean for this purpose. 
187
  Supra, n. 179, at p. 33. 
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 It is usual, according to the terms of the bill of lading, for the shippers to be blamed and 
not for the carriers for any loss or damage to the contents of a container and the former should 
cover any loss or expense, if negligent filling, packing or stowing of the container has caused 
such loss or expense. Nevertheless, even if there is an applicable and effective exclusion of any 
implied duty imposed by the Statute, the exclusion will be unlawful if the damage occurs within 
the ambit of the Hague/Visby Rules
188
. 
When the damage occurs outside the ambit of these rules- before loading or after 
discharge- or outside the ambit of the contract of carriage, the exclusion may be valid, subject to 
the application of the United Kingdom Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, section 1. A problem 
here, though, is that the Unfair Contract Terms Act is not applicable where the contract is made 
between two parties in different countries (Art 26, subsections 1, 3 & 4 of the Act as amended up 
to date to 01/10/2003). A solution might be the Consumer Protection Act 1987 which has a 
wider application.    
The case differs, though, when it comes to defective containers. Even if it is established 
that the container was defective when received by the carrier, the carrier will still be responsible 
for the consequences of not putting right, reasonably obvious defects in the container that cause 
damage to its contents. Therefore, a carrier (or any other bailee such as a port authority) may not 
be happy to simply blame the defective nature of a container supplied by a third party.  
                                                 
188
 See BUDGEN P. “What if a Container is Unsuitable for the Intended Cargo?” Liability of 
Unsuitable Containers, as in http://www.forwarderlaw.com/Feature/consuit.htm (26/04/2005, at 
00:00); also, as interviewed by Ouri Vainio (export Assistant of the biggest finish manufacturer 
VALIO, http://www.valio.com), when manufacturers are signing up contracts with shipping lines 
to receive empty clean containers, in order to ship milk and the containers they receive are not 
clean; the shipping line has to send another one to fully perform the contract. The dirty one is 
sent back under the expenses of the shipping line. Special kinds of documents are necessary 
when food is shipped. 
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A bailee has as obligation to care for the goods
189
. This is a positive duty. It may involve 
the bailee taking steps to rectify any problems noticed, even if these did not originally arise 
through the fault of that bailee. A container may have been originally defective or have been 
damaged as a result of an incident occasioned in the course of transit. There is often little 
evidence as to the position either way. Where the carrier alleges a defective container for the 
purpose of reliance upon an exclusion clause in the BL in its favour then, in the ordinary manner, 
the carrier must prove that the damage falls within the terms of the exclusion clause. It is not for 
the merchant to prove the contrary. 
Similarly, a carrier is not liable at common law for loss or damage which results 
exclusively from some inherent quality or defect of the cargo carried. The exception is most 
frequently invoked in the case of perishable goods such as fish as shown in Albacora v. Westcott 
& Laurence Line Ltd. [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 53, which in the normal course of events are likely 
to deteriorate in quality during transit. Liability in such inherent vice cases may well depend on 
the contract. If the contract requires refrigeration, then there is no inherent vice. If special 
treatment is necessary for the carriage of the shipper’s goods, the shipper must stipulate as much. 
Therefore, in the contract, the use of a refrigerated container should be mentioned when requisite 
and its temperature should be checked
190
.  
By the advent of the Hague/Visby Rules, the common law exceptions of inherent vice 
and Act of God were included in Art. IV Rule 2 and many issues were encountered regarding the 
development of the technology while the liability of the carriers was naturally affected. 
According to Art. IV Rule 2(m) of the Hague-Visby Rules neither the carrier nor the ship shall 
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 See sub-chapter 3(D). 
190
 A refrigerated container is an insulated shipping container used for the carriage of goods 
requiring refrigeration in transit, such as fruit, vegetables, dairy products and meat. The 
refrigerated container is also known as a reefer container, reefer box or simply reefer.  
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be liable for loss or damage arising or resulting from wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss 
or damage arising from inherent defect, quality or vice of the goods.  
Under normal circumstances, fit cargo can bear the ordinary incidence of the voyage, 
under reasonable human care. But, if the cargo is not fit for an ordinary voyage and it acquires 
special treatment in order to travel safely, but it has not been stated earlier in advance, then, the 
carriers/MTOs can be free from liability for the unfitness of the cargo. This may take place, even 
if reasonable human care is taken. It is true that if exporters and cargo-owners require special 
treatment, they must state this so in advance to the MTOs as these in-experts are not likely to 
know if the cargo has an inherent vice and it is not fit for an ordinary voyage. 
In cases of the exception noted above, involving perishable goods such as fish, the 
carriers, when accepting the delivery of this kind of cargo, are expected to exercise the degree of 
care which the nature of the goods demands. They are not obliged to accept the goods for 
carriage but if they do so, they are required to “adopt a system which is sound in the light of all 
the knowledge which the carrier has, or ought to have, about the nature of the goods,” as 
accepted per Lord Reid in the Albacora case. The degree of care expected of the carrier will of 
course vary depending on the extent of this knowledge of characteristics of the particular cargo. 
Thus, in this case where a consignment of wet, salted fish was shipped at Glasgow for 
Genoa, the carrier was not held liable for the deterioration in quality of the goods during transit 
since the shipper had not told him that the fish required refrigeration
191
. Furthermore, the same 
implications hold about Belgian chocolates melting inside containers due to inappropriate 
temperatures.
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 As accepted in the Albacora per Lord Pearce (p. 62, col. 2) ship owners had no reason to 
suspect special risks attending carriage of this fish and were entitled to carry it in the ordinary 
way, and that, therefore, there was no breach of Art. III, Rule 2; see also the Austrean and 
Shipping Orp I India v. Gentle Chemini Co. (1980) 55 ALJR 88 (HCA). 
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i) Be Aware of the Heat 
In Mayhew Foods Limited v. Overseas Containers Ltd. [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 317, Mr 
Justice Bingham held that the contract here was for the carriage of goods from Uckfield to the 
numbered berth at Jeddah and the rules regarding cargo care did not apply to inland transport 
prior to shipment on board a vessel, because under section 1(3) of the 1971 Act they were to 
have the force of law only in relation to and in connection with the carriage of goods by sea. 
In contrast, the contract here clearly provided for shipment at a United Kingdom port and 
from the time of that shipment the Act and the rules applied. The parties clearly expected and 
intended a Bill of Lading to be issued and, when issued, it duly evidenced the parties’ earlier 
contract. Since the bill was issued in a contracting state and provided for carriage from a port in 
a contracting state, the rules applied once the goods were loaded on board the vessel at 
Shoreham (at p. 320, cols. 1 and 2).  
The shippers (Mayhew) and the carriers (OCL) entered into an oral contract for the 
carriage by OCL of a refrigerated container of Mayhew's products from Uckfield in Sussex, UK 
to Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. The goods were to be carried in a refrigerated container at a 
temperature of minus eighteen (18) deg. C. on the vessel Benalder. On 11
th
 December, the 
container was loaded on Benalder and carried to Jeddah arriving there on 21
st
 December. 
Permission to discharge the container was refused because the contents had decayed and 
offensive juices were reported to be dripping from it. The reason for this was that the 
temperature control on the container instead of being set at minus eighteen (18) deg. C. had been 
set at plus two (2) deg. C. to plus four (4) deg. C. The goods had in fact been subjected to some 
heating while in the container. The goods were eventually sold for animal food. 
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OCL accepted that as a result of this failure to refrigerate the goods in the container, they 
were in breach of their contract and duty as bailees and at law in failing to take reasonable care 
of the goods and to carry, keep and care for the same properly and carefully. They sought to limit 
the damages recoverable against them in reliance on the terms of a standard clause in their BL. 
It is true that the temperature appeared in Credits and might cause problems, since it is 
not foreseen by the UCP. For instance, in the case of the temperature clausing, increasingly strict 
food regulations have led to an increase in ill-conceived requests for temperature clausing on 
Bills of Lading. As Richardson notes (1998, p. 22) “what is the problem?” ask many Merchants, 
“why can’t you clause my Bill; to be carried at -18C?” The problem, indeed, is not as simple as 
it seems.  
For example, most reasonable shippers would accept that carriers should only be asked to 
insert in their Bill of Lading purely factual clauses giving undertakings which can be controlled 
and the effect of which can be monitored. This being the case no carrier could clause a Bill: “To 
be carried at -18C”. Virtually all refrigerated goods shipped in containers are FCL packed so the 
carriers never have the opportunity to ascertain the temperature of the goods (as they would have 
done conventionally by taking spear temperatures during loading of the vessel). Accordingly, 
they cannot warrant a temperature of the goods. 
Furthermore, the carriers’ information comes via monitoring air delivery and/or return 
temperatures. In different places, different types of refrigerated containers are controlled in 
different ways. To carry at a set temperature is impossible as there will always be minor 
fluctuations (during defrosting for instance). Thus, any undertaking regarding temperature during 
carriage must always be a range of temperatures (e.g. -18 C to -20 C) or colder than a set 
temperature (e.g. colder than -18 C).  
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Taking such criteria into account, it is difficult for a carrier to decide what type of 
temperature clausing may be offered to shippers. The matter may become more complicated if a 
clause is required evidencing temperature maintenance throughout combined transport. Before a 
carrier could consider applying such clauses the shipper would have to pay a door-to-door freight 
reflecting the provision of refrigeration throughout, including during inland transit. 
The design and capabilities of refrigerated containers are advancing rapidly.  The latest 
containers are capable of a far more sophisticated performance that those manufactured just a 
few years ago. The latest integral refrigerated containers employ Data Loggers, which record 
both air delivery and air return temperatures electronically whereas earlier models monitor 
Partlow Charts which are only capable of recording air return or air delivery. As the life of a 
refrigerated container is approximately twelve years, a diminishing number of Partlow Chart 
models will continue in service, and a substantial part of the P&O Nedlloyd fleet is already of 
the Data Logger variety. 
Firm rules for temperature clausing is made difficult by the existence of integral 
refrigerated containers of varying control performance and a fleet of insulated “port-hole” 
containers that must rely on an external source of cold air and monitoring from the vessel, shore-
based refrigeration facilities or “clip-on units.” The basic rule must always be that, when 
required, such clauses must be factual and unambiguous; evidencing requirements which carriers 
can control and monitor. 
Finally, shippers should ensure that their loaded containers are made available to the 
carrier at the agreed place of receipt with the goods at the required carriage temperature. Given 
the increasingly strict regulations applying to refrigerated foodstuffs, shippers must be prepared 
for rejection of containers if the initial monitoring of the container by the carrier suggests that the 
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goods are not at the required temperature (Richardson 1998, p. 24). However, traditionally 
carriers have preferred not to clause the Bill of Lading to reflect carriage temperatures.  
If there must be a temperature clause for refrigerated goods it should be reasonable and 
feasible. If goods are refrigerated they must be at the correct temperature at the time of shipment 
and FCL packing must be such as to permit free circulation of cool air to avoid “hot spots.” 
Circulation channels must be so constructed as not to collapse during transit. The future 
legalities of containerisation should provide for these kinds of issues, temperature, amongst other 
factors such as shipping delay. 
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b. Delay   
In the past, claims were arising for delay in the processing of shipment (Richardson 1998, 
p. 22). Delay predates containerisation, since containerisation has changed people’s expectations 
about delay. The COGSA does not provide specifically for any limitation to apply in relation to 
claims for delay (Griggs 2005, p. 145). In so far as delay results in physical damage to the goods, 
e.g. by deterioration in quality (Wilson 2008, p. 219), there seems little doubt that such loss is 
recoverable under Art. III Rule 2 which imposes a general duty of care in handling the cargo.  
Since current law is not adequate to solve issues or be compatible with modern trade, it 
should be amended. For example, difficulty arises, in the case of the Hague/Visby Rules, since 
the limit is to be calculated with reference to particulars of “the goods lost or damaged.” But, 
how is it possible to state that “delayed goods” are “lost” or “damaged?” And, if it is not possible 
to calculate the limit, then it would not seem to be possible in fact to limit liability for delay. On 
the other hand, this might not appear in the Hague Rules since the equivalent provision does not 
include the words “lost or damaged”. It would seem that no obligation is to be found in either of 
those two legal regimes when it comes to matter of delay.  
But still this solution might not be adequate.  
The Hamburg Rules (art. 5.3) and the MT Convention (art. 16.3) though contain 
provisions converting pending delay into a right for the claimant to treat the goods as lost, but 
these both regimes have not been ratified. The most recent “Rotterdam Rules” (art. 17(1) & art. 
21) provide for delay in delivery. 
Finally, it should be discerned that delay might not be a casual phenomenon in advanced 
containerisation in the future. This is due to the speed evolved in maritime trade by the 
implementation of specialised containerships. When the containership enters a port in order to 
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load cargo, the procedure is very rapid. It embarks, it loads or unloads, it departs, and all these 
are happening upon ultimate speed. Therefore, people’s expectations have changed. 
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c. Liability of the Consignor 
 In the Hague/Visby Rules, art. IV Rule 6
192
, the consignor is obliged not to ship 
dangerous goods. Therefore, the consignor has a duty to mark or label such goods in accordance 
with international standards. Furthermore, the consignor must inform the transport operator (or 
its agent or delegate) of the dangerous nature of the goods, and if necessary, the precautions that 
need to be undertaken in handling, storage shipping and use.  
 In case the consignor fails to do so, and the transport operator does not otherwise have 
knowledge of the goods’ dangerous character, the former shall be liable for all loss resulting 
from the shipment of the goods and the goods may at any time be unloaded, destroyed or 
rendered innocuous by the multimodal transport operator without payment of compensation
193
. 
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 See Effort Shipping Co v. Linden Management Co. (The Giannis NK) [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
337; Senator Lines GmbH v. Sunway Line, Inc and Others 291 F. 2d 145 Court of Appeals (2
nd
 
Circuit, 2002); cf. BAUGHEN S (Match 2000) “The Legal Status of the non-Contracting 
Shipper,” part. 1, The International Journal of Shipping Law, pp. 21-29. 
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 Supra, n. 174, p. 6.  
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D.) THE IMPLICATION OF CONTAINERISATION ON INCOTERMS 
For two decades, certain, particularly small, manufacturing companies in North 
America, have opted to convey the responsibility for managing transport, and the 
accompanying insurance, to the buyer or, if required to provide product on a delivered 
basis, to a freight forwarder. On the other hand, larger companies or those with in-house 
expertise have tried to gain competitive advantage by controlling the distribution in-house 
and garnering distributive efficiencies. Others only wanted to control the insurance 
arrangements in order to minimize the challenges faced in cases of cargo damage and so 
required CFR terms in the sale contract (Kindred/Brooks 1997, p. 17). Under the CFR, the 
shipper’s price includes the cost of transport but not insurance194.  
Moreover, under containerisation, the goods are prepared and stowed in containers 
before the arrival of the ship. This has created difficulties since it has made the traditional 
FOB point totally inappropriate. Therefore, FOB, CFR and CIF are appropriate only when 
there is delivery to the carrier by handing over the goods to the ship- specifically across the 
ship’s rail-, which simply does not take place when the goods are containerised.  
The consignees who have solid relationships with insurers or insurance brokers find 
CFR terms meet their needs for a delivered product but leave them free to control the 
insurance arrangements. But, still, this is not ideal. According to Ramberg (1999, p. 15), the 
seller should take care not to remain at risk after the goods have been handed over to the 
carrier that the buyer nominates. 
This is particularly important when the seller has no possibility to give instructions 
with respect to the care and custody of the goods, which occurs, for example, when the 
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 See further Ramberg Jan (2000) International Commercial Transactions, 2
nd
 ed. De 
Hague, Kluwer, pp. 108-110; Ramberg Jan (1999) ICC Guide to Incoterms 2000, 
Understanding and Practical Use, pp. 15-18.   
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carrier is obliged only to take instructions from his own contracting party, the buyer. 
Consequently, if the sellers wish to avoid being at risk after handing over the goods for 
carriage until loading on board the ship, they should refrain from using CFR and CIF and 
instead use CPT or CIP where the risk passes upon the handing over to the carriers. With 
regard to container traffic, such handing over will normally take place in the carriers’ 
terminal before the arrival of the ship.  
If the loss of or damage to the goods occurs during the carriers’ period of 
responsibility, it may, in practice, become impossible to ascertain whether it has occurred 
before or after the passing of the ship’s rail. This is another reason for choosing a trade 
term, such as FCA, CPT or CIP
195
, where risk of loss of damage to the goods passes from 
the seller to the buyer when the goods are handed over. 
It is true that the parties may think the differences really do not matter and may 
believe that things will resolve themselves but this is not always the case. Unfortunately, 
commercial practice is not the same in all parts of the world and INCOTERMS can do no 
more than reflect the most common practice. In many cases, it is impossible to reflect in 
INCOTERMS what actually happens in connection with the loading and unloading of the 
goods to and from the means of transport. 
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  “INCOTERM” is an abbreviation of International Commercial Terms and the chosen 
INCOTERM is a term of the contract of sale (N.B. not the contract of carriage); 
furthermore, FOB free on board, CFR cost & freight, CIF cost insurance & freight, CPT 
carriage paid to, CIP carriage & insurance paid to; also supra, n. 179, p. 10, where 
INCOTERMS are defined as a set or uniform rules codifying the interpretation of trade 
terms defining the rights and obligations of both Buyer and Seller in an international 
transaction, thereby enabling an otherwise complex basis for a Sale Contract to be 
accomplished in three letters. 
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The ICC Model International Sale Contract
196
 lists all INCOTERMS in A3 of the 
specific conditions. This model contract is also helpful for multi-modal transport. In 
addition, there is a particular box and space for delivery terms other than INCOTERMS. 
However, as indicated, the parties should carefully consider whether it is appropriate to use 
a term other than an INCOTERM. If they do so, they should ensure that no 
misunderstandings could arise with respect to its interpretation. 
Furthermore, normally the buyer does not risk having to pay the seller demurrage
197
 
when the goods are carried by liner shipping companies. In this case, the goods are 
normally discharged by these companies and stored in cargo terminals until they are 
received by the buyers (Ramberg 2000, p. 21). This is particularly true with respect to 
containerised cargo. But, the problem of matching the terms of the charter party with those 
of the contract of sale is particularly important with respect to commodities carried in bulk. 
Because commercial practice differs in different ports and changes from time to time, a 
failure to match the terms of the contract of sale with the terms of the charter party may 
result in unpleasant and expensive surprises for the contracting parties. 
Moreover, in practice, problems frequently arise because sellers and buyers fail to 
ensure that the instructions given to the issuing or opening bank conform to the terms of the 
contract of sale. To assist sellers and buyers in understanding the documents required in 
different situations under the contract of sale – and to enable the seller to check that the 
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 See extract from ICC publication No. 556, pp. 8, 15; Appendix 4.  
197
 The issue of the liability of the consignee for demurrage is not presently dealt, but it 
should be added that, as it was demonstrated in Malaysian International Shipping Corp 
Bhd v. Visa Australia Pty Bhd (Unreported, July 27, 2001) (Sup Ct (Vic)) the consignee 
failed to return the empty container on time. Therefore, it is arguable whether there is 
liability for demurrage under the MISC Bill of Lading, if the container was not unpacked in 
the consignee’s premise; see further TULLOCH A. (2001) “Australia: Container Detention 
Charge Challenged,” 8(1) International Maritime Law, p. 36. 
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documents required under the contract conform to the ones he has to present under the 
documentary credit- the ICC Model International Sale Contract in the Introduction, Article 
8, lists the most common documents, one of which is the Multimodal Transport 
Document
198
. So, the problem might be solved temporarily with the ICC. 
Also, in the case of documentary credits, even if the credit prohibits transhipment, a 
very common phenomenon in containerisation, a bank will accept a bill of lading which 
indicates that transhipment will take place as long as the relevant cargo is shipped in 
Container(s), Trailer(s) and/or “LASH” barge(s) as evidenced by the bill of lading, 
provided that the entire ocean carriage is covered by one and the same bill of lading and 
incorporates clauses stating that the carrier reserves the right to tranship (Richardson 1998, 
p. 20).    
 
                                                 
198
 Supra, n. 196. 
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 E.) BAILMENT & TORT; FAULT IN CARRIAGE  
According to Art. IV bis, Rule 1 of the Hague-Visby Rules, the limits of liability 
provided for in these Rules shall apply in any action against the carrier in respect of loss or 
damage to goods covered by a contract of carriage whether the action be founded in 
contract or in tort. The purpose of Article IV bis Rule 1 was to ensure that a claimant was 
not placed in a better position by framing his claim in tort rather than in contract. If the 
MTO has been held liable to cargo interests for loss or damage to goods and decides to 
pursue a recourse action against one of the other parties involved in the transportation, they 
may have the right of action in bailment, tort or contract (Faber 1997, p. 31).  
Bailment is relevant to container carriage. For example, when a part of the carriage 
of cargo is entrusted to a carrier other than the MTO and the actual carrier issues its own 
terms of carriage, those terms bind the cargo owner so long as he has given his express, 
implied or apparent authority to the MTO to sub-contract on those terms. Implicit in this, if 
the original Bills of Lading include the expression “on any terms,” then it is sufficient to 
allow the MTO to bind the cargo owners to the terms of the actual carrier’s BL. If these 
critical words are omitted, then the sub-bailment would have been authorised by the cargo 
owners but not necessarily on terms materially different from the terms that they had agreed 
with the MTO.  
It is crucial, therefore, that MTOs get their contractual chain at the outset. As 
demonstrated in KH Enterprise v the Pioneer Container (The Pioneer Container)[1994] 2 
AC 324, the plaintiffs had each engaged carriers to ship goods by sea under Bills of Lading 
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“on any terms”199 where following a collision in fog, the vessel sank with all her cargo off 
the coast of Taiwan.  
It was held that the goods had been sub-bailed with the authority of the owner, the 
obligation of the sub-bailee towards the owner was that of a bailee for reward and the 
owner could proceed directly against the sub-bailee under the law of bailment. According 
to this case, one difficulty that arises is that there is no contractual relationship between 
them and the ship-owners. Here is a ship, upon which goods are loaded in a large number 
of containers; indeed, one container may contain goods belonging to a number of cargo 
owners. One incident may affect goods owned by several cargo owners or even (as here) all 
the cargo owners with goods on board. 
The question that arises concerning containerisation is how bailment operates when 
no contract takes place. Palmer indicates (1991, p. 4) that this may arise from the operation 
of a multipartie situation, so that it is possible to have an almost infinite chain of head 
bailors, sub-bailors and sub-bailees. The owner need never have taken possession of the 
goods before the creation of the bailment. Modern authority has affirmed in a wide variety 
of contexts that a valid bailment may exist without contracts inter parties (Palmer 1991, pp. 
19-20)
200
. 
Bailment might also take place despite the lack of intention to create legal relations. 
The fact that certain terms in the bailment are unenforceable because the parties had no 
intention to enter a binding contract does not detract from the fundamental character or 
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 For the doctrine of “bailment on terms,” read further comment in KOROTANA MS 
(November 2000) “New Privity Law; Its effect on the Law of Carriage of Goods,” 14(11), 
P&I International, pp. 259-261, at p. 261; for problems created by the pilferage of cargo by 
stevedores, see West of England, P&I Association (November 2000) “Stevedoring Firms 
Face Pressure in Algeria,” 14 (11), P&I International, pp. 262-263. 
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 Cf. Bentworth Finance Ltd. v. Lubert [1968] 1 QB 680. 
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status of those parties as bailor and bailee (Palmer 1991, p. 24). Therefore, when a bailee or 
sub-bailee is accused of negligence, it is upon them to establish that they were not negligent 
or that their negligence was not causative of the damage, as further judged in Coopers 
Payen Ltd. and Sanwa Packaging Industry Co Ltd. v. Southampton Container Terminal 
[2003] EWCA Civ 1223
201
. 
As held in Morris v. CW Martin & Sons Ltd.  [1966] 1 QB 716, the primary duties 
of the bailee at common law were to take proper care of the chattel bailed and to refrain 
from converting it
202
. Obviously, the interrelationships between contract, tort and bailment 
are highly complicated as demonstrated in KH Enterprise v the Pioneer Container (The 
Pioneer Container) [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 593. 
Similarly, as held in Nugent v. Smith [1876] 1 CPD 423, the court might discharge 
the carrier if he can show that either an act of nature or a defect of the property itself or 
both taken together formed the sole direct cause of the loss. Since in this particular case 
rough weather conditions caused the loss, which is an act of God
203
, the carrier does not 
insure against the irresistible act of nature, or against defects in the items carried. A ship-
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 Cf. Bullen v. The Swan Electric Engraving Co (1887) 23 TLR 258; also Palmer, (1991, 
pp. 49, 782-785) as in Lawtext Publishing (2003) “Container Terminal Damage to Goods, 
Liability of Terminal as Bailee,” 9(5), Journal of Maritime Law, pp.433 - 438, at 434. 
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 2 Halsbury’s Laws of England, paras. 1801-1833, pp. 830-899; see also McMEEL G. 
(2003) “The Redundancy of Bailment,” 2 (May) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly, pp. 169-200, under which the relevance of the concept of bailment by sea and 
retention of title clauses is analysed. 
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 If the goods are lost by an operation of nature to which no act of man contributes, the 
loss is by the act of God and falls within the well-recognised exception to the liability of a 
carrier as insurer. Damage to the goods by leakage and ordinary incidents of sea transit are 
matters against which man can provide and consequently are not the act of God while an 
unusually violent storm is. An act of God should not allow space for human intervention 
between itself and the damage caused. The rule as it applies to carriers derives from the 
Roman law which was not in terms applicable to the case of carriers by land but of ships 
navigated by their owners; cf. Transcontainer Express v. Custodian Security [1988] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 128; cf. Liver Alkali Company v. Johnson [1874] LR 9 Exch 338. 
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owner who is not a common carrier, is not subject to the liability of a common carrier. 
Consequently, he does not insure the goods bailed to him for carriage. As far as the 
protection of the goods against an act of God is concerned, the mere duty of the carrier is to 
show due diligence and the plaintiff bears the burden to show the absence of such diligence. 
 190 
a. The “Himalaya” Clause 
According to Art. IV bis, Rules 2, 3 and 4, if a claim is brought against a servant or 
agent (but not an independent contractor) of the carrier, such servant or agent shall be 
entitled to avail himself of the defences and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to 
invoke and the aggregate amount recoverable from the carrier, servant and agent shall not 
exceed the limits provided by the Rules. However, art. IV bis, Rule 4, makes it clear that if 
the servant or agent is guilty of intentional or reckless misconduct, whereas the carrier is 
not, the carrier can limit his liability but the servant or agent cannot (assuming he can be 
made legally liable to the claimant). 
Nevertheless there are cases relevant to the context of containerisation where the 
Himalaya clause is not adequate to solve liability issues. As it was demonstrated in the 
United States, the Supreme Court had an opportunity with James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd. v. 
Norfolk Southern Railway Co.
204
 to move the law governing the multimodal carriage of 
goods into the 21
st
 Century, as reviewed further by the past President of the Maritime Law 
Association of the United States and a member of the United States Delegation to the 
UNCITRAL Transport Law Working Group, Hooper Chester (2004, p. 8).  
In the Kirby case, the damage was traced to the railroad. Ten containers of 
machinery were shipped by the cargo interest, Kirby, from Sydney, Australia to Huntsville, 
Alabama, United States. 
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 300 F. 3d 1300, 2002 AMC 2113 (11
th
 Cir. 2002), cert. granted 124 S.Ct.981 (2004). 
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It (the cargo interest) had arranged carriage of the goods with an Australian freight 
forwarder/ NVOCC (Non-Vessel Operating Common Carrier
205
) International Cargo 
Control Pty Ltd. (“ICC”). ICC, acting as a NVOCC, issued a Bill of Lading to carry the 
cargo from Sydney (Australia) to Huntsville (United States) via multimodal carriage. ICC 
retained a VOCC (Hamburg Sud) to perform the same Sydney (Australia) to Huntsville 
(United States) multimodal carriage. The VOCC’s Bill of Lading, issued to the NVOCC, 
did specify that its terms and conditions would extend to railroads but the court did not 
accept this extension. 
The cargo interest, Kirby in this case, claimed that it was not bound by the contract 
and could sue the railroad in tort. In this case the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit approved this theory and directed the railroad to pay cargo damages of 
about $2,000,000 without the benefits of the limitation that was contained in either the 
NVOCC (ICC) BL or the VOCC (Hamburg Sud) BL. Thus, it seems the railroad was not 
entitled to limit its liability to $500 per package by relying on a Himalaya clause in the 
Hamburg Sud (VOCC) BL. Hooper introduces a new wave of calculating liability and 
promoting defences of NVOCCs and third parties. 
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 The Non-Vessel Operating Common Carrier (NVOCC) is regulated by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission in respect of inland activities and by the Federal Maritime 
Commission in respect of activities at the water’s edge. “Non-Vessel Operating Common 
Carrier” (NVOCC) means a common carrier that does not operate the vessels by which the 
ocean transportation is provided, and is a shipper in its relationship with an ocean common 
carrier, by virtue of the Sect. 3(17) of the Shipping Act of 1984 provides a definition of the 
NVOCC- 46 U.S. Code App. 1702(17). The NVOCC acts in dual capacity as a common 
carrier in relation to its shipper and as a shipper in relation to the underlying carriers; see 
Tetley 1988, pp. 697-698; also in http://www.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/mcc4th. 
 192 
i) The Doctrine of Sub-Bailment 
Griggs/Williams (2005, p. 146) asserted that these sub-bailment rights benefit only 
a servant or agent who is not an independent contractor. The rights will probably therefore 
be of limited application in practice since most of the agents who are likely to be held 
liable, for example, stevedores, will normally be independent contractors and not 
employees of the carrier. Accordingly, it may not benefit carriers to whom a sector of 
through-carriage has been delegated as demonstrated in KH Enterprise v the Pioneer 
Container (The Pioneer Container) [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 593. These independent 
contractors may nevertheless be able to limit their liability by virtue of a Himalaya clause 
in the Bill of Lading.    
The doctrine of sub-bailment on terms has its foundation in an obiter dictum of 
Lord Denning MR in Morris v. CW Martin & Sons Ltd. [1966] 1 QB 716, 729. The doctrine 
is contrary to the fundamental principle of law that a person cannot be bound by the terms 
of a contract to which he was not a party, as accepted in Midland Silicones v. Scruttons Ltd. 
[1962] A.C. 446. If there is a sub-bailment of goods to which the bailor has not (expressly 
or impliedly) consented, the bailee will be liable for any loss which occurs, but if consent 
for sub-bailment has been given it does not follow that the bailor has agreed to be bound by 
the terms of the sub-bailment.  
The consent of the bailor can only be relevant to the position between the bailor and 
the bailee. To hold that the terms of a sub-bailment are binding as between the sub-bailee 
and the bailor can only be legitimate in principle if the bailor has consented to the bailee 
agreeing to those terms not (or not only) for himself but on behalf of the bailor. In many 
cases, a BL issued by a carrier will include a Himalaya clause conferring on the carrier’s 
sub-contractors the benefit of all terms benefiting the carrier by providing that, to the extent 
 193 
of those terms, the carrier enters into the Bill of Lading contract not only on his own behalf 
but also as agent for the sub-contractors.  
As it was accepted in New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. AM Satterthwaite & Co. 
Ltd. [1975] AC 154, such a clause is capable of protecting a sub-contractor in appropriate 
circumstances by giving rise to a contract between the owner of the goods and the sub-
contractor whereby the sub-contractor receives the benefit of clauses contained in the Bill 
of Lading.  
There is, therefore, no conceptual difficulty arising wherein a right being 
exercisable against a person with whom the repairer has no contractual relationship. This is 
not the case with an exemption or jurisdiction clause. There is no good reason for requiring 
a bailor to refer a dispute with a sub-bailee for determination in a forum, which the sub-
bailee has selected unilaterally when there is no collateral contract between them to that 
effect (Palmer 1991, pp. 1326-1327, 1338 et seq.). 
Even if a bailor can, in principle, be bound by a jurisdiction clause to which he has 
not agreed, the clause relied on by the defendant has no application because it applies only 
to “any claim or dispute arising” under “this BL contract.” The doctrine of sub-bailment 
does not bind the bailor to a contract to which he was not a party. He is bound by reason of 
a separate relationship based on privity of bailment.  
A contract is formed by agreement while a transfer of possession independently of 
contract forms a bailment. Ship-owners should not be deprived of the protection they 
sought in return for carrying the goods merely because the plaintiff is not in a contractual 
relationship with them.  
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The concept of bald bailment with unrestricted liability to claims framed in bailment 
or tort is unjust and commercially inexpedient
206
. There is no reason for the defendant to be 
deprived of the protection against claims for which they have stipulated. 
The doctrine of sub-bailment on terms provides the most attractive commercial 
solution because the sub-bailee has the benefit of his own terms, especially his choice of his 
own law and of a single and convenient forum for disputes, not those that have been 
negotiated by others. 
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 See Pyrene Co. Ltd. v. Scindia Navigation Co. Ltd. [1954] 2 QB 402, 426-427. 
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ii) CHFs 
The liability of a Cargo Handling Facility (CHF) (Faber 1997, p. 41) for the loss or 
damage to cargo may also arise under contract, tort or mandatory law (statute). Since in 
England there is no statutory law regulating a CHF’s liability in respect of cargo, liability in 
tort arises if the CHF has been negligent. Tortious liability cannot be limited in amount, 
although the CHF may escape liability for certain unforeseeable types of loss such as for a 
cargo owner’s extraordinary profit under a contract for the sale of the cargo. 
A cargo handling facility may seek to protect itself by asserting that it is a bailee on 
terms: i) if a body created by charter, by publishing a tariff, ii) by relying on the principle of 
bailee on terms. Cargo interests may seek to avoid the limitations of liability in the contract 
of carriage by claiming against the CHF at fault with the aim of obtaining an unlimited 
recovery unfettered by contractual conditions. 
To protect the CHF, the contract of carriage normally includes a Himalaya clause 
enabling the CHF to rely on the exclusions and limitations in the contract of carriage. A 
Himalaya clause, in this context gives the CHF the benefit of the exclusions and limits of 
liability in the contract of carriage. In addition, the legal principle of bailee on terms has 
developed so as to enable the CHF to rely on its own contractual terms as against the cargo 
interests with whom there is no direct contract. If the carrier is authorised to use sub-
contractors (such a term is often found in contracts of carriage) and the contractual 
conditions of the sub-contractor are not extraordinary, recent cases have held that the sub-
contractor can rely on his own contractual conditions against the cargo claimant (Faber 
1997, p. 46). 
Sometimes, multimodal transport takes the form of combined transport (Faber 1997, 
p. 9) whereby cargo interests contract with a party who accepts responsibility as principal 
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for the whole movement. Consequently, cargo interests will not find themselves bound by 
limitations and exclusions in the standard terms of business on which other carriers 
involved in the movement operate. Cargo interests need only look to the combined 
transport operator for recompense for loss, damage or delay to the goods (although that 
party may itself operate on the basis of standard terms).  
Any restrictive provisions in a carrier’s standard terms will not be a matter of 
concern to cargo interests; they will be of relevance only insofar as they affect rights of 
recourse by the combined transport operator against the responsible carrier. However, if the 
party who contracts as principal with cargo interests proves to be of poor financial standing, 
cargo interests would face issues pursuing a claim against the responsible carrier in 
bailment or in the tort of negligence.  
It is worth noting, however, that cargo interests might find that the carrier’s liability 
in bailment is subject to provisions in the carrier’s standard terms of business, by virtue of 
sub-bailment on terms. This arises when the head bailor has expressly or impliedly 
consented to the inclusion of the relevant terms in any sub-bailment made by his bailee (if 
the CMR Convention were to apply, cargo interests would, of course, have a broader range 
of targets to sue). 
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F.) REMARKS 
 
Refrigerated containers play a vital role in the life of maritime trade and in the 
evolution of technology that will change the carriage of goods by sea, but this also stresses 
what difficulties may be encountered when drafting contracts in this kind of transportation 
arrangement. The Albacora case is only the beginning concerning the inherent vice 
exceptions.  
Definitely, the economic evolution of ports leads to their further technological 
development; there will be more cases as such, especially if goods are carried within a 
container and liability may occur even if the contract reads expressly about inherent vice.   
Also, it is more important that ports are very well equipped than that they are very large. 
One more point that arising from the Albacora case is whether the problem is that of 
the unsuitable container, or that of the inherent vice. It is uncertain from which ever angle 
the matter is viewed. The relevant question here is whether we judge the unsuitability of the 
container or the inherent vice of the goods, or both. The point is not only to have a suitable 
container; the point is to know how to use it and to know the requirements of your cargo. 
The modern trade that has technologically evolved nowadays could be assisted by the 
application of COGSA’s terms to the party issuing a BL against any party even if that party 
were not privy to the BL (Hooper 2004, p. 8). In the same vein, COGSA’s terms should be 
extended to any party who helped perform a contract evidenced by the BL. 
Moreover, the application of COGSA can also be discerned for damages at sea by 
the use of Article III Rule 1. On package limitation issues, many courts characterise a 
carrier-supplied container as being part of the equipment of a specially designed cellular 
container ship, as Harrington (1982, p. 12) states.  
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Even apart from the Hague Rules, the MTO by bailing the container has impliedly 
warranted that it is reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was let out, that is to say as a 
receptacle for the safe carriage of goods. Although bailment does not exist as such in the 
continental law systems, where it presupposes a contract, according to De Wit (1995, p. 
28), in the common law systems, the law of carriage of goods is a branch of the law of 
bailment. Bailment is a typical common law notion and results from the simple fact that the 
possession of goods has been transferred to someone who knowingly and willingly receives 
these goods for a particular purpose, such as carrying or warehousing them. The law of 
bailment has evolved to a point where the bailee is liable if he fails to take sufficient care of 
the goods.  
In order to escape this liability, the bailee must prove either that he took the 
appropriate care of the goods which were lost or injured while in his possession, or that his 
failure to do so did not contribute to the loss. English law places upon the common carrier a 
liability for loss or damage to the goods carried which is usually described as strict, that is 
liability without fault. As further accepted in London & Northwestern Railway Co. v. 
Richard Hudson & Sons Ltd. [1920] AC 324 (HL) per Lord Atkinson, (p. 340), a common 
carrier is an insurer.  
Nevertheless, it is a condition precedent to his liability that goods, if liable to 
damage unless carefully and properly packed, should be so packed. Even if the operation of 
stuffing the container should be characterised as stowage rather than as packing, the carrier 
should not be responsible for cargo damage to the shipper who stuffs the container. The 
shipper of the cargo was in a much better position to know of the likelihood of it being 
damaged by this particular method of stowage than the ship-owner or the master and it 
appears to me to be logical that in such a case a shipper who knows or ought to know the 
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special characteristics of his own cargo and who approves of it being stowed in a manner 
which is obviously likely to expose it to damage cannot hold a ship-owner responsible for 
the damage which ensues.  
 Damages may arise from insufficient packing within a container and are not 
necessarily limited to that cargo within the container. The container, the ship and other 
cargo may be damaged as well. The fact pattern of the Red Jacket
207
 provides a useful 
illustration if we attribute the loss to improper stowage. Certainly cargo interests are 
neighbourly enough that one has an action in tort against the other for damage to one cargo 
caused by insufficient packaging of another.  
It is true that the Hague Rules impose minimum liabilities on ocean carriers; they 
changed the regime of liability from that of a common carrier to a regime based on fault, 
the burden of proof on the carrier. If, as it is submitted, the carrier has the right to assume 
that those with whom he does business also carry out their obligations, The Red Jacket goes 
too far.  
 According to this case, the shippers or consignees of cargo stowed in 50 
containers which were loaded on deck on the steamship Red Jacket, at New York for 
delivery at Yokohama. She sailed from New York on Dec 26, 1973.  On Jan 10, 1974 she 
encountered heavy weather in the North Pacific and at one point rolled between 35 deg and 
40 deg to port. Container CMLU 122590 which was supplied by the defendants and was 
eight years old and had been on 20 to 30 voyages already had been loaded with tin ingots 
by the fourth party in accordance with a contract between it and the third party. It broke 
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 Houlden & Co Ltd. and Others v. SS “Red Jacket” and American Export Lines Ltd; 
Metal Traders Inc, Third Party; United States Fourth Party (The “Red Jacket”) United 
States District Court, Southern District of New York [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 300; also 
chapter 2. 
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loose and forty-three of the containers containing the plaintiffs’ cargo were swept 
overboard. The other seven were damaged. 
It was held, by the District Court for the Southern District of New York, that 
although the third and fourth parties had caused the ingots to be stowed in a negligent 
manner, this was not the proximate cause of the loss and damage. Additionally, the 
container by reason of its major structural damage was un-seaworthy and its condition was 
the proximate cause of the loss and damage. And, the defendants had not exercised due 
diligence in making the vessel seaworthy as required by the United States Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act, 1936, s 4(1) (46 USC section 1304 (1)) for they should not have 
permitted the container, which was part of her equipment, to be loaded on board and they 
were solely responsible for the loss and damage. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ATTEMPT TO CREATE  
A MULTIMODAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
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A.) INTRODUCTION 
The problem of multimodal transport was first dealt with UNIDROIT in the 1930s 
and then the Committee Maritime International (CMI) in the late 1960s resulting in the so-
called 1969 CMI Tokyo Rules. These constituted the basis for FIATA’s (negotiable) 
combined transport bill of lading (FBL), which first appeared in 1970 and the 
corresponding COMBICONBILL sponsored by the Baltic & International Maritime 
Conference (BIMCO) in Copenhagen (Faber 1997, p. 26). The practical importance of 
multimodal transport has, certainly, been enhanced by the advent of containerisation, since 
the container can move from one mode of transport to another.  
Liability issues can arise in many fields of multimodal transportation. All the 
successive carriers that become involved can be liable in one way or another. While the 
liability and responsibility of each transportation mode is governed by various conventions 
and national laws, the liability of the freight forwarders or Multimodal Transport Operators 
itself is not currently subject to any convention or national law. The problem is that national 
freight forwarder associations around the world have devised their own local standard 
trading conditions (STC) as the underlying contract of engagement between the freight 
forwarder and the shipper.  
Furthermore, according to the UNCTAD/ICC Rules 1992, the liability limits would 
be calculated either: 
a) according to mandatory law or convention, providing 
another limit of liability, had a separate unimodal 
contract been made, 
or  
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b) 2SDR/ 666.67 SDR/kg if no convention would have 
applied and the contract includes carriage of goods by 
sea or water,  
or 
c) 8.33SDR/kg if no unimodal convention would have 
applied and contract includes no carriage by sea or 
water. However, if the UNCTAD/ICC Rules 1992 are 
not incorporated in the contract, the liability of the 
MTO might be further excluded or limited 
contractually. 
However, in a recent report from the Department of Transport, it is stated that 
marine cargo insurance companies have been able to recover on average only about twenty 
per cent (20%) of claims paid out; indicative of the difficulty in proving that loss was 
attributable to the ocean leg of carriage. CIFFA accepts the “network” liability principle 
and argues that a framework which already exists and has proved itself in the market place 
should be promoted as opposed to a regime that causes disharmony and conflict.  
According to the study, a solution to the conflict between shipper/insurance interests 
and carrier interests should not lie in a new multimodal framework but in a new insurance 
regime
208
. 
In approaching the formulation of a set of regulations to govern multimodal 
transport, two alternative multimodal liability systems have been advanced. Proponents of 
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 See “Multimodal Liability: Extracts from a Statement by the CIFFA Sea-Freight 
Committee,” Multimodal Transport: Canadian International Freight Forwarders 
Association Position Paper, as in  
http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/multim.htm (19/04/2005, at 23:00). 
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the “uniform or unified” liability system advocate that a single uniform framework of 
liability should govern the contract from the point of dispatch to the final destination. 
Supporters of the alternative “network” liability system take a more pragmatic (Wilson 
2008, pp. 246-247) approach. While the former is obviously the more rational solution, the 
“network” approach avoids any potential conflict with existing mandatory unimodal 
conventions (Wilson 2008, pp. 246-247). 
The “network” approach is governed by an informal/ indirect convention, 
conceived under the basis of the existing conventions. By virtue of this approach, when the 
leg of the damage or loss is identified, any unimodal convention or mandatory national law 
applicable to that leg will operate to define the carrier’s liability. When it is not known on 
what stage the damage or loss occurred, no unimodal convention will be applicable and the 
parties will have the freedom to draft their own contract.  
The interaction between these two categories; the “pure network liability system” 
(“pure”) and the “modified network liability system,” is demonstrated in Figure 4 below. 
Under the “pure” head, the liability regime governing each mode of transport is preserved. 
It co-exists with the other liability frameworks governing the rest of the constitutive parts of 
multimodal transport. For instance, CMR will apply if damage has occurred along the road 
carriage; the Hague or the Hague/Visby Rules will apply if damage has occurred during the 
sea transport leg, and so on. The advantages and drawbacks of these multimodal liability 
systems are analysed in the sub-chapter C below. 
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B.) THE ERA OF MULTIMODALISM 
i) Kinds of Transport 
 Legal regimes refer to “successive carriage,” “through transport,” “multimodal,” or 
“combined transport,” “unimodal” and “intermodal transport.” Significant distinctions 
occur amongst different countries. It is also important to discern what type of carriage 
damage or loss takes place, since each carriage is governed by its own legal regime or 
combination of legal regimes.  
Generally speaking, “multimodal transport” is defined as the carriage of goods 
from one place to another, performed by at least two different modes under a single 
contract and document. It is a necessary feature of multimodal transport that at least two 
different modes of transport should be used from the depot at which the goods are taken in 
charge to the place designated for delivery (Alcantara 2002, p. 402). When this takes place 
between different states, it could be defined as “multimodal international transport;” a 
more appropriate term, according to Alcantara (2002, p. 402). Certainly, it becomes more 
complicated when a range of means, modes, and states are involved. 
Agreeing with Alcantara (2002, p. 402) and Pampouki (2000, p. 7), apart from the 
international scenario, multimodal transport can also be discerned as “national 
multimodal transport,” when the carrier undertakes to transport goods from one place to 
another, where both places are situated in the same country and at least two different modes 
of transport are involved. 
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For geographical, political, and historical reasons, Europe, of course, can contribute 
unmatched experience in assessing the development of law in relation to multimodal 
transport
209
.  
Because Europe’s geography demands multimodal transport, the legal problems that 
inherently arise in relation to multimodal transport arose earlier here than elsewhere. 
Therefore, the legislation that Europe has developed for multimodal transport may be a 
good guide for the development of multimodal transport law on a worldwide level (see 
Herber 1989, p. 611, in the next sub-chapter). 
According to the general report of Pampouki (2000, p. 9), “multimodal transport” is 
distinguished from “successive and through carriage”, although this distinction is not 
always clear since “multimodal transport” may assume the guise of “successive carriage.” 
In comparison with “multimodal transport,” “successive carriage” of goods is 
where the transportation is performed by more than one carrier, each succeeding the other. 
“Successive carriage” takes place particularly when one carrier comes after another and 
undertakes to perform a separate part of the same carriage under a single contract by virtue 
of a single document. The succession of the carriers is effected in such a way that each of 
them undertakes to carry out a part of the carriage, accepting the terms of transport agreed 
to by the first carrier and consignor. 
And, this implies that
210
 all subsequent carriers as well as the first one bear joint and 
several liability
211
 for the performance of the carriage of goods. At this point, it should be 
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 See further HERBER R. (December, 1989) “The European Legal Experience with 
Multimodalism,” 64, Tulane Law Review, pp. 611-629, at p. 612. 
210
 GOLOGINA-ECONOMOU E. (2000) “Multimodal Transport Carrier Liability & Issues 
Related to the Bills of Lading,” Multimodal Transport: Carrier Liability & Issues Related to 
the Bills of Lading edited by Kiantou-Pampouki A, Brussels, Bruylant, pp. 131-147. 
 208 
mentioned, that Greece does not provide a definition of “multimodal transport,” either 
because of the complete absence of any statutory provision concerning this term or because 
of the incomplete legal regulation of such a transit mode; thus, it is expressed as any 
carriage of goods that takes place under a single contract, performed by more than one 
means of transport in any combination whatsoever.  
Additionally, another term makes compounds this confusion
212. “Multimodal 
Transport” contrasts with “Mixed Transport,” both of which are sometimes but not always 
interchangeable. 
“Mixed transport or carriage” is the carriage of goods when the vehicle carrying 
the cargo for a segment of the carriage is itself loaded - with its cargo- onto another 
(different) means of transport (on land, by sea or by air). Consequently, in such a carriage, 
the second segment of transport is comprised of both the first means of transport (the road 
vehicle) and its cargo.  As Gologina-Economou
213
 points out, this transport is performed by 
virtue of a single contract and a single document and is subject to Article 2 CMR
214
 
governing international road transport in Greece.  
The essential difference, though, between multimodal and mixed transport, as 
opposed to successive carriage, lies in the fact that multimodal transport is accomplished by 
at least two different means of transport. Meanwhile successive carriage is performed by 
one means of transport, although involves different carriers.  
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 Although it does not mean that this is what we actually need, since it can cause confusion 
and instability. 
212
 This confusion appearing in doctrine and jurisprudence is also discerned in Greek Law 
Review; see Decisions 4517/1983 issued by the court of Appeal of Piraeus E.E.D. (= 
Epitheorissis tou Emporikou Dikaiou= Commercial Law Review), 1983, 405, 1062/1985 
issued by the Three Member District Court of Piraeus Pir. Nom (= Piraiki Nomologia= Law 
Review), 1985, 238, as mentioned by Gologina-Economou E. (supra, n. 210, p. 131).  
213
 Supra, n. 210, pp. 134-135. 
214
 CMR is the international convention that covers carriage of goods by road. 
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Besides, a multimodal transport operator will be liable for the entire carriage, while 
the successive transport carrier shares liability with all the other subsequent carriers who 
enter into this agreement
215
. 
Furthermore, “through transport/ carriage” is considered as the transportation in 
which more than one carrier participates and, in practice, it can be regarded as multimodal 
transport since it is almost always performed by two or more carriers. However, Pampouki 
(2000, p. 9) argues that through carriage of cargo can take three variations
216
: 
 The first variation is when more carriers may undertake to advance the same 
goods from one place to another based on a common contract, generally 
concluded by a common agent, so that every carrier performs a part of the 
carriage.  
 The second is when the first (contracting) carrier undertakes to perform part 
of the carriage and, acts as a freight forwarder, forwarding the goods to their 
destination by other carriers.  
 The third variation is when a carrier under an exclusive contract, undertakes 
to perform the entire carriage and to deliver the goods to the consignee at the 
destination. In such a situation, if the transport is effected by the same mode 
of transport, through carriage is distinguished from multimodal transport. 
Otherwise, if different modes are used, then through carriage is barely 
distinguishable from multimodal transport. Therefore, in the latter case, it is 
difficult to distinguish between the two types of transport. 
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 See relevant information PRUSSMAN-RARE (1992) “Seehandelsrecht” (= The Law of 
Carriage of Goods by Sea), 3
rd
 ed.; ANDROUTSOPOULOS (1963) “The Through Bill of 
Lading,” quoted by PAMPOUKI-KIANTOU (2000, p. 9, n. 21). 
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Multimodal transport in the USA is the third form of transportation, while the other 
“ancestor” forms are cargo transportation and through transportation217. “Cargo 
transportation” appeared in the past as a form of transportation that involved two or more 
transit modes and could be divided into segments, hence the origin of the term “segmented 
transportation.”218 Due to the evolution of container technology, the successor of the 
“segmented transportation” came into being under the name “through transportation.” In 
this form, one carrier, acting as the shipper’s agent, arranges the transport for the other 
segments
219
. 
Another term that enters into this muddle is intermodal transport. According to 
Bissell (1971)
220
, “intermodal transport” is based theoretically on the consolidation of 
several break-bulk units into a single interchangeable transportation unit; the container. The 
container is carried via a combination of several modes of transportation, under a single 
shipping document and a single freight charge, from the shipper’s warehouse to the 
consignee’s warehouse. The container is the integrating element of an intermodal 
transportation system. Mahoney (1985, p. 2) states that containerisation and intermodality 
are not synonymous, because intermodal movements can take place without the benefit of 
containerisation.   
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 WOOD S. (2000) “Multimodal Transportation: an American Perspective on Carrier 
Liability & Bill of Lading,” Multimodal Transport: Carrier Liability & Issues Related to the 
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Tulane Law Review, pp. 902-910, by Armstrong; supra, n. 5, at p. 427; see also 
introduction, sub-charter (b). 
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A variety of means is used in intermodal transport, such as ocean vessels, rail 
freight trains, highway trucks, pipelines, and belt conveyors. Thus, when a container has to 
be transported, it is loaded on to a truck and when the truck reaches the port, it is 
transferred by means of a conveyor belt to the deck of the container ship
221
. In this type of 
carriage, problems can arise because the vehicles are shaped differently with “unlike 
means,” as Mahoney puts it, of loading and unloading, with the result that the goods are 
subject to “different stresses” and conditions in each mode. 
It is worth speculating whether intermodal transport came first and later, with the 
development of technology and rapid growth of containerisation, it evolved into 
multimodal transport. Until 1985 authors, like Mahoney, write about intermodal transport 
and although multimodal transport had started to develop by then, they make no reference 
to it.  
According to Pampouki (2000, p. 6), intermodal transport is a form of multimodal 
transport. It may have its own contract terms, but it may not be greater than 
“multimodalism.” On the other hand, Jervell defines “intermodalism” as greater than 
“multimodalism.”222 Actually, the term “multimodal” was the successor of the term 
“combined,” although Pampouki states that all three terms are considered synonymous and 
used in a parallel manner without any distinction. 
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 Mahoney (1985, p. 1) adds that intermodal transport in remote areas takes place by the 
use of beasts of burden and human beings. That might have been an option in the earlier 
years in order to save money but not necessarily in the 21
st
 century when containerisation is 
flowing. Besides, the US and the EU with the support of big maritime organisations and 
shipping lines provide special funding to upgrade where possible remote areas and less 
developed countries (LDCs). 
222
 See JERVELL JBK /PERL A /SHERRY P /SZYLIOWIEZ JS (Summer 2000) “Intermodal 
Education in Comparative Perspective,” 27, Transport Law Journal, p. 419; also, WYATT 
MJ (1991) “Contract Terms in Intermodal Transport: COGSA Comes Ashore,” 16, Tulane 
Maritime Law Journal, p. 177. 
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Although the Multimodal Convention took place in the 1980s, the term “multimodal 
transport” was only used much later. It, thus, remains an issue for discussion, how rapidly 
the maritime world comes to accept terms and trends adopted by relevant legal frameworks. 
Furthermore, it should be analysed what the consequences of their delayed acceptance are, 
such as the transaction costs involved in the legal uncertainty. The lack of agreed 
terminology is symptomatic of the difficulty in achieving a multimodal transport 
framework.  
This may be linked with what Mahoney (1985, p. 14) says: although managements 
of ocean carriers were well aware of the technical feasibility of loading land containers on 
the decks of sea-going vessels, they were reluctant to adopt the practice because it 
interfered with their preconceived notions of how shipping ought to work and with the 
practices and procedures that had evolved over centuries. This is where the broad-
mindedness exhibited by Malcolm McLean
223
 (credited as being the initiator of the land-sea 
container revolution) is essential. 
The opposite of multimodal transport is “unimodal transport,” which is the 
transportation of cargo performed by only one mode of transport, either by one or more 
carriers (Pampouki 2000, p. 9). 
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 Quoted by Mahoney 1985, p. 14. 
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ii) It should be called Multimodalism 
Maritime commerce has evolved along with the development of transportation and 
is often inseparable from some land-based obligations. The international transportation 
industry “clearly has moved into a new era; the age of multimodalism,224 identified as door-
to-door transport based on efficient use of all available modes of transportation by air, 
water, and land.” Increasing volumes of cargo move under multimodal “through” bills of 
lading issued by ocean carriers and intermediaries, such as freight forwarders and non-
vessel owning common carriers (NVOCCs), providing the shippers with an efficient, 
stream-lined method of moving goods from “door to door.” The cargo liability regime 
covering carriage of goods by sea, however, is outdated and unsuited to deal with 
multimodal carriage. 
Many call this “multimodal transport.” It has now become the dominant term 
following on from the Convention of 1980. Several authors, such as Crowley
225
 and Herber 
(1989, p. 612) use the term “multimodalism.” Inappropriately, some even use the term 
“multimodality,” but suitable terms are “multimodal transport” and “multimodalism.” 
Furthermore, Palmer R and DeGiulio FP
226
 say that although the term “multimodalism,” 
has thus far escaped inclusion in most dictionaries, it is a term now extensively used in the 
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 Supra, n. 209, p. 612; also COFFEY WJ (December 1989) “Admiralty Law Institute 
Symposium: Terminal Operations & Multimodalism; Multimodalism & the American 
Carrier,” 64, Tulane Law Review, p. 569, at p. 570. 
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 See CROWLEY ME (June, 2005) “Admiralty Law Institute Symposium, the Uniqueness 
of Admiralty & Maritime Law; the Limited Scope of the Cargo Liability Regime Covering 
Carriage of Goods By Sea: The Multimodal Problem,” 79 Tulane Law Review, 1461; also 
KNEBEL JG /BLOCKER DS (December 1989) “Admiralty Law Institute Symposium: 
Terminal Operations & Multimodalism; United States Statutory Regulation of 
Multimodalism,” 64, Tulane Law Review, p. 543. 
226
 See further PALMER RW/ DeGIULIO FP (December 1989) “Admiralty Law Institute 
Symposium: Terminal Operations & Multimodalism, Terminal Operations & Multimodal 
Carriage: History & Prognosis,” 64, Tulane Law Review, 281, at p. 283. 
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transportation industry to describe the idea of an integrated system of through 
transportation of goods over land and water. 
On the surface, multimodalism merely suggests transportation of a particular 
shipment of cargo by different modes of transportation. It is characterised by the integration 
and co-ordination of various modes of transportation, commonly by means of a metal 
shipping container. I have to say that I have reservations about the term “multimodality”, 
since this may fit other functions and fields of science as well. What we need here is not a 
general term, but something more specific. 
“Multimodal” is defined, in part, as “composed of several distinct types of 
activity.”227 Although the term “multimodalism” is encountered, other terms such as 
“intermodalism” and “combined transport” are commonly used in the transportation 
industry. The three terms seem to be synonymous. Therefore, this phenomenon should be 
called “multimodalism.” 
From a legal standpoint, the development of multimodalism is significant because 
the laws determining the rights and liabilities of carriers and shippers were developed 
separately for each mode of transportation during the decades when those transportation 
segments were viewed as distinct. The technological advances associated with 
multimodalism outpaced changes in the law, often resulting in the implementation of 
disparate legal and regulatory frameworks to a single cargo movement. Changes in the 
liability regime applicable to interstate common carriers, which occurred 
contemporaneously with the legislation in multimodalism, further confused issues. 
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 According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 1485; also quoted by 
Palmer/ DeGiulio, ibid., p. 283, fn. 1; the prefix “multi-” means “many” and derives from 
“multus,” as in The Oxford Reference Dictionary, Oxford University Press, p. 550. The 
term “modal” (p. 537) means “of mode.” Therefore, “multimodal” means “many modes.” 
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Different types of contracts and different liability systems that govern 
multimodalism appear on the scene as well. Some authors (CMI 4.3) call these types of 
contracts “mixed contracts,” others (Androutsopoulos 1963) speak of multimodal 
“through” bills of lading issued, or single bills of lading, or multimodal transport 
documents, but what matters most is that they are talking about the same thing; the 
contracts that govern more than one transport leg at an international level.  
Shippers and forwarders make widespread use of contracts, such as FIATA FBL 
and BIMCO’s, Multidoc95228 and BIFA STC, which are based on the Model Rules for 
Freight Forwarding Services adopted in 1996 by the Federation Internationale des 
Associations de Transitaires et Assimiles (FIATA). Although these Model Rules give the 
impression of simplicity, they mask the precedence of the international Conventions and 
the contracts adopting these Rules are effectively private contracts. Although economists
229
 
are in favour of these private contracts, they are inevitably subject to different 
interpretations by different courts (Crowley 2005, p. 1480) and unfortunately, that hinders 
uniformity. This can, of course, be common to all international contracts which cross 
borders. Even the European Court of Justice (ECJ) may create confusion, as it develops its 
own jurisprudence which may also hinder uniformity (Goldman D. 2007, p. 265). 
Finally, on interpreting “multimodalism” in the USA, it should be noted that it is 
characterised by the integration and co-ordination of various modes of transportation, 
commonly by means of a metal shipping container, providing point-of-origin to point-of-
destination transit under a single set of shipping documents, based on a single through-
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 Appendix 5. 
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 As interviewed by Dr Peter Holmes on 13/06/2006.  
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freight rate charged to the shipper, regardless of how many modes of transportation are 
involved or how many carriers participate
230
. 
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 Supra, n. 217. 
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C.) CREATING THE MULTIMODAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 
Under this sub-charter, the advantages and drawbacks of the “network liability 
system,” discerned in the two categories of the “pure network” and the “modified network,” 
and the “uniform” liability system are discussed. 
The main problem encountered by the parties to a multimodal contract stems from 
the potentially wide variety of terms and conditions of carriage in operation between the 
different modes (Wilson 2008, p. 247). The problem is aggravated by the existence of a 
series of mandatory transport conventions, imposing different liability frameworks on the 
operators of the various modes of transport. Attempts to provide a uniform multimodal 
regime have so far been unsuccessful, but the gap has been partially filled by the production 
of a set of Rules for a combined Transport Document by the International Chamber of 
Commerce (“ICC”), which is available to be integrated by the parties into their individual 
contracts. In the absence of any agreement on an international uniform framework, 
modified versions of the ICC rules have appeared in a variety of standard forms of bill.  
Attempts to pinpoint the most suitable legal advice for particular cases are made by 
examining the existing ratified and non-ratified international, national, and regional 
legislation. In fact, the miscellany of the regulations pertaining to the network system does 
not allow for an accurate presentation of the national laws and a comparison with each 
other, in respect of the MTOs’ liability (Pampouki 2000, pp. 63-64). This, of course, causes 
unpredictability in modern transactions. 
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The question of the localisation of the loss or of the damage is crucial in any 
multimodal liability system. According to Hans Carl
231
, container claims usually involve 
hidden damage, so there is little proof as to whom or what caused the damage. 
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 HANS C. (1999) “The Spread of Multimodal Transport Legislations,” IMMTA Bulletin, 
p. 6, quoted by Alcantara (2002, p. 404, n. 16). 
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i) Pure Network Liability System  
Historically, most ocean carriers have issued bills of lading that provide for liability 
of carriers based on a “network system” of applicable liability frameworks (Palmer RW/ De 
Giulio FP, December 1989, p. 284). Under this scheme the legislation applicable to each 
section of the transportation (i.e. COGSA or the Carmack), governs the liability of each 
connecting carrier. In addition, the rights of indemnity and contribution among carriers are 
governed similarly. Under these circumstances, each carrier limits its liability to the 
segment that it performs, and the applicable law is said “to travel with the cargo.” The 
implementation of the network system to determine liability has created much concern 
about the lack of uniformity resulting from the application of Carmack
232
 and COGSA to 
different segments of shipments. 
The pure network liability system has been articulated in the UNIDROIT 
convention drafts of the years 1961 and 1965 (Pampouki 2000, p. 35)
233
. According to this 
system, where the location of the damage or loss can be identified, any unimodal 
international convention or mandatory national law applicable to the leg will operate to 
define the carrier’s liability. Such international conventions may be applicable either by 
statute as, for example, the Hague/Visby Rules implemented by the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act 1971, or may be incorporated into the contract by the use of an appropriate 
paramount clause. 
 
                                                 
232
 The Carmack Amendment, the predominant source of law in USA governing carriers’ 
liability for cargo loss or damage during transit, prohibits the carriers from limiting or 
exempting themselves from liability. They may limit liability, if that limit is reasonable, 
depending on circumstances. It is not specific as to who determines reasonableness. This 
issue may be left to the courts to determine, supra, n. 217, p. 411. 
233  See also FABER (1997, p. 27). 
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Should no international convention or national law be applicable, however, the 
parties are then free to contract on their own terms and a wide range of solutions is 
available within the standard forms. But, arguing with Wilson (2008, p. 248), at this stage 
perhaps we do not need a wide variety of solutions that may lead to ambiguity, but 
something more specific and “singular.” This is the reason we require new law or even 
further we need specific law to govern multimodalism.   
Some bills provide that a specific convention shall be applicable to a particular leg 
(Combicon bill 11(2), Combidoc 11(i) (b); others include a formula to restrict the liability 
of the combined transport operator to the amount recoverable from any sub-contractor to 
whom he has delegated performance of the particular stage in question, such as Tranzstas 
bill 5(B)(2)(e). The ICC Rules, and many bills based on them, aim at achieving consistency 
by providing that the same framework of carrier liability shall be applicable as if the 
location of the damage had not been identified (see ICC Rules 1975, Rule 13(d)
234
). 
However, in the circumstances when it is likely to not be known at what stage 
damage or loss occurs, when no unimodal convention is applicable, the parties are likely to 
exercise their freedom to draft their own contract. Once again, a range of different solutions 
is evident from an examination of the standard forms. In order to gain the maximum 
protection for the carrier, some bills assume that the loss occurred during the sea leg and 
thus invoke the Hague or Hague/Visby Rules as appropriate, as in ACL bill clause 3IV. 
Other carriers devise their own code of liability, while many adopt the ICC Rules for a 
Combined Transport Document. 
Thus, when the damage is not identified, the parties will decide. But, when the 
damage is identified, then the convention is mandatory. Therefore, the parties cannot 
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contract out of the terms of an otherwise applicable convention. So, the convention, if one 
applies, applies mandatorily. In the case of concealed damage which is not traceable, the 
parties can contract out of the terms of an otherwise applicable convention and actually can 
contract to implement the convention or not.  
If there is not a mandatory set of international rules, there might be mandatory rules 
in the appropriate national law, eventually chosen by the parties, which should then also 
apply. For those segments of transport for which no compulsory rules exist at all, the 
parties may either agree to particular rules being applied to their contract or they may apply 
internal legislation supplementarily or by analogy (Pampouki 2000, p. 28). 
The “pure network” system has the drawback that it can apply only where the stage, 
in which damage has occurred, is known. Locating the damage, though, is difficult and 
sometimes impossible (Pampouki 2000, p. 29), particularly when the goods are sealed 
within a container. Furthermore, this system proves inadequate, even in cases of localised 
damage for example, when damage occurs in the intervals in passing from one to another 
international convention’s scope of application. In any case, the multimodal transport 
operator (“MTO”) may be held liable for damage arising in these intervals. Then there will 
have to be recourse to the local law of the place of damage; and this law may well be 
unknown, both to the consignor (or the consignee) and to the carrier as well.  
The MTOs are favoured by this system since they may exclude or reduce their 
liability for damage caused during the intervals between the various transportation stages, 
given that there is no applicable international convention to govern multimodal transport to 
attach liability to the MTOs. These intervals are subject to common law rules and are not 
covered by mandatory law. Thus, the carriers may insert clauses in the contract releasing 
them from liability or limiting their liability. 
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The shippers on the contrary in this system can have no such predictability. They 
are quite uncertain as to the liability framework governing the contract entered into, and as 
to the scope of application of various international conventions (Pampouki 2000, p. 30). 
The pure network liability system is conservative and incomplete, leaving many problems 
unresolved. Consequently, it is not suitable to satisfy the demands of multimodalism. 
Another problem with the network system is that the various networks have varying 
liability limits.  
De La Garza points out that
235
, for non-maritime conventions, the limits are 
significantly greater- at one point nearly nine times that of the maritime liability limits: “the 
CMR limit is 8.33 SDRs per kilogram, the COTIF-CIM limit is 17 SDRs per kilogram…” 
and this problem clearly leads to another: the application of a maritime convention to non-
maritime activities. Therefore, we need a new uniform multimodal legal framework to 
govern situations such as this as well. In this case, the pure network system is inadequate to 
resolve the situation. Furthermore, according to the explanation of the UNCTAD/ICC for 
their Rules (1992, p. 6, Rule 4), the terms “within the scope of his employment” and “for 
the performance of the contract” might limit the vicarious liability of the MTO.  
The difficulty with these Rules, as stated above, is not only that they are contractual 
in nature and therefore open to a variety of interpretations in different jurisdictions, but they 
are also, by definition, subject to any applicable mandatory law, and thus not necessarily an 
effective means of achieving international uniformity. If the loss can be localised to a 
particular stage of transport and a regional, sub-regional or national mandatory multimodal 
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 See further DE LA GARZA N. (Fall 2004) “UNCITRAL’s Proposed Instrument on the 
International Marine Carriage of Goods,” 32, Transportation Law Journal, p. 95, at p. 103. 
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liability framework, then the liability of MTO is estimated in accordance with the 
recognised applicable regime. 
By contrast, if no mandatory unimodal convention applies, the liability is rendered 
in accordance with the standard form contractual terms, which may incorporate the 
UNCTAD/ICC Rules 1992. These provide for fault-based liability with presumption of 
fault. These rules only apply if the parties so agree. However, as established in Hartford 
Fire Insurance Co., a/s/o Trek Bicycle Corp. v. Orient Overseas Containers Lines 230 F. 
3d 549, a carrier and a shipper can extend the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) 
prior to loading and subsequent to discharge of goods from a ship, but the extent of any 
application beyond the scope of the statute is a matter of contract (COGSA par. 7, 46 App. 
USCA par. 1307). 
In the case above, a containerised shipment of bicycles moving under a through bill 
of lading from Wisconsin to the Netherlands, via Chicago, Montreal, and Antwerp, was 
stolen when the inland trucker left the container unattended in Belgium. The bill of lading 
extended COGSA to cover the entire shipment, but also contained a network liability clause 
relating to “any law . . . applicable to such stage,” which in this case meant the CMR 
Convention. When the shipper sued the carrier in the federal court in New York, however, 
the lower court refused to apply the CMR limitation, because in this instance it lessened the 
carrier’s liability under COGSA.  
The Second Circuit reversed and held that the carrier was entitled to the CMR 
limitation. In doing so, the court held that this was a mixed contract, with no admiralty 
jurisdiction, and therefore applied New York’s choice of law rules to uphold the parties’ 
contractual choice of law provision (i.e. the CMR limitation). The case was remanded for 
further proceedings on whether the carrier was entitled to a limit of its liability under the 
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CMR, considering the shipper’s allegations of wilful misconduct. Other courts, following 
this rationale, have applied state choice-of-law rules in examining a bill of lading’s choice-
of-law provisions, in some instances upholding the parties’ agreement, and in other cases 
making the agreement void. 
The defendants had selected DeBrock Gebr. Transport, NV (“DeBrock”) as their 
trucker between Antwerp and inland destinations in Europe, but DeBrock subcontracted 
with N.V. Groeninghe (“Groeninghe”) to transport Trek’s container from Antwerp to 
Spijkenisse. On 29
th
 October 1996, a Groeninghe truck picked up the container from the 
defendants’ ship at Antwerp. Later that evening, thieves stole the truck, together with the 
container of Trek’s bicycles, after the truck had been left on a public road without any 
supervision or guard near the driver’s home in Deurne, Belgium.  
The police were able to track down approximately thirty of Trek’s three hundred 
and one stolen packages, but the remainder were never recovered. It was held that in a 
situation of potential contract ambiguity, an interpretation that gives a reasonable and 
effective meaning to all terms of a contract is preferable to one that leaves a portion of the 
writing useless or inexplicable. In any event, contracting parties are able to reduce 
uncertainty that rises by drafting a bill of lading that provides for the application of a single 
law during all stages of transport, but in this particular case that had not been done. 
Sometimes, although it may be a matter of jurisdiction, is that the general rule for 
exercising admiralty jurisdiction in a contract case “jurisdiction arises only when the 
subject-matter of the contract is “purely” or “wholly” maritime in nature.” In this case, the 
record did not reveal the exact mileage that the cargo would travel by land or sea under the 
bill of lading, but the land segment of the carriage was clearly more than “incidental” in 
relation to the water segment. 
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Even if the parties’ choice of law is not an issue, some US courts have applied the 
chosen law only to the extent that it does not conflict with the substantive state law. In 
situations where the selected law and state law yield the same result, this is not necessarily 
a problem. For instance, in New York Marine & General Insurance Co. v. S/S Ming 
Prosperity, 920 F. Supp. 416, 420 (SDNY 1996) a containerised shipment of footwear 
carried under a multimodal bill of lading from Hong Kong to New York, via Los Angeles, 
was destroyed because of a train derailment in Arizona. 
The shipper sued the ocean and rail carrier in the federal court in New York, and 
both carriers claimed limitation of damages, the ocean carrier under COGSA, and the rail 
carrier under its circular. The court held that this was a “mixed contract” with no admiralty 
jurisdiction, and therefore, state law governed the shipper’s claims. Applying New York 
law, the court concluded that the ocean carrier was entitled to benefit from the bill of 
lading’s provisions limiting damages to invoice value: “Parties may contract to limit the 
liability of a carrier, even for gross negligence, provided the language of the limitation is 
clear, the shipper is aware of the terms of the limitation, and the shipper can change the 
terms by indicating the true value of the goods being shipped.” 
The international treaty terms which would apply can be excluded by agreement 
between the parties, as this occurs in the concealed damage. The issue of choice of law 
clauses in these contracts, which concerns the applicable law, is related to this. In case the 
damage is localised, the parties may incorporate the relevant law clauses which will apply 
mandatorily, but if the damage is concealed the mandatory relevant applicable law may be 
excluded. 
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Finally, in some jurisdictions such clauses may not be respected in full or may be 
declared null and void
236
. In fact, in the Hartford case, the court granted the shipper’s 
motion for summary judgment, but limited its recovery, dismissing its claims for lost profit 
and consequential damages. The same result was reached concerning the rail carrier under 
the bill of lading’s Himalaya Clause. On the other hand, state law has served to nullify an 
ocean carrier’s or inland carrier’s otherwise valid contractual right to limit. In Mitsui 
Marine & Fire Insurance Co. v. Hanjin Shipping Co., now reported in SE 2d 2004 WL 
106678 (GA State Ct.), 2004 AMC 577, a shipper brought suit against the ocean carrier, 
inland rail carrier, and inland trucker in state court for damages arising out of a 
containerised shipment of yarn carried under a through bill of lading from Japan to Decatur, 
Alabama, via Savannah, Georgia. 
The goods were loaded in Japan, taken by vessel to Savannah, by rail to Huntsville, 
Alabama, and then by truck to Decatur. When the container was opened at the consignee’s 
premises, the goods were found to be damaged. In this case, the shipper had contracted with 
an NVOCC, who in turn contracted with the ocean carrier. The ocean carrier’s bill of lading 
extended COGSA inland and also contained a Himalaya Clause protecting inland carriers. 
The ocean carrier moved for summary judgment to limit its liability in accordance with the 
COGSA $500 per package limitation. 
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The Georgia state court denied the ocean carrier’s motion for two reasons. Firstly, 
relying extensively on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd. v. 
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. 125 S. Ct 385, 2004 AMC 2705 (2004), which involved 
similar facts, the court held that a shipper who contracts with an intermediary (such as an 
NVOCC) is not bound by limitations contained in the ocean carrier’s bill of lading. 
Secondly, the court concluded that even if the ocean carrier’s extension of COGSA bound 
the shipper, the limitation would still fall under Georgian law. Under Georgia’s common 
carrier statute, a common carrier is prohibited from limiting its liability by language in a 
bill of lading. Accordingly, in the absence of an express agreement negotiated between the 
carrier and shipper, the carrier was not entitled to any limit based on the pre-printed portion 
of the bill of lading. 
When composing a proper multimodal legal framework, it should be taken into 
account that a contract to transport goods over both sea and land is obviously not a 
traditional maritime contract
237
. Therefore, what should be targeted is the harmonisation of 
the CMR or COTTIF with COGSA, if possible. Many of the standard form contracts are 
drafted under the Standard Conditions of FIATA (FBL) and the Combined Transport 
Document published by BIMCO and INSA (COMBIDOC) are based on the original ICC 
Rules. 
In some countries, such as Japan, the network liability system applies which seems 
to be satisfactory. What is interesting here is that Japanese banks paying insurance 
settlements according to documentary letters of credit, accept documents issued under this 
system and insurers seem to have no problem with this. It seems therefore that in Japan, 
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there is not much space for unification efforts. Moreover, the fact that contracts currently 
used under validity in Japan might not be regarded valid under the domestic laws of other 
nations still remains insoluble.  
Therefore, the extent to which these contracts are valid is debatable. 
In Japan, in one case on multimodal transport, Amatsu Keiko v. Japan Schenker 
K.K. [1991] Tokyo District Court, the defendant was held to be a contractual carrier 
(multimodal transport operator) and the claim was accordingly dismissed; hence, the 
validity of the contract is not clear. Nor is the standard of care required of the multimodal 
transport operator evident. This explains the fact that there are no cases reported in Japan in 
which the multimodal transport operator claimed a recourse action against its servants or 
agents or against actual carriers and this may create further problems. Generally, the 
recourse claim of the employer against his/her employee is sometimes limited so that the 
damage is shared between the employer and the employee in an equitable manner 
(Pampouki 2000, p. 155). 
Technology has evolved in such a way that modern multimodal carriage is not 
performed by a single entity, since efficient multimodal carriage depends on many different 
parties performing many different transportation modes, acting together to accomplish the 
carriage. Having to meet the specific requirements of law in a Himalaya Clause, as already 
mentioned in chapter 3 (Da), tends to lower the efficiency of the network system (Hooper 
2004, p. 8). 
As discussed by the US Supreme Court in James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd. v. Norfolk 
Southern Railway Co. 125 S Ct. 385, the following issues apply:  
a) whether a cargo owner is the one who contracts with a freight forwarder, 
under a house bill of lading, and whether they are both bound by the 
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terms of contracts the forwarder later makes with carriers to transport the 
goods  
b) whether the freight forwarders are acting as agents of the shipper, when 
the former enter into a contract with an ocean carrier, and if the freight 
forwarder is considered as the shipper on that bill of lading
238
. 
The multimodal system is shown (Hooper 2004, p. 9), by the decision of the 
Eleventh Circuit in Kirby case, as having many different legal provisions, which no longer 
fit together. Though, Professor Ramberg (Hooper 2004, p. 9) favours the network system, 
describing the evolution of a freight forwarder as that from a shipper’s agent to a carrier. 
FIATA publishes documents that permit a freight forwarder to act as either the 
agent of a shipper by using a Forwarder’s Certificate of Transport or as a carrier by issuing 
a Forwarder’s Bill of Lading. Many continental European Members of FIATA initially 
strongly opposed to the assumption of a carrier’s liability by a freight forwarder, but they 
now agree that a freight forwarder should be able to assume that liability. Doing away with 
the network system, Ramberg contends (Hooper 2004, p. 9), would be as beneficial to the 
transportation system as was the assumption of carrier status by freight forwarders. 
Uniformity is clearly what we need for this undertaking. 
Commenting on the Kirby Case, it should be added that a new era is coming which 
will depend on the way this case will be interpreted by the Supreme Court. If it interprets 
the NVOCC’s Himalaya clause liberally to extend the contract of carriage terms to all its 
participants, it will have gone a long way towards putting the contract of multimodal 
carriage together again. If, on the other hand, it concludes that all participants in the 
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carriage should be entitled to the protection of the contract of carriage without the need of a 
specific Himalaya Clause, a giant step would be taken towards uniformity in the law 
concerning multimodalism. 
The limited scope of the Hague Rules (and US COGSA) has left the sea carriage 
framework unable to deal efficiently with the increasing number of claims involving 
multimodal bills of lading where the loss or damage occurs inland. For the past several 
decades, parties to multimodal bills of lading have been compensated by including choice 
of law provisions (network clauses and Clauses Paramount), to govern the rights and 
liabilities of the carrier and shipper outside the tackle-to-tackle period, and Himalaya 
Clauses, to extend coverage to persons not otherwise covered by the framework. 
These clauses, however, have been subject to different interpretations by different 
courts, as evidenced by the Kirby case; even the most carefully drafted bills of lading have 
not prevented the application of state law on significant issues of liability and damages. The 
result has been low predictability and high litigation costs. The Kirby decision has helped 
matters somewhat by expanding admiralty jurisdiction and thus the application of federal 
maritime law, as opposed to state law, to all aspects of multimodal contracts and by 
offering some guidance as to the interpretation of Himalaya Clauses.  
The decision, however, leaves many questions unanswered and does not come close 
to solving the problems created by the absence of an international convention covering 
“door to door” multimodal shipments. Moving on further with the analysis in the Kirby 
case, the Court determined that there is nothing inherently local about this dispute to justify 
interference with the uniformity of federal maritime law. There is a type of “network,” 
when the ICC bill of lading contained network liability provisions, applying US COGSA to 
the sea portion of transport and establishing ICC’s maximum liability in accordance with 
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“applicable international convention or mandatory national law” with respect to any other 
“stage of the multimodal transport” and with the Hague/Visby limits as a default limit 
(Crowley 2005, p. 1487). 
Furthermore, if a carton inside the container is damaged, when the vessel launches 
and crosses the boundaries of the Departure State where civil law was applied and enters 
another state where common law applies, it is hard to find the suitable legal framework. It 
is even more difficult to define where the damage occurred.  
For instance, in Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. M.V. Hakusan II 954 F. 2d 874 (3
rd
 
Circuit 1992) a container carrying umbrellas by sea from Taiwan to Los Angeles and then 
by rail to New Jersey, was stolen from the inland carrier’s warehouse in New Jersey. The 
bill of lading identified Keelung, Taiwan as the load port and New York as the place of 
delivery, but did not specify that the shipment would move overland via Los Angeles. The 
shipper sued in federal court, asserting admiralty jurisdiction. The lower court, however, 
held that the claim did not give rise to admiralty jurisdiction, because the bill of lading 
involved “extensive cross-land transport” and thus granted the inland carrier’s motion to 
dismiss. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit cited the general 
rule that a contract must be “purely” or “wholly” maritime in nature to fall within admiralty 
jurisdiction, with two exceptions to the rule. Firstly, if a contract is partially maritime and 
partially non-maritime, the court will entertain admiralty jurisdiction if the maritime and 
non-maritime portions of the contract can be severed without prejudice to either party. 
Secondly, a federal court may exercise maritime jurisdiction over the entire contract if the 
non-maritime aspects of the transportation are “merely incidental.” 
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The Third Circuit held that neither exception applied. Nevertheless, due to the 
ambiguity in the bill of lading, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to 
determine whether the shipper had a reasonable belief, based on prior dealings or 
customary trade practice, as to whether the goods would travel entirely by sea. If the parties 
had contemplated a voyage entirely by sea, admiralty jurisdiction would attach. Where the 
bill of lading unambiguously provides for inland carriage, however, the courts have not 
hesitated to dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction. 
Lastly, even where the parties have agreed to apply COGSA or some other law to 
the period of inland carriage, courts have treated COGSA only as a contract term; enforcing 
its provisions only to the extent they do not conflict with applicable state law, as previously 
indicated. As a result, the parties to a multimodal bill of lading have been subject to 
different rules respecting liability, burdens of proof, and limits of liability, time bar, and 
choice of law, depending on what law is applied. It is customary for parties to a multimodal 
bill of lading to include choice of law provisions covering liability during the different 
stages of transport. This is due in part to the present lack of any mandatory international 
multimodal convention governing these stages. 
Commonly known as “network liability” clauses, these provisions often apply the 
law of any mandatory international convention or national law covering the stage where the 
loss or damage occurred and a default liability framework (such as COGSA, Hague Rules, 
Hague-Visby, etc.), if the location of the occurrence cannot be proven. Whether the parties 
agree to uniformly extend COGSA/Hague Rules inland, or use a network liability choice of 
law approach, US courts have not hesitated to apply state law, including a forum state’s 
choice of law rules, to determine the validity of the bill of lading’s provisions. 
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The CMI/UNCITRAL Draft Convention 2008 (the recent “Rotterdam Rules”) also 
attempts to provide a network solution by Art. 26, but there is a more fundamental problem 
with the CMR in that a hypothetical road contract for, say, the pre-maritime leg of the 
carriage would, in many cases, fall outside the ambit of the Convention (Baughen 2009, p. 
161). For the “network” system to apply, the damage must have occurred during pre-
carriage or during carriage. In this respect, a choice can be made between the place where 
the damage is caused, where it occurs, and where it is detected. The time of detection may 
be before the voyage begins, e.g. in case of damage caused by the shipper having the cargo 
badly stowed in a container. The most serious objection against the place where the damage 
is caused is that the question of proper causation according to the applicable law has to be 
resolved before it can be determined whether the provisions of the UNCITRAL Instrument 
2008 or of another convention are applicable. 
The place where damage has occurred is a factual matter, is usually relatively easy 
to establish and may be expected to produce fair results. Therefore, the place of occurrence 
must be regarded as the proper choice within the scope of the network system and art. 26 of 
the UNCITRAL Draft 2008 so provides. As an example of the “network scope” may be 
taken a contract of carriage from Singapore to Antwerp, Belgium. Under this particular 
contract the goods are to be shipped through a Dutch port of discharge, Rotterdam, and 
carried thence by land. This contract is governed by Singapore law, whether by express 
choice of the parties or by operation of other principles of the conflict of laws. Before a 
court in a country adhering to the Instrument, Singapore law would be displaced to the 
extent that mandatory provisions of an international convention governing road haulage, 
also adopted by that country, are applicable to the inland leg of the journey. 
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The law governing the carriage of goods by sea has always been unique. Concepts 
such as seaworthiness, perils of the sea, general average (Richardson 1998, pp. 81-83) 
salvage (Richardson 1998, p. 83), and deviation are peculiar to sea carriage and will 
continue to make maritime law such an intriguing area of practice. Unlike other modes of 
transport, however, sea carriage is governed by an outdated liability framework that has 
failed to keep up with changes in the industry. 
 235 
ii) Modified Network Liability System 
 The so-called modified network liability system gives authority to the agreement 
of the parties, thus eliminating the weaknesses of the pure network system. The basic idea 
of the modified system is preserved but it can be modified by statute or by the parties’ 
agreement. The MTO is also subject to the mandatory regulations of the trajectory where 
the damage has occurred. It is possible, however, for an additional arrangement to be made 
with respect to the multimodal transport operator’s liability in a case where no mandatory 
framework is applicable or in case of non-localised damage (Pampouki 2000, pp. 30-31).  
 If modification is established by contractual agreement, it is more than certain, that 
the carriers will attempt to include a rule favouring themselves. However, the modified 
network system cannot effectively fill the existing gap with respect to the damages 
occurring in the intervals that are not covered by transport law. Neither does it cover the 
gaps existing as regards to damages occurring gradually or due to delay. 
 It creates problems with respect to the nature of the law governing the various parts 
of the transport; namely, whether the law applicable to a trajectory should be considered as 
mandatory, and if so, whether it is mandatory in its entirety or could it also be considered as 
mandatory in a case where certain of its provisions are non-mandatory. The answer to this 
question is that, through interpretation, a liability regime may be considered as mandatory 
in its entirety, in spite of the fact that certain of its provisions are non-mandatory. This, of 
course, creates uncertainty of law at the expense of the shipper, who has no way of 
knowing in advance, which liability framework will govern the multimodal transport 
contract he has entered into. All of this further reinforces the case for an appropriate system 
of law with general applicability and is of major jurisprudential significance. 
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 Many standard transport documents, such as Combiconbill and BIMCO Combidoc, 
as well as the initial version of the FIATA BL, have been drafted on the basis of this system 
(Pampouki 2000, pp. 31-32). 
 237 
iii) Unified Liability System   
If, in contrast, one contract is made for a transport engaging at least two different 
modes of transport, then it is necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not the liability of 
such a carrier (the so-called “multimodal transport operator,” MTO) should not, in 
principle, depend upon the localisation of the loss or damage to the particular mode of 
transport where the loss or damage occurred (the so-called “uniform/ unified” liability 
system) (Faber 1997, p. 26). 
The uniform/ unified liability system, as the term itself indicates, provides the same 
carrier’s liability throughout the whole transport, namely, a single liability framework, 
founded on the same basis from the beginning to the end of the transportation. The 
framework of liability may be one of those governing one of the transport stages, a 
combination of them, or even a completely different framework. As regards the base of 
liability, in particular, it could be a fault-presumed liability, containing or not containing 
limits of liability; it could also be a strict liability, providing or not providing exemption 
grounds (Pampouki, pp. 32-33). 
The uniform liability system, including certain elements of the modified network 
system is depicted in the UN Convention of 1980 on International Multimodal Transport of 
Goods. This system presents fewer gaps and creates fewer problems than those of the 
network system, in case of non-localised damage. Actually, since the same set of rules 
applies to all phases of transport from the beginning to the end, there is no reason to search 
for the particular stage at which damage has occurred. Thus, problems concerning the 
gradual occurrence of damage or of damage due to delay existing under the network system 
are eliminated. 
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The uniform liability system, however, leaves certain problems unresolved. One of 
the most important problems concerns the recourse action of the carrier against the sub-
carriers who were delegated to perform particular parts of the transport. Naturally, the 
MTO does not always carry out the whole transport personally, but employs sub-carriers to 
perform one or more parts of it. The MTO is liable to cargo-interested persons in the same 
way for the entire transport, while the sub-carrier is subject to the law governing the part of 
transport where damage had occurred. Therefore, the MTO who has indemnified the cargo 
interested person for damage caused not by the MTO, but by one of the employed sub-
carriers, has a recourse action against the latter to claim back the paid compensation. 
However, such a recourse action has very little chance of success. 
In the case of identified damage, if the uniform liability of MTO results in a larger 
amount than the liability of the sub-carrier under the rules governing the particular part of 
the multimodal carriage, the recourse action will not (completely) cover the claim of MTO. 
In case of non-localised damage, on the other hand, the MTO should first localise the 
damage in order to find the actual carrier (sub-carrier) against whom to direct his recourse 
action. In such a case, however, the problems arising under the network system return 
(Pampouki 2000, p. 33). 
It has also been maintained that the establishment of a uniform and mandatory 
liability framework of MTO would be in conflict with binding unimodal liability 
frameworks provided by international conventions or by domestic laws. Taking into 
consideration that mandatory liability provisions operate in favour of the shipper, the 
objection can be rejected if the uniform liability framework covers all the liabilities 
prescribed in unimodal conventions; even more so, if multimodal transport is looked upon 
as a specific mode of transport, constituting an integrated whole and not as a technical 
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adjustment of minor parts, each constituting a separate contract of carriage. Certainly, the 
practical question is how to establish such a worldwide uniform liability framework. 
The best way for such a framework is for it to be established through an 
international convention, in as much as multimodal transport is mainly concerned with 
international carriage. The particular issues enumerated above illustrate how uncoordinated 
the international scene is. Therefore, it is vital to establish binding international conventions 
with a mechanism to achieve uniformity of interpretation and application. However, the UN 
Convention on the subject, though duly signed and concluded, failed to be ratified to come 
into effect and is very unlikely to come into effect in the near future (Pampouki 2000, p. 
33). Existing unimodal conventions providing for certain combined forms of transport, 
cannot apply by extensive interpretation or by analogy to other cases than those provided 
therein. 
A national statute could certainly establish a uniform liability system for the 
multimodal transport operator; such a statute, however, will not change the mandatory 
framework of unimodal transport international conventions. Additionally, such a statute 
could only have a limited local application.  
Finally, contracting parties will -by adopting a set of rules (i.e. UNCTAD/ICC or 
some others) or a standard bill of lading- be unable to provide a solution oriented towards a 
uniform liability of the MTO. A uniform liability framework, covering all stages of 
carriage, could only be established by law, more specifically by an international 
convention. Multimodal transport is commonplace today and constitutes a major legal 
problem that is under discussion globally. Consequently, it merits any efforts made for 
drawing up a new international convention, which in the light of new views and thoughts 
could lead to more successful results (Pampouki 2000, p. 34). 
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In the absence of an applicable mandatory international convention, the parties to a 
combined transport contract are entitled to negotiate their own terms and can impose on the 
carrier a uniform liability throughout the period of transit. Even if an international 
convention is applicable to one leg, the parties may still agree on a uniform liability 
throughout the remainder of the transit.  
In the majority of cases, however, the extent of the carrier’s liability will be 
dependent on locating the place where the damage or loss occurred (Wilson 2008, p. 247). 
Although the network liability system changes the law according to the mode of 
transportation and the location of the damage, still the unified liability appears the fairest. 
This is also the position of the United States (Hooper 2004, p. 9
239
). Uniformity could be 
achieved if the network exception is narrowed as much as possible. In particular, the United 
States supports a door-to-door framework on a uniform liability basis as between the 
contracting parties, subject to a limited network exception. 
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iv) Ambiguities about Mixed Contracts 
The mixed contracts are a common feature in the liner trade. However, their legal 
character is not always well understood and, in practice, many create ambiguities. They 
may refer to “connecting carrier” arrangements. Such arrangements may apply where a 
carrier is able to carry out only part of the voyage with a vessel under its own control and 
has agreed with the shipper to take care that the other part(s) are carried out by other 
carrier(s) with whom it may have an arrangement to do so. Occasionally, the connecting 
carrier may be an inland carrier
240
. If a transport document or an electronic record is issued, 
the mixed character must be reflected in such document or record, so as to protect third 
parties relying on the contents of such documents or records. 
“Multimodal transport” means the carriage of goods by at least two different modes 
of transport on the basis of a multimodal transport contract from a place at which the goods 
are taken in charge by the multimodal transport operator to a place designated for delivery. 
It differs from the concept “mixed contracts” or “door-to-door” in that it requires the 
presence of a single contract for multimodal transportation, one document and one 
responsible party for the entire transit, while the latter does not necessarily do so as it may 
be organised with various carriers, or indeed as the parties may wish. On the other hand, 
“intermodal transport” has been defined as the movement of goods in one and the same 
loading unit or road vehicle, which uses successively two or more modes of transport 
without handling the goods themselves in changing modes. 
Agreeing with Alcantara (2002, p. 401), we can only and properly refer to transport 
as “multimodal international transport” when it corresponds to the legal definition stated 
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earlier. Usually, various expressions are used in an operational or commercial sense. This 
may cause confusion (Alcantara 2002, p. 401), because we are aware that most, if not all, of 
the multimodal arrangements are “door-to-door” but not the reverse. The expression “door-
to-door” is thus opposed to “port-to-port.”  
“Port-to-port,” as differentiated from “tackle-to-tackle” (Alcantara 2002, p. 401), 
refers to a sea carriage in which any minor transportation of the goods between the place of 
their storage within the port to the ship, and vice versa at the port of destination, effected by 
land carriage is regarded as supplementary to the sea carriage, usually undertaken by the 
sea carrier. As a result, confusion may arise if we mix up concepts in order to treat a “door-
to-door” transportation by different modes, but in which one must be a sea carriage, while 
“door-to-door” also fits with land transportation only without involving a sea leg. This will 
all be the more so, as such a marine segment is to be the axis of the others and a single 
contract and documents are to be used (Alcantara 2002, p. 401). 
Such a model of two or more carriages, though supplementary to the sea carriage, 
will certainly be “door-to-door” and, insofar as it is arranged with one carrier, in one 
contract and under one document it will also be “multimodal;” but other forms of 
multimodalism excluding the sea carriage could not be assimilated to that particular 
structure (Alcantara 2002, p. 401)
241
.  
In fact, the proposal for application of the rules contained in the Draft Instrument is 
a maritime transport effecting door-to-door application with the supply of other non-marine 
modes of carriage. To the extent that it will be intended to use (“partly by sea”) more than 
one mode, the entire transportation should be deemed to be multimodal, though any other 
choice of combined transport excluding sea carriage would not fit within the scope of the 
                                                 
241
 Cf. Jindal Iron & Steel Co v. Islamic Solidarity Co (The Jordan II) [2004] UKHL 49. 
 243 
new framework. The latter, therefore, will have to be understood only as a limited type of 
multimodalism (Alcantara 2002, p. 403). 
Under Art. 5 of the UNCITRAL Draft 2008, the transits from the port of discharge 
to the final place of delivery will normally be performed by road or railway or indeed, by 
road and air or inland waterways, so rendering the whole service to be multimodal and 
door-to-door (Carr 2010, p. 306). It is important to note that the carrier’s period of 
responsibility extends from receipt to delivery of the goods, thus serving the purposes of 
uniform liability for the entire transportation. This, of course, is in principle only, because 
the uniform rule has not been thoroughly pursued. 
Under Art. 26 of the UNCITRAL Draft 2008, for example, in respect of 
transportation preceding or subsequent to sea carriage, gives way to the application of other 
mandatory international Conventions in relation to other modes of transport. The Draft 
2008 will then be displaced where a Convention which constitutes mandatory law for 
inland (or other) carriage is applicable to the inland (or other) leg of a contract for carriage 
by sea, and it is clear that the loss in question occurred solely in the course of the inland (or 
other) carriage (Carr 2010, p. 406). According to this though, this Draft then, known as 
“The Rotterdam Rules,” has nothing more to add in the current situation, since the 
UNCITRAL/ICC Rules play a similar role. 
From a multimodalist
242
 perspective, it is doubtful that the future UNCITRAL 
Convention will achieve the desired uniformity in the field of multimodal transport 
liability. Therefore, it might be worth following the route of “the pyramid method.”243 
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D.) THE SYSTEMS IN PRACTICE  
The international solutions proposed for the liability issues of multimodal transport 
just outlined adopt different approaches and therefore can result in significantly different 
distributions of risk and responsibility for the same incident. In practice, the UNCTAD/ 
ICC Rules 1992 were accepted as the appropriate standard for the model combined 
transport bills of lading designed by such industry associations as BIMCO and FIATA 
(Kindred/ Brooks 1998, p. 7). They are not voluntary but mandatory and certainly, that may 
have its advantages and drawbacks, since it depends on whether the parties agree to apply 
these Rules or not. The advantage is that they are able to reflect a longer experience of 
multimodalism and to draw on the precedents provided by the previous separate models of 
ICC and UNCTAD. 
The vital matter in commercial practice is whether the Multimodal Rules desired by 
the operator, the shipper or the consignee are incorporated into the transport documents 
used. Finally, the Rules applicable will depend on the type of document requested by the 
cargo owner, if any, and the carrier’s or TPL’s available documents (Kindred 1998, p. 24). 
In practice, few cargo interests examine the fine print of contracts arranged on their behalf 
(Kindred/Brooks 1998, p. 24) but accept the documents provided as standard for the 
service. There is commercial pressure on the operator to issue a transport contract matching 
the terms of the letter of credit; otherwise, shippers tend to accept the third party’s or 
operator’s transport document as issued without considering that they may negotiate the use 
of an alternate document or clause(s). This tendency works in favour of multimodal 
operators minimizing the risks they face (Kindred/Brooks 1998, pp. 24-25). 
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Furthermore, according to Faber (1997, p. 25) as far as the distinction between the 
freight forwarder as an agent and the freight forwarder as a carrier is concerned, the 
problems are basically the same. This is irrespective of whether the transport is performed 
by a single mode of transit (so-called “unimodal transport”), or by a combination of 
different modes in the same contract (so-called “combined” or “multimodal” transport). 
However, the rules applicable to the different modes of transport differ with respect to basis 
as well as limitation of liability, since every transport mode is run by its own legal regime 
and that may create controversy in legal disputes, as demonstrated in Royal § Sun Alliance 
Insurance plc v. MK Digital FZE (Cyprus) Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 629, [2006] 2 All ER 
(Comm) 145. 
Thus, if separate contracts are made for each segment of transport from place of 
dispatch to the final destination (so-called “segmented” transport) different rules apply for 
each segment depending upon the mode of transport. This is totally unacceptable for all 
parties concerned, since it creates confusion, and more importantly, it allows for the 
possibility of avoiding liability. This is why we must attain the uniformity of laws. For 
example, in The Gabrielle Wehr, (decision of the Hoge Raad of June 29, 1990, Nederlandse 
Jurisprudentie (NJ) 1992, p. 106, translated in European Transport Law (ETL) 1990, p. 
589) the Dutch Supreme Court applied the CMR to so-called “RoRo”-transport (Roll on-
Roll off), where a truck was loaded onto a ferry from Goteborg (Sweden) to Rotterdam (the 
Netherlands). As the carriage by sea of the goods in the truck took place under a waybill 
and not under a bill of lading, neither the Hague Rules, nor the Hague-Visby Rules were of 
direct application, something which can create ambiguity in the world of maritime space. 
If, in contrast, one contract is made for a transport engaging at least two different 
modes of transport, then it is necessary to resolve whether or not the liability of such a 
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carrier (the so-called “multimodal transport operator”, MTO) should be segmented so that 
his liability would depend upon the identification of the particular mode of transport where 
the loss or damage occurred (the so-called “network” liability system) (Faber 1997, p. 26).  
Suffice to say that the “network” liability system has been preferred in the current 
rules and conditions applicable to multimodal transport. Lord Diplock
244
 remarked that in 
practice nearly all claims are settled without any recourse to the network system, 
particularly as recourse to it has no practical effect on the liability of the Multimodal 
Transport Operator (Alcantara 2002, p. 404). Furthermore, in some cases private settlement 
may take place and the case not reach the courts at all
245
. This will certainly at least 
sometimes prove to be beneficial to the parties, since the pure network principle poses 
certain difficulties for the parties to anticipate and by which to assess their respective risk 
exposures. 
The most important matter for Containerisation is to decide what we actually need: 
should this be an international convention to solve multimodal matters; or something more 
practical, like the domestic law of the Destination State, where the damage was actually 
discovered or the transhipment port. Moreover, it is open to debate whether the desired 
international convention would have mandatory scope or would be the same as the one with 
the Rules. Since no international multimodal convention is in force for Containerisation 
yet, one way to judge relevant cases is the incorporation of the UNCTAD/ICC Rules 1992 
in the contract, which then may govern combined transport. 
Furthermore, it is worth examining whether or not an extension of the Hague/Visby 
Rules would be able to govern multimodal transport internationally and whether this may 
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be the answer to the problem of uniformity. Certainly, achieving uniformity is essential in 
this undertaking, since that would solve issues at a global level and would harmonise the 
applicable laws. The level of mandatory scope that may be rendered would enhance the 
powers of a fresh convention. A flexible way of satisfying modern trade needs to be sought. 
Additionally, converting a unimodal carrier into an MTO may mean escaping from 
mandatory rules: hence, the existence of Rule 13 of the UNCTAD/ICC Rules. Moreover, 
such a “conversion” would bring certain consequences. We need MTOs in Containerisation 
and we should harmonise the UNCTAD/ICC Rules, so that they comply with the domestic 
legislation and with their applicability in different regions. 
As there is also intermodal transport, which is integrated transportation of goods 
over both sea and land (Mahoney 1985, p. 7)
246
, this kind of transport may require a 
separate convention or legal framework. Containerisation has brought many problems as it 
starts developing rapidly without limits yet set. It is the most efficient kind of trade that has 
existed so far and therefore its legal problems should be settled accordingly. Perhaps, in the 
future, a super multimodal harmonising legal framework will finally be devised and render 
this kind of trade the most powerful of all. Although disputes mainly arise in the sea leg, 
this does not mean that the road and train legs do not also play their part in this 
undertaking. 
According to the Executive Summary, the UNCTAD/ICC Model Rules, which are 
based on the network principle, have filled a gap in intermodal transport liability left by the 
failure of the 1980 UN Convention on Multimodal Transportation of Goods to attract 
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sufficient support and consequently failed to enter into force
247
. The result is remaining 
uncertainty in the terms of liability and the legal position generally. Harmonisation of 
conditions, such as uniform liability limit for all modes to facilitate intermodal transport, 
could yield massive savings in costs to intermodal transport of up to 50M Euro per 
annum
248
, and this is only one of several benefits to be derived from a harmonising 
international convention.  
The legal system of Thailand deserves consideration. Here, there is no specific legal 
framework focusing on multimodal transport. The general provisions of the Thai Civil and 
Commercial Law (“CCC”) apply when goods are damaged during inland transportation, 
irrespective of the mode, road or rail. In contrast, when goods are damaged in the sea-leg, 
the COGSA applies. In the near future, Thailand will be enacting legislation for multimodal 
transport. Thailand and the rest of Asian countries have formulated the Asian Framework 
Agreement on Multimodal Transport as the model law for application among Asian 
countries. The forthcoming legislation will thus be on line with the Asian Framework 
Agreement
249
.  
According to the proposed legislation of Thailand, the consignee is required to give 
written notice of loss or damage to the goods to the multimodal transport operator when the 
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goods are delivered to him. Without such notice, the goods so delivered will be deemed to 
be the proper and exact goods as described in the multimodal transport document. 
However, where the loss/damage is not apparent, the consignee has six 
(consecutive) days to give notice in writing, or else the same presumption of properly 
delivered goods will apply. These provisions are equally applicable to actions in contract 
and tort, and to claims made against the multimodal transport operator or his/her servant, 
agent or other person whose services were used by the multimodal transport operator to 
perform the contract. So, this could be adopted in whole in the future international 
instrument that should be drafted to govern international multimodal transportation. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that,
250
 containerised cargo now accounts for a very 
high percentage of cargo movements carried on a multi-modal basis by more than one 
mode of transport under a single contract. Current commercial as well as insurance practice 
and existing maritime conventions are generally structured to provide for this traditional 
type of transport. Certainly, we should move towards a “single contract” method, which 
would promote simplicity and clarity. Furthermore, this “single contract” method stands for 
multimodalism on a door-to-door basis (Wilson 2008, p. 246). 
Accordingly, the Multimodal Transport Operator would remain solely responsible 
to the cargo owner for the safety of the goods during transit, having negotiated separate 
contracts for the different legs with individual unimodal carriers. The essence of such an 
arrangement is that the cargo owner would not be in contractual relations with individual 
“actual carriers” and his rights and liabilities would depend solely on the terms of the 
combined transport contract.  
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Therefore, many modern shipping documents are now drafted in a form in which 
they can be used interchangeably for either combined transport, through transport or on a 
port-to-port basis, and include terms appropriate for each contingency, like P&O Ned Lloyd 
bill, Conline bill, ACL bill
251
. 
Any attempt to solve the problem by agreement is similarly restricted, since 
contractual provisions are liable to be overruled where a unimodal convention is mandatory 
on a particular leg and that is why it is not possible to govern multimodalism with merely 
private contracts, as economists argue should be the case
252
. This problem can, however, be 
overstated since, in general, unimodal conventions are only applicable where the leg in 
question is “international,” i.e. the points of departure and arrival are located in different 
states. 
In practice this means that, outside Europe, conventions other than Hague or 
Hague/Visby Rules are rarely relevant. The network system, expressed in UNIDROIT 
drafts has tried to bring the carrier’s liability close to the liability of the sub-carrier, so that 
the carrier’s recourse action against the sub-carriers can be ensured. Thus, the established 
liability system retains the multiplicity of unimodal liability frameworks: moreover, it 
avoids unjust treatment of the carrier, in cases where his liability is larger in amount than 
the liability of the sub-carriers or his servant and agents. 
However, one should expect an international convention of multimodal transport to 
be more than a simple reproduction and juxtaposition of the laws governing the modes of 
transport and the constitutive parts of the contract. Additionally, the complexity and lack of 
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predictability of their provisions have been considered as weaknesses of the UNIDROIT 
drafts (Pampouki 2000, pp. 36-37).  
According to Pampouki (2000, p. 63), the main problem is that uniformity has not 
been achieved at an international level and therefore the important issue of a global and 
mandatory application of an international convention governing multimodal transport 
should be discussed. An important issue which arises at this point is whether the domestic 
rules can or should be extended in order to render solutions to the international commercial 
forum and whether the desirable uniformity may be achieved. One good idea would be to 
use the limits of liability provided by CMR, given that they are widely accepted (Pampouki 
2003, p. 64).  
The different ways of interpreting law in several States is, of course, also an 
obstacle to achieving the desirable uniformity. For example, the US Shipping Act of 1984 
by the Federal Maritime Commission (now replaced by the Shipping Act of 1998) defines 
“through transportation” as “continuous transportation between origin and destination for 
which a through rate is assessed and which is offered or performed by one or more carriers, 
at least one of which is a common carrier, between a United States point or port and a 
foreign point or port.” The regulation issued by the Federal Maritime Commission253 in 
1984 requires in part that the multimodal tariff must include: “a contract of affreightment 
clearly setting forth the responsibility for through transportation which is consistent with 
the holding out provided by the application of the rates and conditions of the tariff.”  
Some commentators have suggested that this regulation requires the carrier, issuing 
the bill of lading, to accept responsibility for the goods throughout the entire period of 
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transportation, thus preventing the latter from confining its liability to the portion of the 
transportation that it performs under a network system
254
.  
Naturally, it would lead to uniformity
255
 if this method were followed. It follows 
directly that all the harm and cost is caused by the absence of an integrated international 
convention. On defining uniformity, it should be added that any desirable multimodal legal 
framework should contain clear and simple rules that will create certainty in trade but 
above all, would comprise of legislation that is fair and equitable to all parties.  
On seeking uniformity, Transport Canada
256
 suggests that the “Hague/Visby Rules 
be retained and the government continue to make efforts, in consultation with industry and 
in co-operation with like-minded countries, towards the development of practical options 
for a new international framework of liability for the carriage of goods by sea that would 
provide a viable alternative to the Hague/Visby Rules.” 
Finally, if the entire multimodal system is to operate under one set of laws, the 
terminal’s liability standard should not change with the particular role it is performing at 
any given moment; rather, it should be as close as possible to the standards of other 
participants in the contract of carriage. All parties to the multimodal system should be 
entitled to contract to carry cargo under one contract governed by one set of laws. The 
uniformity
257
 and predictability that would flow from such a system would encourage 
quicker settlements and more efficient insurance placements.  
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But, we should not forget Peru’s position: “a consensus is almost a utopia,” when it 
expressed concern that the CMI Draft Instrument’s door-to-door provision might be too 
ambitious, thereby precluding its acceptance
258
. 
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E.) THE APPLICABILITY OF STRICT LIABILITY IN MULTIMODAL 
TRANSPORT  
Furthermore, liability problems may emerge when successive carriers become 
involved and here the chaos begins, especially when attempting to attach responsibility for 
misfortunes. This should be analysed in the new multimodal liability framework, where the 
immunities and resources of the Multimodal Transport Operators against the Claimants, 
would be assessed, as well as whether there are any exceptions to the fault-based rule. A 
definition of strict and fault-based liability is relevant at this point and, more specifically, 
their applicability to any future multimodal transport law should be sought and adopted for 
the resolution of liability. Meanwhile, it is important to explore and compare the mandatory 
standard of care the MTOs should have in situations where their liability is fault-based, as 
well as to examine what different States rule on this issue. 
On the question of establishing the basis of liability, an initial choice could be 
between holding the multimodal operator strictly liable
259
 for all loss and damage to goods 
while in its possession (however caused), or liable only for preventable loss and damage 
resulting from lack of care and attention (fault-based liability)
260
. In principle, the liability 
of the carrier, according to both the Hamburg Rules (Art. 5.1) and the Multimodal 
Transport Convention (Art. 16) follows the principle of presumed fault. For example, the 
carrier must disprove negligence on his part. Actually, as expressed in these Conventions, 
he must prove “that he, his servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably be 
required to prevent the occurrence and its consequences” (MTC Art. 16). 
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The former standard of absolute liability provides greater protection for cargo 
owners since the multimodal operator is made to bear all the risks. In practice, this is never 
the case as all rules of strict liability excuse the carrier or operator in a few uncontrollable 
causes of loss such as force majeure (Act of God), shipper’s own faults, and inherent vice 
or defects of the goods themselves (Kindred/Brooks 1997, p. 2). Additionally, the matter 
as to who will bear the costs for such losses, if the MTOs escape them, should be 
discussed. 
In contrast, the standard of fault liability allocates to the operator only those risks 
associated with its own actions, leaving losses that arise from others to fall on the cargo 
owner. Therefore, the operators will be responsible only for the consequences of any 
negligent acts and omissions that are committed by themselves or their employees and 
agents
261
. 
According to the FIATA Model Rules for Freight Forwarding Services, the freight 
forwarder can be liable as carrier. This followed the principles of French Law with a kind 
of del credere - liability for the freight forwarder’s subcontractors (i.e. the acting carriers). 
This would thus determine the extent of the freight forwarder’s liability vis-à-vis his client 
(systeme cameleon) and it represents the so-called “network liability.” 
This system enables the freight forwarders to enjoy a back-to-back position, since 
they can institute recourse actions against their sub-contractors on the same terms as those 
applied in their relation to their own customers. This occurs primarily when the loss or 
damage can be attributed to a particular segment of damage.  
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Still, art. 6.1.1 of the FIATA Model Rules notes that the freight forwarders should 
admit liability more or less on the basis of a presumed fault or neglect, when the loss or 
damage can be attributed to the freight forwarders themselves.  
These rules follow the del credere- liability system of French Law in that the freight 
forwarder as principal for carriage and other services is liable according to the same rules 
that would apply if the customers had entered into a separate contract for such service or 
carriage. Consequently, the mandatory or other rules and conditions relating to the service 
or carriage would apply (Art. 7.3 of the FIATA Model Rules).  
However, it is pointed out that if the freight forwarders performed the service of 
carriage using their own facilities or means of transport, they would, of course, be free to 
subject the contract to their own specific conditions providing these did not depart from any 
compulsorily applicable framework. This could create problems since they would try to 
escape most of their liability. In contrast, if the freight forwarders are not engaged as 
carriers, their liabilities will be based on a duty to exercise due diligence and to take 
reasonable measures in performing the services. 
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F.) THE TRUE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONTRACT 
Constructing container law gets even more complicated when three or more 
separate parties are involved, and where the location and cause of damage must be 
determined which in turns leads to the problem of which is the true construction of the 
contract and how it could be interpreted to determine which participant in the carriage 
might enjoy the protection offered by which contract of carriage.  
On calculating liability, the courts will meet the relevant problem of interpreting the 
true construction of the contract. The United States Court of Appeals used the common 
sense approach in Stolt Tank Containers, Inc. v. Evergreen Marine Corporation, et al, 962 
F.2d 276, 1992 AMC 2015 (2
nd
 Cir. 1992). In this case, Stolt Tank Containers leased ocean 
tank containers to Monsanto International. Monsanto entered a Bill of Lading contract with 
Evergreen to carry the containers filled with chemicals. Some containers were damaged 
while in Evergreen’s custody. The Second Circuit upheld the Evergreen BL limitation 
against Stolt Tank Containers even though Stolt Tank Containers was not privy to the 
Evergreen BL. The Second Circuit upheld the district court’s reasoning that Stolt Tank 
Containers had “at least constructive notice of the liability limitations, and was bound both 
by COGSA and the BL,” since the five containers were to be shipped by sea from a United 
States port to Japan aboard Evergreen vessels. 
Therefore, the true construction of the contract should be considered in the drafting 
of the new law that will govern containerisation and generally what is hidden beneath. For 
example, according to the case above “constructive notice of the liability limitations” 
bound Stolt Tank Containers, which was essential for the calculation of the liability. 
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G.) THE UN MULTIMODAL CONVENTION 
Further work towards an international convention on multimodal transport took 
place within UNCTAD and resulted in the 1980 United Nations Convention on 
International Transport of Goods. This basically followed the principle of a “uniform” 
liability, but with the important exception that it was possible to depart from the monetary 
limitation of the Multimodal Transport Convention whenever the loss or damage could be 
localised to a particular mode of transport where, according to the applicable mandatory 
law, a higher limitation amount would apply (Art. 19)
262
. 
By the parties’ agreement, the limits of liability may be increased (art. 18, par. 6) 
but not reduced, due to the mandatory character of the regulations operating in favour of the 
shipper (art. 3). When loss of or damage to the goods occurred in one particular part of the 
multimodal transport, in respect of which an international convention is applicable or a 
mandatory national law provides a higher limit of liability, the limit of liability would 
follow from the application of art. 18, par. 1-3. Under this latter provision, the limit of 
multimodal transport operator’s liability for such loss or damage is to be determined by 
reference to the provisions of such convention or by mandatory national law (art. 19). 
Here, a modified network system is implied in relation to the area of limitation of 
liability. As already noted above multimodal liability limits apply whenever damage can be 
localised to a particular mode of the transport. This regulation, however, does not cover the 
entire framework
263
 and therefore, it may not be adequate to render fair solutions within 
this field. 
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Furthermore, it should be noted that the facts which led to the negotiation of the 
Multimodal Convention are still applicable today; cargoes continue to move in containers 
on a point-to-point basis, passing through several liability frameworks while on their 
journey from shipper to consignee. While documentation accompanying multimodal 
shipments is not yet uniform, great strides have been made through commercial channels 
and practices, most notably the International Chamber of Commerce and its Uniform Rules 
for a Combined Transport Document. For Coffey, however
264
, the problems that the 
Convention sought to address either were “largely resolved by 1980 or never existed at all”. 
But they did exist indeed
265
. I would have to say that I disagree, especially taking account 
the advent of Containerisation. The problems became more significant as technology 
developed. 
Many of the principles of the Multimodal Convention are applied in practice
266
 
despite the fact that it has not been ratified. Obviously, certain of its values have been 
indirectly accepted in practice. 
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H.) THE MERCOSUR
267
 PARTIAL AGREEMENT FOR THE FACILITATION OF 
MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT OF GOODS 
This Agreement aims to facilitate multimodal transport between member States. 
The member States of Mercosur to which the Agreement is to apply are Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. The Agreement applies to contracts for multimodal transport of 
goods and the provisions of this Agreement will only apply if specific reference to the 
Agreement is made in the multimodal contract. The liability of the Multimodal Transport 
Operator -in respect of loss following delay in delivery, consequential loss or damage other 
than loss or damage to the goods- is limited to an amount not exceeding the equivalent of 
the freight under the multimodal contract (Art. 16).  
Accordingly, under Art. 18, the MTO will lose the right to limit liability (Art. 18) if 
it is proved that the loss, damage or delay resulted from his personal act or omission 
committed with malice (intent to cause such loss or damage or reckless conduct with 
knowledge that such loss, damage or delay would probably result) or gross fault 
(negligence that is marked by conduct that presents an unreasonably high degree of risk to 
others and by a failure to exercise even the slightest standard of care). 
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I.) CONCLUSION 
We need multimodal law broad enough in scope to govern the rights and liabilities 
of all parties involved in multimodal carriage, including inland carriers and their 
contractors. To guarantee predictability and minimize litigation costs, simple provisions on 
liability and limitation (possibly following the form of strict liability framework adopted in 
the CMR Convention), together with jurisdiction, dispute resolution and combined 
transport provisions need to be adopted. Until then, the industry can continue to expect ad 
hoc decisions by the courts, such as the Kirby decision, to shape the rules for multimodal 
transport. 
Particularly, in view of the defences available to the carrier according to the rules 
for carriage of goods by sea (error in the navigation and management of the vessel as well 
as fire) considerable difficulties are encountered when efforts are made to establish a 
“uniform” liability for the multimodal transport operator (Faber 1997, p. 27).  
Finally, only time will tell what fate the most recent “Rotterdam Rules” will have.
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CONCLUSION 
 263 
The evolution of containerisation has affected the liability of the carriers and it is to 
question whether we need new law. On replying it, an issue of major gravity is to be 
debated further, such as whether drafting a new legal regime to govern multimodal 
transport is feasible or not. As shown, containerisation brought a revolution in international 
trade but there are still developments to take place in the future. The container may be 
defined as the “metal package” one day meanwhile debate may occur on what the “metal 
package” limitation would be. 
Custom comes forth to complete the current legislation (Chapter III). Therefore, we 
need a legal regime that will govern on deck cargo issues. To pure logic, undeclared deck 
cargo should not constitute an issue anymore, since marine technology brought a change in 
the maritime legal world concerning undeclared deck cargo on board of containerships. It is 
to be debated further in which part of the modern containerships cargo is to be stowed. 
Accordingly, the container is an essential modern metal portable accessory of the ship but 
not a hold. 
Additionally, the future legal regime will read as to how and under what type of 
containers the goods will be transported. If the cargo acquires special treatment, it needs to 
be stated so, early in advance. Particularly, the multimodal law that might be developed 
should classify goods, temperatures and type of containers in order to govern adequately 
without gaps containerisation and multimodal transportation.  
Moreover, it is to be researched whether the “Himalaya” clause is to be extended to 
the stevedores meddling with containerisation and what the role of the modern stevedores 
in the future is meant to be. Similarly, the issue with INCOTERMS is debated as such. We 
need new law, indeed. But, do we need new INCOTERMS, as well? 
 264 
Achieving legal uniformity is the result of the future new container law but certain 
factors might hinder it. The current method of dealing with container legal cases under the 
multimodal liability systems is solving partially the problems. 
On the other hand, it is the most realistic way nowadays of dealing with them. 
Global advances will be taking place in multimodal transportation and the technological 
part of it, but legally we are pacing slowly. It is to be debated, whether the “pyramid 
method” as discussed below can be a way to achieving uniformity under the ideal future 
container legal regime that will be shaped to conquer all the current ones, will be under a 
mandatory scope and will put an end to the multimodal mayhem. 
Additionally, the most recent “Rotterdam Rules,” an UNCITRAL convention, 
(Baughen 2009, p. 151) does not adequately cover the field of multimodal transport. A 
more appropriate solution would be an international instrument that involves all legs 
equally and at an unlimited level to satisfy multimodal needs. 
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A. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTAINER TRANSPORT 
a. Containerisation has Limits  
Although cheap shipping, fuelled by containerisation is remarking the world, and 
the shipping container made the world smaller and the world economy bigger
268
, still, the 
Post-Panamax Containerships are “striving” to cross the Panama Canal, since these ships 
cannot fit anymore there. Therefore, Containerisation has limits in all the aspects of it. 
Initially, the Panama Canal problem and, secondly, the only document that may render 
legal temporary solutions in relevant cases, which currently exists is the Multimodal 
Transport Document (MTD) which entails the Multimodal Transport Rules. Therefore, our 
“Current Limited Legislation” status in this field indicates the limits of Containerisation 
and it is to be debated in the future how we will shape the multimodal law. 
Lately, the Panama Canal is asking funds from Europe to expand its width and it is 
to wonder whether the fiscal life of Panama Canal will ever be the same again.  
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b. The Social Implications of Containerisation: Labour Problems.  
Developing countries confront problems on containerisation like lack of money and 
unsuitable infrastructure. Many workers will be laid off their jobs, resulting in many serious 
implications. It remains an important factor the effect of the invalidation of Container Rules 
on future negotiations involving automation and intermodalism, not only between maritime 
labor and management, but in other industries as well
269
.  
Computerisation in modern maritime trade has developed globally and rapidly. The 
more applicable it is, the more likely it is for marine workers to lose their jobs. The 
problem is more intense particular in the developed countries in contradiction with the 
Developing States.  
Therefore, containerisation and employment law cannot be symbiotic. 
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c. The Affect of Globalisation in Modern Shipping 
 
Experience elsewhere suggests that it might be possible to make improvements, but 
there is no suitable model of terminal performance that can be reliably applied to individual 
sites. It was put to us that even with productivity improvements the need for new capacity 
is delayed rather than dismissed altogether. Given the lead times between any decisions to 
approve and proceed with a project, completion of it, and even with productivity 
improvements and lower trans-shipment, such decisions are likely to have to be made by 
ports and others on future capacity, in the very near future. 
Furthermore, the AP Moller-Maersk Group’s share of the total global cellular fleet 
still remains at just over 13%, reflecting little change since 2000 -a truly remarkable 
achievement by any standards. Its executives will argue that when you get to the top, you 
are an easier target to be shot at, and far more cargo is required to remain there in real 
terms
270
. The global alliances whose membership includes seven of the top ten carriers 
collectively control an estimated 39% of the world’s static capacity and 66% of the static 
capacity controlled by the top twenty carriers. If the comparatively higher service 
frequency offered by the global alliances on the world’s arterial routes is factored in, it is 
likely that the global alliances control a significantly greater proportion of total capacity for 
both the world and the top twenty.  
Ocean carriers seek to control marine container terminal operations for strategic, 
economic and operational reasons
271
. 
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The size of international trade market is constantly increasing at a time when both 
modern technology and transport systems are making it ever easier to move goods around 
the world. Banks have recognised this fact and are prepared to invest money into emerging 
markets, particularly, where sellers of goods are more likely to require financial assistance 
with start up costs, growing, purchasing and processing or mining expenses
272
.  
It should be possible for a universally accepted document of title to be developed 
(which in time could become computerised) that would provide the banks with sufficient 
security whilst the goods are store and thereby allow trade in emerging markets to develop. 
However, such a system would seem to be some way away and is likely to require a great 
amount of international co-operation to achieve. Only time will tell whether this idea 
becomes a reality. In the meantime, documenting transactions requires care and attention. 
Furthermore, liberalisation and technological progress have steadily altered the way 
in which international production is being undertaken. At first, multinational companies 
adopted simple integration strategies where they set up foreign affiliates producing, 
typically with technology obtained from the parent company, the same standardised 
commodities that previously had been subject to cross-border trade (Hoogvelt A 1997, p. 
122). 
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B. REMARKS 
a. Filling the “Bandwidths”  
Checking former or existing law and attempting to correct mistakes or fill gaps is 
probably one of the best actions one could take to solve definitely not all, but some of these 
huge problems. Certainly a question might be raised here of how we are supposed to re-
examine; definitely by empirical research. By revising legislation, it seems that we are 
almost getting there but we never reach our goal; the legal regime which promotes 
uniformity. After thorough empirical research, we should solve as better as possible the 
problems maritime lawyers and their customers meet in practice and law or better in the 
practice of law for containerisation, particularly when damage cannot be located. It must be 
defined, finally, which of all these laws is the most appropriate for a specific international 
container case and what our answer would be to our clients. An adequately shaped 
multimodal legal regime should govern whether my advice will have “nationality.” 
Moreover, what “nationality” that advice would be in a common insoluble multimodal case. 
Furthermore, it would be necessary to distinguish between, for instance, vessel-
operating MTOs (VO-MTOs) and non-vessel MTOs (NVO-MTOs). Freight forwarders 
would fall into the latter category, but this would not make any difference with respect to 
their liability (Faber 1997, p. 28). According to Japanese law ((Kozuka Souichiro, quoted 
by Pampouki (2000, p. 13) freight forwarders are considered as a type of multimodal 
transport operator and it may be wise, liability is also attributed to them. This constitutes an 
additional reason for synchronizing the liability of the MTO with the liability which applies 
to the maritime carrier as such, since otherwise the NVO-MTO would have to assume a 
more extended liability than would apply to a maritime carrier (Faber 1997, p. 29).  
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If, for instance, the defence of error in navigation and management of the ship was 
available to the maritime carrier in case of collisions and stranding, and the NVO-MTO 
lacked the possibility of invoking that defence against his customer, then the liability would 
ultimately have to be against his customer, then the liability would ultimately have to be 
born by the MTO without any possibility of recourse against the party who actually caused 
the loss or damage (Faber 1997, p. 28).  
Therefore, the mere conversion of a maritime carrier into an MTO seems 
insufficient to deprive the carrier of the defences which he would have had if he had 
concluded a contract for an ordinary port-to-port shipment. For this reason, any switch from 
the traditional “network” liability system to the “uniform” liability system depends upon 
whether or not the Hamburg Rules successfully replace the traditional maritime liability 
system under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules. 
It should be born in mind that the transport industry has been considerably re-
organised in latter years. Attention is not focused to the same extent on the ownership of 
the means of conveyance. Quite often ships are not owned by the operators at all. They can 
be used by shipping lines under various chartering and leasing arrangements or else by a 
joint organisation which charters the ships from its partners in the joint venture. From a 
legal view-point, when deciding carrier status and carrier liability, one should therefore 
focus on the question whether or not the enterprise actually operates the respective means 
of conveyance. But, it should be discussed, what is meant by “operation” for the purpose of 
distinguishing between a performing and a contracting carrier if the controlling 
circumstance is no longer ownership (Faber 1997, p. 29).  
But, gaps are not the only ones above defined, as the biggest one is the lack of 
adequate multimodal legal system. 
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b. What We actually Need;   
 The Future of Multimodal/ Intermodal/ Combined Transport Liability Rule 
No international multimodal convention is shaped for Containerisation. Therefore, 
we should be specific on what we actually need, either an international convention to solve 
multimodality matters or something more practical. That may be defined as either the 
domestic law of destination delivery where the damage was actually discovered or the 
transhipment port. It should also be considered whether that international convention would 
have a mandatory scope or it would be the same as the situation with the UNCTAD/ICC 
Multimodal Transport Rules 1992, taking also consideration the fact that certain countries 
have not legislation at all and some states not even developed containerisation in their 
maritime trade but they are trying to develop their imports (for example, the Less 
Developed Countries -LDCs).  
It is important to define what we need, when replying the question whether we need 
new law. Perhaps, we would not need this if private contracts resolved this ambiguity, but 
this may not be currently valid. Besides, inside a contract, a breach can always take place 
and if we rely upon the private contracts only, without the co-existence of an appropriate 
legal regime, certainly we would not get an adequate result upon our matters. 
Taking into account, all this tangled web of laws and exploring for innovations, in 
my view, international multimodal law should be shaped and ratified unanimously, not 
having to be incorporated in the contract as the situation with the UNCTAD/ICC Rules 
1992. It seems we have nothing at the end, since the latter, even though incorporated to the 
contract, cannot work when there is a mandatory law applied; thence, the need of preparing 
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a multimodal legal instrument under an international mandatory scope which would reach 
uniformity
273
.  
In this project, the importance and emergency of the settlement of law in this 
undertaking is highlighted, particularly with the development of technology meanwhile the 
economic impact of it and the labour problems it can create. A solution might be to extend 
the domestic rules in order to render solutions to the international commercial forum. It 
may be possible to achieve uniformity and surely that is our main desire.  
An extension of the Hague/Visby Rules to govern multimodal transport 
internationally might be the answer to this problem, but that means we unanimously adopt 
them, since we are talking about multimodalism, which entails a multitask to be performed 
universally. At this point exactly is where the need of uniformity “sparkles”, because it is 
not only one country we are talking about where the maritime trade is flowing by 
implementing containerisation. Actually, it is more than one country involved and that 
acquires a mandatory uniform multimodal legal regime to govern and render fair solutions 
to any arising problems within this undertaking wherever in the universe. Moreover, the 
ideal multimodal legal regime would adequately rule upon the defences and resources of 
the Multimodal Transport Operators (MTOs) against the Claimants, which are significant. 
But, unfortunately, uniformity is only partial. 
It should be taken into account what the parties agreed to and as evidenced in the 
bill of lading. For example, a COGSA package should be the result of some amount of 
preparation to facilitate transport and handling but a container can also be considered as a 
metal package, either there is a clear agreement to that effect or not.  
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Unless otherwise agreed, when goods are placed in containers without being 
described as separately packed, they would be regarded as goods not shipped in packages. 
Finally, when a bill of lading is ambiguous, then, in view of the widely accepted 
understanding that the original purpose of the limitation was to protect shippers against 
carriers, the ambiguity would be resolved against the carrier.  
Therefore, we need multimodal law that will govern the package problem 
adequately. The question whether massive metal shipping containers can be considered 
packages for purposes of the $500 limitation of liability under section 1304(5) has been the 
subject of judicial and scholarly debate for the past thirty years. A “metal package” 
approach may solve problems as such. 
Moreover, we need new law that will govern the deck cargo on containerships. 
While looking on the facts in maritime practice in containerisation, one day all containers 
will be placed on deck by custom which will conquer and may, might become law or even 
by just an oral consent of the parties themselves or by something that will not even be 
spoken as a term, since this is the way that the modern ships are being constructed, “single-
platformed.” This will take place and become reality, unless we hinder technology from 
manufacturing these modern ships. 
Finally, we need new law that will govern fairly and entail both these issues; the 
package problem and the deck cargo on containerships. Perhaps, having one “singular” 
regime to include all these major and minor issues under itself might be a unique idea. 
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i) BIFA & FIATA 
BIFA has made a major contribution to standardising the terms of multimodal 
carriage by drafting the Standard Trading Conditions for use by its members. These set out 
the responsibilities and liabilities of the Company (defined as “a BIFA member trading 
under these Conditions”) and the Customer (defined as “any person at whose request or on 
whose behalf the Company undertakes any business or provides advice, information or 
services”) who warrants that he is either the “Owner or the authorized Agent of the 
Owner.” BIFA has also endorsed the FIATA Bill which incorporates the UNCTAD/ICC 
Rules. So, we are again in a similar situation, since the Conditions need to be incorporated 
into the contract, and they are not mandatory. Express incorporation is the ideal method, 
but they may be incorporated impliedly, or otherwise.  
Not having a mandatory scope does not necessarily provide for solutions to the 
problems arising
274
.   
A legal issue likely to arise is whether a negotiable multimodal bill of lading is 
recognised as such -i.e. as a document of title- in English law. Common law recognises 
only a shipped bill of lading as a document of title. However, a document of title may be 
created by mercantile custom at common law. It would therefore be possible for a 
multimodal bill of lading to be recognised as a document of title through a customary use in 
the trade. 
The FIATA Bill and the UNCTAD/ICC Rules work within the parameters of a 
network framework in that there are different provisions in respect of extent of liability: i.e. 
whether or not the carriage involves a sea or inland waterways segment. This issue of kind 
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of mode also affects the maximum amount of carrier liability. And all this is subject to the 
proviso that mandatory laws, be they domestic or international convention, do not enter into 
the picture.  
Standard trade conditions are also accepted by professional associations in Belgium, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK
275
.  
However, both FIATA Bill and BIFA have brought some temporary harmonisation 
and certainty in the area of multimodal transport, but a mandatory scope is what we need. 
Unluckily, the Multimodal Convention 1980 is unlikely to be ratified by the United 
Kingdom, unless it decides to ratify the Hamburg Rules. If the Multimodal Convention 
came in force, it would create a regime of minimum liability which cannot be derogated 
from unless of benefit of cargo interests. 
But, currently there are no plans to ratify the Hamburg Rules but the United 
Kingdom might be persuaded to do so if countries with shipping interests or E.U. Member 
States were to ratify it. The Multimodal Convention is designed to introduce a uniform 
liability scheme. The liability of the multimodal transport operator is therefore not 
dependent on establishing on which mode of transport the loss or damage occurred. 
It adopts a simple scheme: the MTO is responsible for loss, damage or delay in 
delivery while the goods are in his control- that is, from the time he takes them in his 
charge to the time of delivery, and, it assumes fault based liability. And, exactly this is what 
we mean by “unification.” The above simplicity in respect of liability does not mean that 
the Multimodal Convention is the perfect solution to a complex situation. It has its fair 
share of problems, some of which are highlighted here. 
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It adopts a complex network scheme for compensation by drawing a distinction 
between multimodal transport involving a sea trajectory and multimodal transport not 
involving a sea trajectory. So, where there is sea carriage liability the amount is limited to 
920 SDRs per package or other shipping unit or 2.75 SDRs per kilogram. In the absence of 
a sea leg, liability is set at the maximum of 8.33 SDRs per kilogram of gross weight of 
goods lost or damaged.  
However, where loss or damage occurs on a mode of transport where application of 
a mandatory national law, or international convention would provide a higher limits of 
liability than that set in Art. 18 of the Multimodal Convention, the MTOs liability amount 
will be calculated by reference in the international convention or mandatory national law.  
The “limited network system” of compensation means that the issue of where the 
damage or loss occurred is still pertinent, if not for the basis of liability, for calculation of 
liability amounts. The Multimodal Convention 1980 also innocently assumes that transport 
documents clearly state whether the freight forwarder acts in the capacity of principal to 
bring him within the definition of multimodal transport operator provided in Art. 1(2). This 
is likely to produce expensive and time-consuming litigation to ascertain the forwarder’s 
capacity. 
But, what is more surprising for the Multimodal Convention itself is that it lacks a 
precise definition of international multimodal transport. Art. 1(1) defines that: “…the 
carriage of goods by at least two different modes of transport on the basis of a multimodal 
transport contract from a place in one country at which the goods are taken in charge by the 
multimodal transport contract from a place in one country at which the goods are taken in 
charge by the multimodal transport operator to a place designated for delivery situated in a 
different country. The operations of pick up and delivery of goods carried out in the 
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performance of a unimodal transport contract, as defined in such contract, shall not be 
considered as international multimodal transport.”  
No attempt has been made to define mode of transport. “Is mode of transport 
restricted to the vehicle (e.g. train, ship), the medium (e.g. sea, road) or does it include 
both? The definition also excludes operations of pick-up and delivery of goods in the 
performance of a unimodal transport; it does not specify the acceptable extent of these 
operations. For instance, should a road leg/ sea leg/ road leg operation be regarded as 
multimodal carriage, or are the road legs simply operations of pick-up and delivery? Will 
the issue be decided by looking at how the road legs are described in the documents, or will 
factors such as the time taken to complete the different legs and calculation of charges be 
used to ascertain whether the particular carriage contract is a unimodal transport contract or 
not
276?” 
Still, regardless of these ambiguities, the Multimodal Convention if adopted will 
herald a new era of predictability inside this uncertainty. To some extent this has been 
achieved by the standard terms devised by the freight associations for use by their 
members. This may arguably be true of the United Kingdom and other Member States of 
the European Community, such as Germany and the Netherlands, but the same is not true 
of the developing countries that are playing an increasingly important role in the global 
marketplace.  
Against this drawback, the Multimodal Convention introduces a regime which will 
protect the cargo interests by giving a minimum level of legal protection.  
It is high time the United Kingdom re-examines both the Hamburg Rules 1978 and 
the Multimodal Convention 1980. Apathy or hostility on its part may prove, in the long run, 
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detrimental in economic terms. It must be remembered that any international convention is 
the product of compromise between different national interests and legal systems. 
Ambiguities in international conventions resolve themselves over time through 
jurisprudence and amendments. The Hague Rules and the Warsaw Convention are fine 
illustrations. 
 However, it is also high time for the USA to re-examine the Hague/Visby Rules and 
the SDR Protocol. 
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ii) The CMI Draft Instrument in Transport Law  
The liability Committee (IUMI) supports the work of CMI. The CMI may be the 
right forum to discuss and possibly achieve harmonization in the law that governs the 
carriage of goods by sea. But, the CMI project will only be promising if the views of the 
interested commercial parties will be observed by the ISC. In discussions, at governmental 
level these commercial aspects are frequently neglected and legal arguments prevail. This 
for example has happened during the discussions on the Hamburg Rules. When economic 
aspects are neglected there is no guarantee that the new legal instrument will find the 
necessary support. In such a case, the new legal instrument will only lead to further 
proliferation of law.  
The CMI Draft Instrument on Transport Law and its successor “The Rotterdam 
Rules” should apply to all contracts of carriage, including those concluded electronically. 
To reach this goal, the Instrument must be medium neutral as well as technology neutral. 
Fortunately or unfortunately, the Draft Instrument does not lay down rules for uniform and 
general acceptance over the burden of proof, which would then be subject to the national 
law in force in the place of jurisdiction, so leading to diverse and probably frustrating 
results.  
The dividing line of application between the Draft Instrument and the mandatory 
Conventions cannot be left to such a complex and relative matter as is the burden of 
proving the location of the loss or damage to the goods, because then the exposure of risks 
will continue to be far from predictable (Alcantara 2002, p. 405). Therefore, the solution 
suggested in the CMI may be interesting, but not efficient to eliminate legal uncertainty. As 
it is significant to regulate a carriage by sea from door-to-door the exercise is reasonable 
and probably unbeatable. 
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However, through its variations, opting outs and limitations on both the uniform and 
network liability principles, the Draft Instrument does not embrace multimodal transport 
through any combined modes but by sea-carriage and others only, so such scope is not 
suitable to a project of uniformity in the international legislation on multimodal 
transportation (Alcantara 2002, p. 405). The area of maritime carriage may well need to be 
updated so as to contemplate and take up the needs of trade for door-to-door arrangements. 
To that effect and extent the CMI Draft Instrument is valid and meritorious. 
Whether it will help to procure international uniformity for multimodal transport law, given 
the existing lack of a uniform liability regime in force internationally is another matter, 
which should be discussed
277
. 
It should be added that the recent draft Convention, known as the “Rotterdam 
Rules” is quite ambitious in that it is not confined to the familiar territory of the sea 
carrier’s liability for cargo. But, it raises difficult issues when hypothetical road contracts 
for the pre-maritime leg of the carriage would, in many cases, fall outside the ambit of the 
Convention (Baughen 2009, p. 161). Therefore, it is difficult to achieve uniformity at this 
point. 
Whether the new convention (“The Rotterdam Rules”) will avoid the fate of the 
Hamburg Rules remains to be seen (Baughen 2009, p. 151) and it is to be seen whether Art. 
2 of “the Rotterdam Rules” will have its merit in the future, since uniformity is very 
difficult to be accomplished. 
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iii) The Pyramid Method 
 Whilst the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules contain no provisions on jurisdiction and 
arbitration, provisions are contained in articles 21 and 22 of the Hamburg Rules. The CMR 
contains provisions on jurisdiction and arbitration in art. 31 and 33, but the Budapest 
Convention on the Contract for Carriage of Goods in Inland Navigation 2000 contains no 
such provisions
278
. 
 Under a fault-based regime, such as found in the Hague/Hague-Visby and 
Hamburg Rules, the carrier whether or not fault is presumed, is generally liable if negligent, 
although certain regimes provide limited defences even in the event of negligence. Such 
regimes are intended to reflect the particular risks associated with the particular mode of 
transport e.g. exclusion of navigational fault under the Hague/ Hague-Visby Rules. Were a 
strict liability regime to be adopted, the carrier’s defences in theory would be limited to 
establishing that the loss or damage was caused by an act wholly beyond the control of the 
carrier, such as an act of God or that of a third party etc. Under a strict liability regime, the 
level of property insurance cover required by the shipper would inevitably be less than that 
required under a fault based system and should therefore cost less. 
 The Hamburg Rules, which provide an express rule of limitation in the case of 
delay (Article 6(1)(b)), are not accepted internationally while in some countries the Hague 
Rules are adopted and others opt for the Hague-Visby Rules. Still this does not cover the 
current needs of trade. That is why Containerisation and the evolution of the new 
technology in container-ships has affected the frameworks directly or indirectly for the 
limitation of the liability of the carriers and since the current frameworks are not adequate 
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to cover problems as such, the thought of creating a new legal framework might be urgent 
at this point. We need new law that will be accepted internationally, it will not bisect the 
judgements in courts, and it will be unified. 
 However, as the carrier would be exposed to greater liability than under a fault 
based system, indemnity cover would be likely to cost more and this would be more passed 
on to the goods owner by way of an increase in freight rate. Furthermore, payments and 
associated administrative and legal costs arising from incidents occurring during the 
adventure e.g. GA and salvage would continue to be funded at first instance by cargo 
interests (unless provision is made in the contract of carriage) albeit that ultimately such 
costs may be recovered from the carrier. 
 Although, fewer claims are likely to be disputed by the carrier under a strict rather 
than a fault based regime, with an associated reduction in administrative and legal costs, 
disputes would still arise. However, with either system both the prudent goods owner and 
the prudent carrier will need to affect appropriate property and indemnity cover. It is 
therefore unlikely that by adopting the one liability system rather than the other, there 
would be an overall saving on the total costs of the adventure. It is more likely that the shift 
in allocation of risk between the parties and their respective insurers would merely be 
accompanied by a re-stribution between them, of the costs of the adventure. 
 Currently, most MTOs provide a combined transport service, while shipowners, 
NVOCCs or freight forwarders operate under contracts providing for network liability. 
However, in response to commercial pressure, from powerful volume shippers who wish to 
utilise systems which they consider straightforward and advantageous from a liability 
perspective, a number of MTOs have agreed contracts which provide for uniform liability 
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and this is what we acquire. These MTOs require special cover to cater for liabilities, which 
exceed those, permitted by standard P&I cover.  
 In the case of approved multimodal contracts the Clubs are in effect, extending 
cover to meet what are strictly non-marine risks e.g. loss or damage during road carriage. 
The Clubs will generally provide cover to meet the commercial needs of their members. 
 It is likely therefore that if the shipping community wished to accept higher levels 
of liability, the Club system could be amended in order to accommodate them. However, as 
pointed out above, a shift in the allocation of risk between the parties to a contract 
of carriage is unlikely of itself to reduce the overall costs of the adventure. Amending the 
regimes that presently govern the carriage of goods is worthwhile if the goal of greater 
international uniformity can be achieved, with a consequent benefit to all involved in the 
carriage of goods by sea and land. 
Consequently, amending the regimes that presently govern the carriage of goods is 
worthwhile if the goal of greater international uniformity can be achieved, with a 
consequent benefit to all involved in the carriage of goods by sea and land. But, we need to 
put forward the “Pyramid Method.” The current tried and tested practices should not be 
lightly abandoned. In a paper approved by the Maritime Transport Committee of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the comment was made “the 
greatest opportunity for improvement does not necessarily lie in the creation of a radical, 
new regime, but rather to identify those elements (probably the vast majority) on which 
there is agreement and use these elements as the basis for future work.” Therefore, taking 
as a basis the Hague or Hague/Visby Rules upon it, we can build the ideal multimodal legal 
regime and not deprive containerisation of its law. 
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It is true that under the multimodal muddle, three options may arise: 
a) Either we leave the problem as it is, 
b) We go for the middle ground solution and we change something into an extent and 
like that we end up with the Multimodal legal regime, 
c) We erase all the existing conventions from the map and start from the very 
beginning to create a new legal regime. 
In my opinion, we should definitely do something about this modern problem 
nowadays. The preferable solution is (b), which is more realistic, since solution (c) might 
be a “utopia.” It is vital that the future Multimodal Law will not give way to other 
mandatory international Conventions, but that will be mandatory and “independent.” Since 
these various legal frameworks are causing confusion, it is better that we look ahead and 
shape a Multimodal Law that can stand on its own and which will govern multimodalism. 
For example, Hague/Visby Rules do not read either about deck cargo or delay. The 
recent “Rotterdam Rules” do. At this point, perhaps, we should select one of these plenty 
legal regimes as a base and modify them in a manner, which will be compatible with the 
needs of modern international multimodal transport. Superficially, it looks as if the CMI 
Draft is a combination of the Hamburg Rules and the Hague/Visby Rules. Still, though, it 
lacks the ultimate sense of modern international multimodal transport, since, for instance, 
the USA have not adopted neither the Hague/Visby Rules, nor the SDR Protocol. It would 
be advantageous if the USA adopted them. This may well be a forward step towards 
uniformity. When and if this will take place is unknown, since it is a matter of balancing 
the interests of the opposite parties. 
Having a variety of laws might be beneficial in maritime trade, since there is a 
variety of cases and contracts as well, which may be provided via the network system. But, 
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the uniform approach which stands more rational may render more clarity. And, actually 
clarity is what we need for such a multi-task. An appropriate legal instrument would be the 
one that embraces multimodal transport through any combined modes, apart from just sea-
carriage. Such scope is suitable to a project of uniformity in the international legislation on 
multimodal transportation. 
Exactly, we need to synchronise the liabilities in order to achieve uniformity but it 
is to wonder how much feasible this is. We need a mandatory universal multimodal legal 
framework that will cover fairly all legs and all contracts and might rule as such; “This 
Convention applies exclusively to all multimodal contracts of carriage and only when 
goods are carried by containers.” Certainly, my successor who will comment further on this 
should reply to my pending query how many SDRs the “metal” package limitation would 
be, was my “metal” package theory adopted. 
Besides, perfection is achieved, not when there is nothing more to add, but when 
there is nothing left to take away
279
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